The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth by Gamage, David
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2015
The Case for Taxing (All of ) Labor Income,
Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth
David Gamage
Indiana University Maurer School of La, dgamage@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gamage, David, "The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth" (2015). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. 2414.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2414
The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor
Income, Consumption, Capital
Income, and Wealth
DAVID GAMAGE*
For these reasons, we believe that consideration of eva-
sion, avoidance, and administration is essential to the posi-
tive and normative analysis of taxation. . . . Extreme
assumptions about the feasibility of tax instruments are ana-
lytically convenient, but incorrect.... The conceptually pure
tax base-be it the flow of income, wealth, sales revenue, or
something else-cannot be perfectly measured, and the tax
authority is constrained to rely on some correlate of the
concept.
Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhakil
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a tension in the economics-oriented literature on taxation.
On the one hand, the theoretical literature largely focuses on how
taxes can be designed so as to minimize distortions related to labor
supply and savings behaviors. 2 Yet, on the other hand, the empirical
* Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. I have
received invaluable help from too many individuals to name since I began working on this
project. I especially owe thanks to Alan Auerbach, Joseph Bankman, Eric Biber, Tom
Brennan, Neil Buchanan, John Brooks, Charlotte Crane, Lilian Faulhaber, Brian Galle,
Mark Gergen, Jacob Goldin, Daniel Halperin, David Hasen, Andrew Hayashi, David
Herzig, David Kamin, Mitchell Kane, Louis Kaplow, Sarah Lawsky, Leandra Lederman,
Katerina Linos, Jack McNulty, Susan Morse, Shu-yi Oei, Jason Oh, Leigh Osofsky,
Miranda Perry-Fleischer, Shruti Rana, Alex Raskolnikov, Adam Rosenzweig, Andrea
Roth, Emmanuel Saez, Emily Satterthwaite, Deborah Schenk, Darien Shanske, Daniel
Shaviro, Steven Shay, Joel Slemrod, Kirk Stark, Karen Tani, Ethan Yale, Lawrence
Zelenak, and the editorial staff of the Tax Law Review.
1 Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3
Handbook of Public Economics 1423, 1427, 1454-57 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 2002).
2 Of course, there is also a sizable economics-oriented literature on tax evasion, avoid-
ance, administration, and related considerations. For a review of some of that literature,
see id. But the economics-oriented literature studying which major forms of taxation gov-
ernments should employ has primarily emphasized labor-to-leisure and saving-to-spending
distortions (along with related distortions involving certain other aspects of investment
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literature does not support the claim that either labor-to-leisure or
saving-to-spending distortions are of primary importance for many
real world tax policy questions.3 Moreover, integrating the empirical
economics literature with the legal literature on tax planning suggests
that, for many important tax policy problems, the primary efficiency
costs of taxation may well arise from a variety of more idiosyncratic
and context-dependent distortions and from administrative and com-
pliance costs, rather than from labor-to-leisure or saving-to-spending
responses.4
At the very least, then, there is strong reason to infer that taxation
involves important efficiency costs other than labor-to-leisure and sav-
ing-to-spending distortions. This empirical inference is in some ten-
sion with the theoretical literature's emphasis on these two forms of
distortions.
choices that are less contingent on the details of how tax systems are implemented, such as
the locational choice of investment). See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-05-
1009SP, Reform Debate: Background, Criteria & Questions 41 (2005), available at http:I/
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05lOO9sp.pdf ("Three choices commonly discussed are the choice
between work and leisure, the choice between consumption and saving, and the choice
between domestic and foreign investment."); Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and
Public Economics 317 (2008) (stating that incentive concerns "involving labor effort" are
"the focus of most optimal tax analysis"); Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz,
The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,
50 J. Econ. Literature 3, 3 (2012) ("Indeed, until recently, the labor supply elasticity was
the closest thing that public finance economics had to a central parameter."); Joel Slemrod,
The Consequences of Taxation, Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, July 2006, at 73, 73 ("[T]raditionally,
economists have focused on the behavioral responses of labor supply, saving, and invest-
ment .. "); see also Section II.B. & Part III.
3 I support and explain this in Subsections II.B.1 and III.B.1; see Jane G. Gravelle &
Donald J. Marples, Cong. Research Service, R42111, Tax Rates and Economic Growth, at
Summary (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42111.pdf ("A review of
statistical evidence suggests that both labor supply and savings and investment are rela-
tively insensitive to tax rates."); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency,
Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111 Yale L.J. 1391, 1398 (2002) (reviewing Joel B.
Slemrod, Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich (2000))
("Most of the evidence for behavioral responses in the book relates to tax avoidance strat-
egies (e.g., charitable giving techniques, shifting income from corporations to individuals,
and the timing of receipts), rather than to real activities (labor and saving decisions).");
Costas Meghir & David Phillips, Labour Supply and Taxes, in Dimensions of Tax Design:
The Mirrlees Review 202, 252 (James Mirrlees, Stuart Adam, Timothy Besley, Richard
Blundell, Stephen Bond, Robert Chote, Malcolm Gammie, Paul Johnson, Gareth Myles &
James Poterba eds., 2010) [hereinafter Mirrlees Review] ("For highly educated individuals
the sensitivity of both hours of work and participation to work incentives are almost
zero."); Saez et al., note 2, at 4, 42 (concluding that "[a]lthough evidence of a substantial
compensated labor supply elasticity has been hard to find, evidence that taxpayers respond
to tax system changes more generally has decidedly not been hard to find .. ", and also
concluding that "while there is compelling U.S. evidence of strong behavioral responses to
taxation at the upper end of the distribution" that these responses consist entirely of "tim-
ing and avoidance" transactions, and that "[i]n contrast, there is no compelling evidence to
date of real economic responses to tax rates . .
4 See Section II.B; Part III.
THE CASE FOR TAXING
How should tax legal scholarship react to this tension? What les-
sons should policymakers draw from the theoretical literature in light
of this tension? More generally, accounting for this tension, how
might tax systems be reformed so as to raise revenues or "promote
distributional equity" 5 with lower efficiency costs?
As a starting point for pondering these questions, it should be un-
derstood that taxation is largely the art of measurement. Essentially
all forms of taxation are built around measuring some activities or
characteristics of taxpayers and then setting tax liabilities based on
these measurements. Furthermore, when it comes to real world tax
policy, all plausible forms of tax measurement are imperfect-and im-
perfect in numerous different ways. A major reason for this is that
taxpayers respond to taxation through a variety of techniques for al-
tering their activities and adjusting or concealing their characteristics
so as to game measurements in order to pay less tax. In other words,
because taxpayers actively seek to pay less tax, anything measured by
a tax system will likely be altered in response to the specifics of the tax
measurement.
This Article's thesis is in a sense rather simple: Because all plausi-
ble forms of tax measurement are imperfect, it often will be better for
governments to utilize multiple forms of tax measurement. Put meta-
phorically: If every available basket is full of holes, then we might
want to collect our eggs with more than one layer of basket.
Yet there is a caveat to this maxim. There perhaps would not be
any advantages to using multiple layers of baskets if all of the availa-
ble baskets had the exact same holes. To continue the metaphor, imag-
ine that one basket is placed inside another.6 If all of the holes in the
first basket were perfectly replicated by the second basket, then there
might not be any advantages to nesting the baskets. If the holes in the
two baskets perfectly overlap, then any egg falling through a hole in
the inside basket would also fall through a hole in the outside basket.
Only to the extent that the holes in the baskets do not perfectly over-
5 As discussed in David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Jus-
tice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 Tax L. Rev.
1 (2014), I purposefully use the phrase "promote distributional equity" (and other, similar
terms, all of which I use synonymously), because I believe that the term "redistribution"
has misleading connotations as the term is commonly used in the academic literature. By
using terms like "promoting distributional equity," I mean to refer to government attempts
to advance goals related to distributive justice, in accordance with the government's social
welfare function.
6 I thank Louis Kaplow and Brian Galle for helping me to devise this metaphor. It may
be worth noting that Louis Kaplow's preferred version of this metaphor is based on buck-
ets and water, rather than baskets and eggs, as the metaphor was originally inspired by
Okun's leaky bucket. See Joel Slemrod, Fixing the Leak in Okun's Bucket: Optimal Tax
Progressivity When Avoidance Can Be Controlled, 55 J. Pub. Econ. 41, 41-42 (1994).
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lap, then, are there likely to be advantages to nesting multiple layers
of baskets.
Correspondingly, for purposes of tax-system design, when deciding
whether to make use of multiple tax measurements, it is crucial to
assess whether the imperfections in the available measurements over-
lap or are distinct. To the extent that different forms of taxation have
nonoverlapping imperfections, there may be powerful advantages to
utilizing multiple forms of taxation. The reason for this follows from
economic theorems that I previously referred to as the "tax-smoothing
principle. ' '7 Under assumptions that (in prior work) I argued reasona-
bly track real world tax environments,8 and as I elaborate further be-
low, the tax-smoothing principle implies that utilizing multiple forms
of taxation generally should reduce overall distortionary costs to the
extent that the different forms of taxation have nonoverlapping
imperfections.
Building on that analysis from my prior work, this Article evaluates
some standard proposals for taxing labor income, consumption, capi-
tal income, and wealth. This Article argues, with respect to plausible
real-world implementations of these forms of taxation, that these
forms of taxation tend to have substantially nonoverlapping imperfec-
tions. Accordingly, this Article concludes that overall distortionary
costs can be reduced by utilizing some approach for taxing all of labor
income, consumption, capital income, and wealth.
This Article's conclusions thus contrast with an influential set of ar-
guments in the law-and-economics literature for why governments
should primarily rely on only either a labor income tax or a progres-
sive consumption tax. These arguments are sometimes called
"double-distortion" arguments, and I follow that terminology in this
Article. As Daniel Shaviro has explained:
[T]he "double distortion" literature in legal scholarship...
draws the conclusion that distributional objectives should be
pursued entirely through a progressive consumption tax [or a
labor income tax] .... This is a legal literature based on cer-
tain economics literature. Economists may be bemused by
how this legal literature treats this economics literature.9
7 Gamage, note 5, at 41.
8 Id. at 49-72.
9 Daniel Shaviro, NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, Week 13, David Gamage's "A Frame-
work for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments," Part 1, Start Making Sense
(Apr. 30, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2014/04/nyu-tax-policy-collo-
quium-week-13-david.html.
[Vol. 68:
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Double-distortion arguments are based on two central sets of as-
sumptions: first, that labor-to-leisure distortions are the sole imper-
fection in a labor income tax or a progressive consumption tax; and,
second, that this imperfection is perfectly replicated by supplementary
forms of taxation.
Most of the prior literature on the limitations of double-distortion
arguments has focused on the implications of relaxing this second set
of assumptions-that the labor-to-leisure distortions induced by a la-
bor income tax or a progressive consumption tax are perfectly repli-
cated by supplementary forms of taxation. 10 Most notably, the
economist Emmanuel Saez has argued that relaxing this set of as-
sumptions supports positively taxing capital income,11 and the law-
and-economics scholar Chris Sanchirico has argued that relaxing this
set of assumptions supports utilizing a variety of supplementary forms
of tax measurement (although Sanchirico's work does not explain
which supplemental measurements should be positively taxed and
which should be subsidized).' 2
Yet many other scholars remain unconvinced by these critiques of
double-distortion arguments. 13 Although the advocates of double-dis-
10 This set of assumptions is typically explained as consisting of two primary assump-
tions: (1) that taxpayers are homogeneous except in their ability to earn labor income, and
(2) that taxpayers' preferences are weakly separable between labor and consumption. For
discussion of the literature on the implications of relaxing these assumptions, see, for ex-
ample, Gamage, note 5, at 52-56; David Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit
Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design, J. Legal Analysis (forthcom-
ing 2015) (manuscript at 11-15), available at http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/
2014/12/24/jla.lauOO9.full.pdffml.
11 Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income
Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. Pub. Econ. 217, 225-26 (2002).
12 Chris William Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing
Only Labor Income, 63 Tax L. Rev. 867, 940-54 (2010); Chris William Sanchirico, Tax Ec-
lecticism, 64 Tax L. Rev. 149, 156-59 (2011) [hereinafter Tax Eclecticism]. In contrast to
the implications of this Article's analysis, both Sanchirico and the advocates of double-
distortion arguments agree that relaxing this second set of assumptions does not imply that
governments should positively tax capital income or otherwise levy supplemental forms of
taxation at positive rates. Instead, Sanchirico and the advocates of double-distortion argu-
ments agree that relaxing this second set of assumptions implies only that governments
should potentially either positively tax or subsidize capital income and other supplements
to a labor income tax or a progressive consumption tax. In light of this, I previously sum-
marized the debate between Sanchirico and the advocates of double-distortion arguments
as largely being about which positions should bear the burden of proof when governments
must cope with limited information. Gamage, note 5, at 54-56.
13 For instance, Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach conclude in response to Saez's
arguments that "the arguments are at this point sufficiently theoretical and tenuous that we
cannot say they currently support [taxing capital income.]" Joseph Bankman & David A.
Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58
Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 1455 (2006) [hereinafter Ideal Consumption Tax]. Bankman and Weis-
bach respond even more harshly to Sanchirico's arguments, saying "[w]e do not believe
Sanchirico's article adds much to the literature and in many ways obscured well-established
ideas." Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, A Critical Look at a Critical Look-
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tortion arguments agree that relaxing this second set of assumptions
makes it theoretically possible that governments might want to utilize
supplemental forms of tax measurement, these scholars conclude that
policymakers in most cases will lack the information needed to know
how to do so.14 As David Weisbach argues, "[t]he [double-distortion]
model contains strong assumptions. The key claim of the benchmark
model is not that the assumptions are true. Instead, the model helps
us understand the implications of a more general model where the
assumptions are relaxed. s15 He continues, "[elven when we relax the
assumption [that the labor-to-leisure distortions induced by a labor
income tax are perfectly replicated by supplementary forms of taxa-
tion], however, luxury taxes are not consistent with optimal distribu-
tive policies .... ",16
This Article explores the implications of relaxing the first set of as-
sumptions upon which double-distortion arguments are based-that
labor-to-leisure distortions are the sole imperfection in a labor income
tax or a progressive consumption tax. To do so, this Article treats the
second set of assumptions (that these labor-to-leisure distortions are
perfectly replicated by supplementary forms of taxation) as being
true, but only for the purposes of developing this Article's analysis.
Put another way, my arguments are based on analyzing the implica-
tions of efficiency costs other than labor-to-leisure distortions. Thus,
to the extent that policymakers can obtain useful information about
the ways in which the labor-to-leisure distortions induced by a labor
income tax or a progressive consumption tax are not perfectly repli-
cated by supplementary forms of taxation, my policy prescriptions
should be adjusted to account for that information. 17
Reply to Sanchirico, 64 Tax L. Rev. 539, 539 (2011) [hereinafter Critical Look]. However,
note that I do not quote these rebuttals to Saez's and Sanchirico's critiques so as to express
agreement with the rebuttals. Instead, my aim here is merely to explain how my project
differs from the prior work by Saez and Sanchirico. My point here is only that the rebut-
tals that the advocates of double-distortion arguments have made in response to Saez's and
Sanchirico's critiques do not apply to this Article's analysis, as this Article's analysis is
based on relaxing a different set of assumptions on which double-distortion arguments are
based.
14 Bankman & Weisbach, Critical Look, note 13, at 550 ("we agree that, in theory, some
mix of positive or negative income, consumption and other taxes is apt to dominate a pure
labor tax. No one has yet specified just what that mix might be, however..
15 Weisbach, note 10 (manuscript at 8).
16 Id. (manuscript at 13); id. (manuscript at 15) ("The resulting taxes and subsidies, how-
ever, are not the conventional pro-poor redistributive policies we might have thought opti-
mal without careful consideration. Instead, they are set based on subtle interactions with
the income tax. Relaxing the assumptions in the benchmark model does not restore stan-
dard distributive weights.").
17 To the extent that the empirical literature suggests that labor-to-leisure distortions
might not be especially important with respect to many real world tax policy questions,
however, these adjustments might end up being relatively minor, even to the extent that
[Vol. 68:
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Thus, looking beyond labor-to-leisure distortions, what can we say
about the other forms of distortionary responses that might be in-
duced by a labor income tax or a progressive consumption tax? Some
of the prior literature discussing double-distortion arguments explic-
itly makes clear that the literature's conclusions only apply when com-
paring an "ideal" labor income or consumption tax to other potential
supplementary forms of taxation-with an "ideal" labor income or
consumption tax then being defined as one that has no imperfections
other than inducing labor-to-leisure distortions. 18 Most notably, tax
law scholars Bankman and Weisbach argue that an "ideal" tax falling
on only labor income or consumption is superior to an "ideal" tax that
also falls on capital income. Bankman and Weisbach justify their fo-
cus on these "ideal" forms of taxation by claiming that real-world
taxes on capital income involve far greater imperfections beyond la-
bor-to-leisure distortions than do real-world taxes on labor income or
consumption. 19 Bankman and Weisbach thus claim that they are eval-
uating "the best possible case for [taxing capital income]" and that
"[i]f a consumption tax is superior.., even ignoring the major imple-
mentation problems of [taxing capital income], it follows that a con-
sumption tax will be even more desirable once those problems are
taken into account. '20 These arguments by Bankman and Weisbach
have been echoed by a number of other tax scholars.21
Even accepting that real world capital income taxes probably do
involve worse implementation problems than do real world labor in-
come or consumption taxes, however, it is crucial to understand that
imperfections in tax systems must be evaluated through marginal anal-
ysis. Accordingly, as I explained at length in an earlier Article, in light
of the tax-smoothing principle, "that a tax instrument is superior for
raising any fixed sum of revenues does not imply that the tax instru-
ment is superior for raising marginal revenues. '2 2 Thus, contrary to
Bankman and Weisbach's conclusions, this Article argues that it is
probably optimal for governments to positively tax capital income.
governments can obtain the information needed to know how to make these adjustments.
For further discussion of the potential implications of relaxing this set of assumptions and
other assumptions underlying this Article's analysis, see Gamage, note 5, at 49-72.
18 Bankman & Weisbach, Ideal Consumption Tax, note 13, at 1417-19; see also Kaplow,
note 2, at 90-96 (discussing problems of implementation).
19 Bankman & Weisbach, Ideal Consumption Tax, note 13, at 1415.
20 Id.
21 See George R. Zodrow, Should Capital Income Be Subject to Consumption-Based
Taxation?, in Taxing Capital Income 49, 51 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C.
Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007) ("Some tax experts argue that many tax sheltering schemes,
most of which involve manipulations of provisions related to the taxation of capital income
would not be possible under a consumption tax.").
22 Gamage, note 5, at 10.
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Moreover, much of the double-distortion literature does not even
note (as Bankman and Weisbach's article does) that the literature is
implicitly assuming that labor-to-leisure distortions are the sole imper-
fection in a labor income tax or a progressive consumption tax. 23 This
is so even for much of the literature that seems to be aimed at influ-
encing real world policy.24 Implicitly, then, much of the double-distor-
tion literature treats real-world labor income taxes and progressive
consumption taxes as being equivalent to the theoretically "ideal" ver-
sions of these forms of taxation. In other words, despite there being
numerous studies explaining that labor income taxes and progressive
consumption taxes are subject to a diverse variety of major imperfec-
tions,25 double-distortion scholarship often argues for policy prescrip-
tions based on the implicit assumption that real-world
implementations of these forms of taxation would be perfect except
for inducing labor-to-leisure distortions.
Departing from this assumption, what can we say about the extent
to which the imperfections in real world labor income taxes or pro-
gressive consumption taxes might or might not overlap with the im-
perfections in potential supplementary forms of taxation?
Unfortunately, only a small portion of the prior literature examining
the imperfections in these forms of taxation directly evaluates this
question.
23 For instance, Weisbach's recent review of the double-distortion literature and its im-
plications for cost-benefit analysis does not explain that his arguments are implicitly treat-
ing real world labor income taxes as being equivalent to the "ideal" versions. Weisbach,
note 15, at 8-15; see also N. Gregory Mankiw, Mathew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, Optimal
Taxation in Theory and Practice, 23 J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2009, at 147, 171-72 (concluding
that real world tax policy remains far from the policy recommendations that the authors
argue are implied by the optimal tax theory literature, including the policy implications
that the authors argue follow from double-distortion models based on the work of Atkin-
son and Stiglitz).
24 In addition to the scholarship cited in note 23, further examples include: Robert Car-
roll & Alan Viard, Progressive Consumption Taxation: The X Tax Revisited 179-80 (2012)
(arguing for the adoption of a progressive consumption tax based on double-distortion
reasoning); James R. Hines, Jr., Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, 21 J. Econ. Persp.,
Winter 2007, at 49, 66 ("Heavy American reliance on income rather than consumption
taxation has not served the U.S. economy well. The inefficiency associated with taxing the
return to capital means that the tax system reduces investment in the United State and
distorts intertemporal consumption by Americans, meanwhile discouraging U.S. labor sup-
ply no less than would a consumption tax alternative."); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23
J. Legal Stud. 667, 677 (1994) ("This argument... suggests that it is appropriate for eco-
nomic analysis of legal rules to focus on efficiency and to ignore the distribution of income
in offering normative judgments."); David Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Re-
distribute Income?, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439, 453 (2003) ("My conclusion is quite simple:
Legal rules should not be used to redistribute income.").
25 For discussion, see Section II.B and Part III.
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Of the prior literature that does directly evaluate this question,
among the most notable are a handful of articles analyzing whether or
not distortions related to certain types of purely illegal tax evasion
might overlap when comparing income taxes to consumption taxes. 26
These articles conflict on whether or not supplementing an income tax
with consumption taxes might reduce these types of tax evasion.27 As
the economists Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer explain, "the pre-
cise results are model-dependent" and the models suggesting that sup-
plementing an income tax with consumption taxes might not reduce
tax evasion depend on the modeling assumption "that the act of tax
evasion is tightly tied to the production of a distinct good."' 28 This
assumption probably does hold for a substantial portion of the tax
evasion that is based on not reporting cash transactions, but this as-
sumption probably does not hold for many other forms of tax
evasion.29
In another highly relevant article, the economists Roger Gordon
and Soren Nielsen compare a form of an income tax to a form of a
consumption tax so as to evaluate distortions related to cross-border
shopping and to shifting taxable income abroad. 30 Gordon and Niel-
sen reason that these distortions are substantially nonoverlapping be-
tween these two forms of taxation. Therefore, applying a variation of
the tax-smoothing principle, Gordon and Nielsen conclude that taxing
both labor income and consumption should reduce the overall distor-
tionary costs from cross-border shopping and from shifting taxable in-
26 E.g., Robin Boadway, Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, Towards a Theory of the
Direct-Indirect Tax Mix, 55 J. Pub. Econ. 71, 72-73 (1994); James R. Hines Jr., Might Fun-
damental Tax Reform Increase Criminal Activity?, 71 Economica 483, 483 (2004);
Jonathan R. Kesselman, Evasion Effects of Changing the Tax Mix, 69 Econ. Rec. 131, 131
(1993); Wolfram F. Richter & Robin W. Boadway, Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax
Evasion, 7 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 361, 361 (2005).
27 Compare Kesselman, note 26, at 131, with Boadway et al., note 26, at 72-73.
28 Joel Slemrod & Christian Gillitzer, Tax Systems 29-30 (2014).
29 See id. ("This need not be true, as is indicated by the simultaneous presence of formal
and informal housepainters, repair people, and so on. Still there is certainly evidence that
evasion is concentrated in particular sectors . . . because of the small scale of production
that can aid concealment and the lesser need for receipts .. "). Examples of the sorts of
tax evasion for which this assumption probably does not hold in many cases include when
taxpayers claim deductions based on fraudulently implausible appraisal estimates and
when taxpayers report a fraudulent basis on selling capital assets, as these forms of tax
evasion usually are not directly tied to any particular income earning or other production
processes. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth Under
the Income Tax, 81 Ind. L.J. 539, 540 (2006) ("[T]ax basis is commonly overstated."); Mark
P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based Penal-
ties, 64 Tax L. Rev. 453, 472 (2011) ("[T]here is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that
taxpayers are aggressive in valuing uncertain tax items and in exploiting legal
uncertainty.").
30 Roger H. Gordon & Soren Bo Nielsen, Tax Evasion in an Open Economy: Value-
Added vs. Income Taxation, 66 J. Pub. Econ. 173, 173 (1997).
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come abroad, as compared to taxing only one of either labor income
or consumption.31
This Article's approach is very much in the spirit of Gordon and
Nielsen's work. However, this Article evaluates the taxation of capi-
tal income and wealth, in addition to the taxation of labor income and
consumption. Also, this Article seeks to generalize the analysis by
considering a diverse variety of distortionary responses, many of
which are quite idiosyncratic and context-dependent, rather than lim-
iting the analysis to only a handful of distortionary responses that are
more general in nature.
The literature on tax planning suggests that many important real
world distortionary responses are highly idiosyncratic and contingent
on the details of how tax systems are implemented. 32 For example,
prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the U.S. income tax was plagued by
many variations of distortionary responses where taxpayers claimed
inflated deductions to offset their labor income by exploiting the rules
governing depreciable assets. According to Calvin Johnson, in their
heyday, these forms of distortionary responses
... caused lots of economic damage by channeling resources
into junky investments: jojoba beans in Costa Rica, wind-
mills in the Mojave desert, garden apartments outside of
Dallas put up and then torn town, see-through office build-
ings put up just for the tax shelter. We gave up billions of
dollars of tax revenue to buy junk.33
That the 1986 Tax Reform Act largely shut down these types of re-
sponses demonstrates their contingent nature.
Today, among the most important distortionary responses through
which the highest-income U.S. taxpayers reduce their income tax lia-
bilities are those that involve recharacterizing what might be thought
of as labor income so that it is treated as a capital asset, and then
exploiting the realization rules so that these "capital assets" can be
used to fund consumption while enabling the taxpayers to circumvent
substantial portions of both the ordinary income and capital gains
31 Id. at 189-90.
32 See Joseph Bankman & Michael L. Schler, Tax Planning Under the Flat Tax, in Tax-
ing Capital Income, note 21, at 245, 247 ("The biggest dangers ... are the flaws not yet
identified, or even existing until the specific language is in place."); see also Alex Ras-
kolnikov, Taxation of Financial Products: Options for Fundamental Reform, 133 Tax
Notes 1549 (Dec. 19, 2011) (discussing tax-gaming responses related to the taxation of
financial products); David M. Schizer, Frictions As a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1312 (2001) (discussing limitations on tax-gaming responses); Gregg D.
Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games, 146 Tax Notes 615 (Feb. 2, 2015).
33 Calvin Johnson, What's a Tax Shelter?, 68 Tax Notes 879, 880 (Aug. 14, 1995).
[Vol. 68:
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components of the income tax.34 There are numerous variations on
these sorts of distortionary responses, and they can often be very com-
plicated-especially when the responses take advantage of partner-
ship tax rules or the rules governing the taxation of financial
products. 35 Underscoring the real world importance of these sorts of
responses, tax legal scholar Edward McCaffery has labeled the use of
these responses as "Tax Planning 101, '"36 and tax accounting scholar
Douglas Shackelford has concluded that through use of these sorts of
responses that "the capitalist can transform the income tax into a
somewhat voluntary assessment. 37
I use the term "tax-gaming responses" to refer to the subcategory of
distortionary responses that are more idiosyncratic and contingent on
the details of how tax systems are implemented, such as the examples
noted above. One reason why I use the term "tax gaming" is to skirt
the question of whether these responses are legal (corresponding with
the term "tax avoidance") or illegal (corresponding with the term "tax
evasion"), as many of these responses are of unclear or borderline
legality. Precisely delineating what counts as a "tax-gaming response"
is not essential for this Article's analysis, so long as it is understood
that real world tax systems tend to be subject to numerous idiosyn-
cratic tax-gaming responses that are based on exploiting the details of
how these tax systems are implemented.
It is challenging to analyze the implications of tax-gaming responses
because how taxpayers use these responses can change dramatically
over time and across different tax environments. As Shackelford ex-
plains, "[t]he half-life of these plans is short. They become obsolete as
the law changes and as tax innovators, unaided by patents and copy-
rights, are forced to recover their investments quickly and develop su-
perior avoidance techniques. '38 Nevertheless, it seems clear that tax-
gaming responses have historically been very important. 39 Moreover,
34 For discussion of these responses, see Gamage, note 5, at 37-40.
35 See, e.g., Douglas A. Shackelford, The Tax Environment Facing the Wealthy, in Does
Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich 114, 125-27 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 2000) (explaining several variations on these sorts of responses); Democratic
Staff of S. Fin. Comm., How Tax Pros Make the Code Less Fair and Efficient: Several New
Strategies and Solutions 2-8 (2015), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030215
%20How%20Tax%2OPros%2OMake%20the%2OCode%20Less%20Fair%20and%20
Efficent%20-%2OSeveral%2ONew%20Strategies%2Oand%20Solutions.pdf. (same).
36 Edward J. McCaffery, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Income Tax Law 12-15
(2012).
37 Shackelford, note 35, at 127.
38 Id. at 121-22.
39 See, e.g., Myron S. Scholes, Mark A. Wolfson, Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, Ed-
ward L. Maydew & Terry Shevlin, Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach 7
(5th ed. 2015) ("Thus not only is tax planning a big business, but the returns on investment
in tax planning can be very large."); Slemrod & Gillitzer, note 28, at 62 ("[T]o reduce tax
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it seems reasonably certain that tax-gaming responses will remain very
important in the future, regardless of how existing tax systems might
be replaced or reformed. As Ronald Pearlman has written, tax sys-
tems that might plausibly be enacted will "be full of exceptions from a
theoretically pure model. To paraphrase the movie Field of Dreams, if
you enact it, they will come."' 40 Pearlman's "they," of course, refers to
the tax lawyers, accountants, and financiers who can be expected to
devise numerous tax gaming responses for exploiting any conceivable
real world form of taxation.
This Article argues, that when comparing multiple forms of taxa-
tion, each of which is based on substantially different base-calculation
rules, the tax-gaming responses to these forms of taxation will tend to
be at least significantly nonoverlapping. I further argue that this will
tend to be especially so with regard to the top portion of best-off tax-
payers. Consider, for example, the tax-gaming responses noted above
whereby many of the highest-income U.S. taxpayers currently
recharacterize their labor income as "capital assets" and then use
these "capital assets" to fund consumption purchases, circumventing
both the ordinary income and capital gains components of the income
tax. For a relatively simple variation on this sort of tax-gaming re-
sponse, consider entrepreneurs and executives who receive stock in
return for their labor and who then borrow against that stock to fund
their consumption purchases. 41 Importantly, employing these sorts of
tax-gaming responses can shield taxpayers from paying income tax on
some of the returns to their labor,42 but these responses do not in and
of themselves shield the taxpayers from any consumption taxes that
might attach to the purchases funded through that labor.
For instance, the billionaire Larry Ellison reportedly "bought one of
the most expensive yachts in the world" by borrowing against the
liabilities, distorting actions (e.g., investment in sectors where it is easier to convert ordi-
nary income into capital gains) are utilized. There is considerable empirical evidence testi-
fying to the extent and tax sensitivity of these kinds of avoidance behavior.").
40 Ronald A. Pearlman, A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real World, There Is No Perfect
Tax System, in Toward Fundamental Tax Reform 106, 112 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A.
Hassett eds., 2005).
41 See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders' Stock, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 60, 62 (2011) (dis-
cussing how "founders' stock" qualifies for capital asset treatment).
42 See id. at 80-91; David I. Walker, The Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of
Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1505,1520-21 (2009) (noting "equity
compensation can be tax advantaged versus the accrual or cash compensation ideal");
David S. Miller, The Zuckerberg Tax, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2012, at A27 ("But how much
income tax will Mr. Zuckerberg pay on the rest of his stock that he won't immediately sell?
He need not pay any. Instead, he can simply use his stock as collateral to borrow against
his tremendous wealth and avoid all tax .... If Mr. Zuckerberg never sells his shares, he
can avoid all income tax and then, on his death, pass on his shares to his heirs. When they
sell them, they will be taxed only on any appreciation in value since his death.").
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stock he received from laboring as the CEO of Oracle-thereby cir-
cumventing much of the income tax that otherwise might have been
owed on the returns he received from laboring for Oracle.4 3 Yet to
the extent that yacht purchases are subject to sales taxes, luxury excise
taxes, value added taxes, or other forms of consumption taxation, Elli-
son potentially would have been subject to these forms of taxation on
purchasing his yacht.
Certainly, Ellison might have also employed different tax-gaming
responses to circumvent some of the consumption taxes that might
have been owed on his yacht purchase." But by utilizing multiple
forms of taxation, a government can potentially capture more of the
metaphorical tax eggs that otherwise would slip through the holes in
any single tax basket. Accordingly, although I have not been able to
discover what taxes Ellison actually paid on his yacht purchase, there
can be little doubt that Ellison pays significant sales tax to California
on at least some of his consumption expenditures. Moreover, were
the United States to adopt a value added tax (VAT), even more of
Ellison's purchases probably would be subject to taxation, as VATs
tend to have far fewer holes than do retail sales taxes.45 Reporting
suggests that Ellison has sold only a small portion of his perhaps $17
billion worth of Oracle stock, and that he primarily funds his con-
sumption expenditures through borrowing against that stock.46 To the
extent that these expenditures would be subject to consumption taxa-
tion, then, the applicable consumption taxes would likely be capturing
portions of Ellison's labor-funded expenditures-much of which
slipped through the holes in the income tax.
Although Ellison appears to have been successful at using tax-gam-
ing responses to circumvent substantial portions of the taxes he other-
wise might have owed on both ordinary labor income and capital
gains, he probably has not been able to entirely skirt these forms of
taxation. 47 Ellison's recent cash salary from Oracle has reportedly
43 See Miller, note 42, at A27 ("He reportedly borrowed more than a billion dollars
against his Oracle shares and bought one of the most expensive yachts in the world.").
44 For an example of a tax-gaming response that another famous taxpayer has used to
reduce yacht tax liabilities, see Gayle Fee & Laura Raposa, Sen. Skipper Skips Town on
Sails Tax, Boston Herald, July 23, 2010, at 16 (explaining the Senator avoided paying Mas-
sachusetts sails tax on his yacht by listing Newport, Rhode Island as the yacht's hailing port
instead of a town in Massachusetts like Nantucket).
45 For discussion of the holes in sales taxes and VATs, see Section III.A.
46 See Carrie Kirby, Inside Look at a Billionaire's Budget-Larry Ellison's Spending
Worries His Accountant, S.F. Chron., Jan. 31, 2006, at Al ("Instead of selling [his Oracle
shares], he has financed his lavish lifestyle ... by borrowing against his stock.... [I]t is not
uncommon for senior executives to borrow against their stock to avoid parting with it.").
47 Apart from the capital gains tax that Ellison presumably paid on selling some of his
stock, he probably has paid at least some amount of income tax when he received his stock
in the first place, and Oracle was likely also denied at least some amount of deductions that
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been only one dollar annually,4 but he reportedly sold at least hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of his Oracle stock, likely in order to re-
duce his risk exposure, and so he presumably paid at least significant
amounts of capital gains tax.49 Moreover, while reporting suggests
that Ellison may have used tax-gaming responses so as to pay property
tax on only about $65 million of a mansion of his that might be worth
over $200 million, that still means that Ellison pays a rather significant
amount of annual property tax on his mansion. 50 Overall, then, Elli-
son appears to have been able to substantially reduce his tax liabilities
under multiple forms of taxation, but each of these different forms of
taxation appears to have successfully captured a distinct portion of
Ellison's economic resources.
Returning to the metaphor, were it possible to devise a single per-
fect tax basket, we perhaps should rely solely on that perfect tax bas-
ket instead of utilizing multiple imperfect tax baskets. Similarly, if we
could devise a single tax basket that was perfect except for one hole,
then we might want to focus exclusively on patching that one hole.
But if all available baskets have numerous distinct holes, and espe-
cially if these holes are constantly changing over time and in reaction
to attempts at patching, then we might want to nest multiple baskets-
at least so long as the holes in these baskets are at least significantly
nonoverlapping.
This analysis, however, does not imply that governments should tax
everything. Nesting a large number of baskets might greatly reduce
how many eggs fall to the ground, but it might also be costly to con-
struct each incremental basket. Correspondingly, although making
use of numerous forms of taxation might substantially decrease the
overall distortionary costs from tax-gaming responses, doing so might
also substantially increase the administrative and compliance costs of
it could have taken had Ellison instead been paid in cash salary. Nevertheless, the overall
income tax collected from Ellison and Oracle jointly probably was still significantly re-
duced by paying Ellison in stock rather than cash salary. Without knowing more of the
details of how Ellison has structured his tax planning, it is difficult to assess precisely how
much income tax he might have actually paid. Yet it seems reasonably certain both that
Ellison has been substantially successful at reducing his income tax liabilities and that Elli-
son has not been able to totally negate his income tax liabilities all together. See Fleischer,
note 41, at 80-91 (explaining how these sorts of tax-gaming responses work to reduce the
joint tax liability of the employer and employee).
48 Robert W. Wood, Tax-Smart Billionaires Who Work for $1, Forbes, Apr. 5, 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/04/05/tax-smart-billionaires-who-work-for-l/.
It is unclear what other forms of compensation Ellison currently receives from working for
Oracle and the extent to which this compensation might be captured by either the ordinary
income or capital gains components of the income tax.
49 See Kirby, note 46, at Al.
50 See James Temple, Billionaire Larry Ellison Gets $3 Million Tax Break: County OKs
His Appeal Based on Falling Value of His Sprawling 23-Acre Estate in Woodside, S.F.
Chron., Mar. 27, 2008, at Al (discussing the property tax on Ellison's mansion).
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the tax system. Ultimately, then, there may be trade-offs between the
potential advantages of utilizing multiple forms of taxation to reduce
distortionary costs and the potential disadvantages of increasing ad-
ministrative and compliance costs.
What are the implications for assessing tax reform proposals and for
the related question of what forms of taxation a government should
employ? This Article proceeds to analyze this question (first, in Part
II) at a more general conceptual level and then (second, in Part III) by
applying the theoretical framework developed through that more gen-
eral conceptual discussion to evaluate specific tax policy debates.
Part II analyzes what can be learned from the theoretical and em-
pirical economics literatures. Beginning with seminal work by the
economist Martin Feldstein in the 1990's, economists have been strug-
gling with the implications of the evidence that taxpayers engage in a
diverse variety of distortionary responses with respect to a different,
but related, tax policy question-the question of measuring how
changing the rates of an income tax affects the overall distortionary
costs induced by the income tax. Under strong assumptions, this liter-
ature has demonstrated how analysts can partially answer this ques-
tion without needing to know much about the specific ways in which
taxpayers respond to the income tax. The economist Raj Chetty more
recently described approaches of this sort as employing "sufficient-
statistics" methodology. 51
In a prior Article, I argued that this "sufficient-statistics" methodol-
ogy can be adapted to inform the question of which forms of taxation
a government should employ.52 That Article focused on outlining a
theoretical framework for evaluating incremental reforms. This Arti-
cle builds on that theoretical framework so as to also evaluate funda-
mental tax reforms. Part II describes the most important elements of
the theoretical framework so as to explain the framework to a some-
what broader audience, with a focus on explaining the tax-smoothing
principle.5 3 That Part then analyzes what the empirical economics
literature suggests about the key parameters for applying the theoreti-
cal framework.
Part III then applies the theoretical framework to analyze selected
fundamental tax reform debates. In doing so, Part III makes both a
stronger argument and a (related) weaker and more tentative argu-
51 Raj Chetty, Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural
and Reduced-Form Methods, Ann. Rev. Econ., Sept. 2009, at 451, 452-56.
52 See Gamage, note 5, at 45-48.
53 This Article is written primarily for an audience of tax legal scholars who are familiar
with the relevant background literatures. Yet, as compared to the prior article, Section
II.A. focuses more on explaining (and less on arguing for) the key aspects of the theoreti-
cal framework.
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ment. The stronger argument is to assess the reasoning behind why
the double-distortion literature concludes that an optimal tax system
should consist primarily of only either a labor income tax or a progres-
sive consumption tax, and to show that this reasoning is unpersuasive
as applied to real-world tax policy. Double-distortion arguments typi-
cally are based on only distortionary costs and not on administrative
or compliance costs. Nevertheless, despite the claims made by the ad-
vocates of double-distortion arguments, incorporating tax-gaming re-
sponses into the analysis implies that overall distortionary costs could
be reduced by utilizing some approach for taxing (all of) labor in-
come, consumption, capital income, and wealth.
Importantly, a number of prominent advocates of progressive con-
sumption tax proposals have claimed that a well-designed progressive
consumption tax would be immune to tax-gaming responses that in-
volve taxpayers recharacterizing their labor income as a form of "capi-
tal" so as to exempt that labor income from the progressive
consumption tax. Part III evaluates two of the most influential pro-
posals for implementing a progressive consumption tax so as to
demonstrate that both of these variations on a progressive consump-
tion tax would almost certainly remain vulnerable to these sorts of
tax-gaming responses. More generally, I argue that any plausible real-
world implementation of a progressive consumption tax would con-
tain holes that taxpayers could exploit so as to fund consumption
purchases with the returns from their labor while still substantially cir-
cumventing the progressive consumption tax. I further argue that sup-
plementing a progressive consumption tax with some form of a capital
income tax could alleviate the efficiency costs from these forms of
distortions.
Overall, Part III compares some common proposals for taxing labor
income, consumption, capital income, and wealth. I argue that the
tax-gaming responses to these forms of taxation tend to be at least
significantly nonoverlapping, and especially so with respect to the top
portion of the best-off taxpayers. Part III thus concludes that utilizing
some version of all four of these tax measurements could reduce over-
all distortionary costs as opposed to not utilizing any version of one or
more of these tax measurements. This is the stronger argument devel-
oped in Part III.
The weaker and more tentative argument developed in Part III re-
gards administrative and compliance costs. It is difficult to predict
how taxing (all of) labor income, consumption, capital income, and
wealth might affect administrative and compliance costs, as compared
to not utilizing one or more of these tax measurements. I tentatively
suggest reasons for concluding why the advantages from utilizing all of
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these measurements to reduce distortionary costs might outweigh the
possible disadvantages of potentially increasing administrative and
compliance costs, at least with respect to the top portion of best-off
taxpayers. But this conclusion is only tentative as it is based on very
limited empirical evidence.
Ultimately, demonstrating the potential advantages of collecting
our tax eggs with more than one basket does not fully answer the
questions of exactly which baskets a government should employ or
exactly how these baskets should be nested together. Accordingly,
this Article raises more questions than it answers. Yet understanding
the potential advantages of using multiple tax baskets is an important
step toward more fully answering these questions. If the tax legal
literature is to meaningfully advise on the future of tax reform, then
reform proposals must be evaluated in their non-"ideal" states. Con-
sideration of tax-gaming distortions and administrative and compli-
ance costs thus merits a central place in the analysis of tax reform. In
particular, I argue that the implications of tax-gaming responses
should be evaluated through marginal analysis (in light of the tax-
smoothing principle) and that this analysis supports the use of multi-
ple forms of taxation.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
AND ITS KEY EMPIRICAL PARAMETERS
Following common terminology in the public finance literature, I
use the term "tax instrument" to refer to any policy variable that a
government might adjust so as to raise revenues or to promote distri-
butional equity. I thus use the phrase "the optimal choice of tax in-
struments" to refer to governments' decisions about how to raise
revenues or how to promote distributional equity, abstracting from
the related questions of how much revenue should be raised or how
much (or what forms of) distributional equity should be promoted.
More informally, when I refer to questions such as what forms of taxa-
tion a government should employ, I mean to refer to optimal choice of
tax instruments questions. In other words, this Article evaluates only
how governments should raise revenues or promote distributional eq-
uity; this Article does not directly consider how much revenue should
be raised or how much (or what forms of) distributional equity should
be promoted.
This Article elaborates and applies a theoretical framework that I
developed in a prior Article, 54 which I refer to here as "this Article's
theoretical framework" or, more simply, as "the theoretical frame-
54 Gamage, note 5.
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work." Before the theoretical framework can be applied, however, an
analyst applying the framework must first determine which tax instru-
ments are to be evaluated. Because any policy variable that a govern-
ment might adjust to raise revenues or promote distributional equity
can be thought of as a "tax instrument," there are potentially an infi-
nite number of tax instruments that might be analyzed. Yet the theo-
retical framework was only designed to compare a discrete number of
tax instruments in any single iteration of applying the framework. The
theoretical framework can potentially be used to analyze a variety of
tax reform proposals through repeated iterations of applying the
framework.5 5 Nevertheless, for now, it should be understood that the
choice of which tax instruments are to be evaluated must be deter-
mined prior to applying the theoretical framework.
This Article mostly focuses on evaluating the use of "major" tax
instruments, by which I mean the setting of tax rates for different
forms of taxation each of which has its own distinct base-calculation
rules.56 The theoretical framework can also be applied to analyze the
setting of the base-calculation rules within different forms of taxa-
tion.57 But the focus of this Article is on comparing the use of major
tax instruments, such as labor income taxes, VATs, capital income
taxes, and wealth taxes. More specifically, the focus is on which of
these major tax instruments should be used.
55 See Part III.
56 Note that it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to precisely delineate the boundaries be-
tween what does and does not constitute a "major" tax instrument.
57 My prior Article discussed how the theoretical framework can be applied to evaluate
whether specific legal rules should be designed to promote distribution. Gamage, note 5,
at 72-84. The same approach can also be used to evaluate calibrating specific tax-base cal-
culation rules so as to promote marginal amounts of distributional equity or to raise margi-
nal revenues, while holding the remainder of the tax system constant. This is because tax-
base calculation rules are a subset of the larger category of legal rules, with tax-base calcu-
lation rules being designed to serve the regulatory purpose of measuring the tax base in
question. Thus, the analysis in the prior Article of how the theoretical framework can be
applied to evaluate designing legal rules to promote marginal amounts of distribution ex-
tends to the design of tax-base calculation rules. Note, however, that the theoretical frame-
work only evaluates the trade-offs among distribution, efficiency, and revenues.
Consequently, another approach may be needed to determine the efficiency-maximizing
setting for a tax-base calculation rule before the theoretical framework can be applied to
evaluate the implications of departing from that efficiency-maximizing setting in order to
promote distributional equity or to raise revenue. For instance, an analyst might start by
applying Weisbach's framework for evaluating line-drawing problems. David Weisbach,
Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627 (1999). His
framework is designed to analyze the efficiency-maximizing settings for certain types of
legal rules, but-following the double-distortion argument against designing legal rules to
promote distribution-Weisbach's framework does not incorporate distribution. Thus, the
theoretical framework can be applied to evaluate optimal departures from the efficiency-
maximizing settings implied by Weisbach's framework so as to better optimize the overall
balance between distribution and efficiency.
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The remainder of this Part first summarizes and explains the theo-
retical framework and then assesses the literature relevant for estimat-
ing the key empirical parameters for applying the theoretical
framework. Readers who already feel comfortable with the theoreti-
cal framework from reading the prior Article may wish to skip Section
II.A. and begin reading with Section II.B. Readers who are already
deeply familiar with the relevant economics literatures may wish to
skim much of Part II, as Part II largely focuses on explaining the im-
plications of the economics literatures in order to set up the applica-
tions in Part III.
A. Summarizing and Explaining the Theoretical Framework
Often called "optimal tax theory," the modern structure of public
finance economics largely revolves around the challenges of raising
revenues and promoting distributional equity in light of governments'
information constraints. 58 A typical starting point is to imagine that
governments wish to raise greater revenues from taxpayers with high
ability than from taxpayers with low ability.59 But it is important to
understand that "high ability" in this context simply refers to those
taxpayers from whom the government wishes to raise greater reve-
nues in accordance with the prespecified social welfare weights. I gen-
erally assume in this Article that "ability" is connected to taxpayers'
overall capacity for generating monetary resources (in other words,
taxpayers' "ability to pay").60 But this Article's analysis potentially
could be modified based on other notions of ability-that is, on other
notions of what it is that the government wishes to accomplish by pro-
moting distributional equity.
If the government had perfect information about each taxpayer's
ability, the government could simply assign a tax liability to each tax-
payer. Because governments cannot perfectly observe ability, govern-
ments instead must rely on proxies for ability based on information
that the government is able to measure. Optimal tax theory scholar-
ship thus typically considers the reason why governments design tax
58 See Bernard Salanie, The Economics of Taxation 64 (2d ed. 2011) ("This is the most
important theme in the optimal taxation literature: how much information the government
has determines what fiscal instruments it may use.").
59 Daniel Shaviro, The Economics of Tax Law 3 (NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-06, 2014), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2380898.
60 For further discussion, see Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in Tax Justice:
The Ongoing Debate 123, 125-31 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002).
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systems to measure concepts such as "income" or "consumption" to
be that they use these measurements as proxies for ability. 61
Because governments cannot observe ability perfectly, taxpayers
can take actions to conceal their ability from the government. When
taxpayers act to conceal their ability from the government, the gov-
ernment loses because less revenue is collected, and the taxpayers also
lose if they incur costs in order to conceal their ability. 62 The social
welfare losses that result from taxpayers incurring costs to conceal
their ability from the government are often called "deadweight loss,"
"excess burden," or "distortionary costs."
A government (in theory) could minimize distortionary costs by lev-
ying only lump sum taxes, wherein each taxpayer would be assessed a
fixed tax liability the amount of which would not vary based on any
choices made by the taxpayer.63 The reason governments do not typi-
cally levy lump sum taxes is distributional equity.64 Optimal-tax-the-
ory scholarship thus generally assumes that governments seek to
optimize the trade-off between efficiency and distributional equity.65
One guideline for how governments might minimize efficiency costs
while promoting distributional equity is the "elasticity principle. '66
Elasticities are formulas for measuring the extent to which taxpayers
engage in additional distortionary tax-reduction behaviors in response
to increasing tax rates. All else being equal, the more elastic the tax-
reduction behaviors induced by a tax instrument, the greater the dis-
tortionary costs generated by increasing the tax rate of the instrument.
In order to minimize distortionary costs, then, the elasticity principle
implies that lower tax rates should be set for tax instruments that in-
61 Louis Kaplow, Taxation, in 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 647, 669-70 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). ("The assumption is that differences in
earning ability are unobservable, so income, a signal of earning ability, is taxed instead.").
Note that ability is sometimes conceived of as a proxy for utility or for something else even
more fundamental to the government's distribution goals.)
62 It may be that taxpayers can conceal some portions of their ability at no cost, But, to
the extent so, any actions taxpayers take to costlessly conceal their ability should be in-
framarginal with respect to the relevant tax rates. See Gamage, note 5, at 56-57. Thus, any
such actions generally should only generate income effects, not substitution effects. Follow-
ing standard optimal-tax methodology, this Article factors out income effects, as the impli-
cations of income effects depend on how the government spends the revenues it raises.
See id. at 44 n. 160.; David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience:
Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 62-64 (2011).
63 See Shaviro, note 59, at 2.
64 Id. at 2-7; Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 61, 61 (1998).
65 See Shaviro, note 59, at 4; see also Nathaniel Hendren, The Inequality Deflator, Inter-
personal Comparisons Without a Social Welfare Function 1-7 (July 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/inequality-deflator-
vnber.pdf.
66 Gamage, note 5, at 19.
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duce more elastic tax-reduction behaviors. In other words, all else be-
ing equal, we should tax more those goods and transactions for which
taxpayers are less likely to alter their behavior in response to taxation.
Another guideline for how governments might minimize efficiency
costs while promoting distribution is the tax-smoothing principle,
which implies that, all else being equal, it is more efficient to make use
of more tax instruments than fewer tax instruments.67 The tax-
smoothing principle, however, does not necessarily apply to all forms
of distortionary costs. This Article's theoretical framework was
largely developed for the purpose of evaluating the extent to which
the tax-smoothing principle does (or does not) apply in different pol-
icy contexts.
1. The Tax-Smoothing Principle
The tax-smoothing principle is based on the notion that taxpayers
generally face increasing marginal costs to acting to reduce their tax
liabilities. 68 The prior Article discussed at length both the reasons for
inferring that taxpayers generally face increasing marginal costs to act-
ing so as to reduce their tax liabilities, and the possibility of exceptions
to this general rule.69 The basic intuition is that taxpayers who desire
to reduce their tax liabilities generally should start with the tax-reduc-
tion techniques that are the least costly per dollar of tax liability re-
duced, and should only move on to more costly techniques once less
costly alternatives have been exhausted. I argued that this basic intui-
tion should generally apply to all tax-reduction behaviors-including
behaviors that might be labeled as tax avoidance, tax evasion, or tax
gaming-although there may be exceptions in particular contexts. 70
To elaborate, consider again the Larry Ellison example. There are
numerous different ways in which Ellison might act so as to reduce his
tax liabilities. To the extent that he can act to reduce his tax liabilities
without incurring any costs (as he perceives costs), he probably will
take these actions even if the relevant tax rates are low.71 After all,
67 See id.
68 "Costs" in this sense include any factor that might prevent a taxpayer from acting to
reduce tax liabilities. So, for instance, both social norms and taxpayer's internal motiva-
tions to follow the law or to act in a pro-social fashion constitute costs under this definition,
to the extent that these factors might prevent taxpayers from acting to reduce their tax
liabilities.
69 See Gamage, note 5, at 56-63.
70 Id at 57-62.
71 Conversely, some taxpayers might not be motivated to act to reduce their tax liabili-
ties no matter how high tax rates might be set-for instance, if these taxpayers perceive it
to be immoral to engage in tax-reduction behaviors and consider these morality costs as
overpowering any potential benefit from tax savings.
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why should he not take actions that would produce some tax benefit
at no cost? Yet once Ellison has exhausted any costless ways in which
he might reduce his tax liabilities, he will need to decide whether to
engage in further tax-reduction behaviors that he perceives as being
costly. As a general matter, we can probably expect him to begin with
the tax-reduction behaviors that involve the smallest cost per dollar of
potential tax benefit, and to proceed to more costly tax-reduction be-
haviors only once the less costly behaviors have been exhausted. To
the extent that Ellison is economically rational, we can expect him to
stop engaging in additional tax-reduction behaviors at the point where
the marginal cost of engaging in even further tax-reduction behaviors
would exceed the marginal tax benefit.
Of course, many of the tax-reduction behaviors that Ellison might
engage in could be lumpy, in the sense of involving some amount of
fixed costs. To the extent so, Ellison potentially could face decreasing
marginal costs to engaging in further tax-reduction behaviors along
certain portions of his overall cost function. There are thus exceptions
to the general notion that taxpayers face increasing marginal costs to
acting to reduce their tax liabilities. However, merely knowing that
such exceptions exist is of little help to governments in designing real-
world tax policy. In most policy contexts, governments cannot easily
learn the details of taxpayers' cost functions. Moreover, different tax-
payers will often face discontinuities at different points along their
overall cost functions. When considering a population of taxpayers,
then, the most that governments can usually ascertain is that taxpayers
generally tend to face increasing marginal costs across the overall span
of their cost functions. After all, even if taxpayers' actual cost func-
tions resemble stair steps more than straight lines, a path that gener-
ally rises in a discontinuous stair-step fashion is likely to appear
indistinguishable from a truly linear path from the vantage point of
someone far away.
Both the tax-smoothing principle and this Article's theoretical
framework are based on numerous assumptions-such as the assump-
tion that taxpayers face increasing marginal costs in reducing their tax
liabilities. As my prior Article explains in greater detail, my analysis
is not based on believing that these assumptions universally hold true.
Instead, my analysis is based on concluding that governments usually
will not have the information needed to design tax policy to account
for the ways in which these assumptions do not hold true.72 Optimal
tax theory revolves around the challenges that governments confront
due to having limited information about taxpayers.73 Certainly, there
72 Gamage, note 5, at 51.
73 See notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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may be policy contexts in which governments can obtain useful infor-
mation about the ways in which the assumptions underlying my analy-
sis do not hold. To the extent so, and as my prior Article elaborates, 74
the prescriptions I argue for should be adjusted to account for the
implications of this information. Nevertheless, as a general matter,
taxpayers should mostly engage in less costly tax-reduction behaviors
before engaging in more costly alternatives, and this is all that is
needed for the tax-smoothing principle to generally apply.75
Accordingly, because taxpayers generally face increasing marginal
costs to acting to reduce their tax liabilities, the distortionary costs
generated by any form of taxation should generally rise exponentially
with the relevant tax rates. To understand why, consider Figures 1 and
2 below. 76
FIGURE 1
Marginal Cost of$Tax-Reduction
Behaviors
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74 Gamage, note 5, at 50-72.
75 Id. at 62-63.
76 Figures 1 and 2 are adapted from the standard textbook depictions of the distortion-
ary costs of taxation, except that these standard depictions usually are based on only spe-
cific tax-reduction behaviors, such as taxation imposing a wedge between buyers'
willingness to pay and sellers' willingness to accept. Figures 1 and 2 are designed to gener-
alize the insights from these standard depictions. Thus, for example, as applied to the tax-
reduction behaviors of consumers substituting away from the purchase of taxed goods,
Figures 1 and 2 implicitly assume a competitive market with no producer surplus, as pro-
ducers' willingness to accept is depicted by the flat line of the X axis. Incorporating the
possibility of producer surplus would complicate the graphs, but would not dramatically
change the analysis.
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Figure 1 depicts the "amount of measured taxable activity" on the X
axis.77 The far right side of the X axis (Qp) represents the amount of
taxable activity that would be measured by the government if the tax-
payer did not engage in any tax-reduction behaviors. 78 By engaging in
tax-reduction behaviors, the taxpayer thus shifts leftward along the X
axis. The far left side of the X axis corresponds with zero measured
taxable activity, which could be achieved if the taxpayer acted so as to
completely eliminate the entire tax liability.
The diagonal line rising from Qp to the Y axis represents the margi-
nal cost function faced by the taxpayer for reducing the amount of
measured taxable activity (that is, for engaging in tax-reduction be-
haviors). As discussed earlier, the line is drawn so that the taxpayer
faces increasing marginal costs to shifting leftward along the X axis
(that is, to reducing the amount of taxable activity measured by the
government).
As a general matter, taxpayers should engage in tax-reduction be-
haviors up to the point where the marginal costs of engaging in further
tax-reduction behaviors would exceed the marginal tax benefit from
doing so. Figure 1 depicts the tax benefit of reducing measured taxa-
ble activity by a unit as T. The taxpayer should thus engage in tax-
reduction behaviors until the amount of measured taxable activity is
reduced to point QT along the X axis, which corresponds with the
point where the marginal cost of further tax-reduction behavior would
exceed the marginal tax benefit (7).
In contexts wherein only a single tax instrument is relevant, the tax
benefit (T) should be a direct function of the effective tax rate of that
instrument. For instance, Figure 1 could depict a flat-rate sales tax,
with the X axis then representing the dollars of taxable purchases
measured by the government. The tax benefit (7) of reducing mea-
sured taxable purchases by a dollar would thus equal the effective
sales tax rate.
The shaded triangle represents the total distortionary costs-or
deadweight loss (DWL)-generated by the taxpayer's tax-reduction
behaviors. This is because the square formed by the horizontal line
between QT and Qp, and by the vertical line measured by T, repre-
sents the tax revenue the government does not receive as a result of
the tax-reduction behaviors engaged in by the taxpayer. The portion
of this square above the marginal cost line represents the net benefit
the taxpayer receives from the tax-reduction behaviors after incurring
77 The Y axis indicates the dollar measurement of costs and benefits. Alternatively, the
Y axis could measure utility or any other common metric for comparing costs and benefits.
78 The "P" in Qp is used to indicate that this point on the X axis corresponds with the
taxpayer's behavior prior to the use of any tax-reduction techniques-with "P" standing
for prior.
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costs, with the shaded area below the marginal cost line representing
the total costs the taxpayer incurs to engage in the tax-reduction be-
haviors. The shaded area thus corresponds with potential welfare
benefits that neither the taxpayer nor the government receives on ac-
count of the distortionary costs.
With that background, I now show how raising the relevant effec-
tive tax rates should exponentially increase distortionary costs.
FIGURE 2
Marginal Cost of$ Tax-Reduction
Behaviors
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Figure 2 depicts two different marginal tax benefits (T1 and T2) as-
sociated with two different effective tax rates. As drawn, T1 is approx-
imately double the height of T2. So, for instance, if Figure 2
represented a flat-rate sales tax, T1 would correspond with approxi-
mately twice as high an effective sales tax rate as compared to T2.
The deadweight loss triangle corresponding with T,1 is the entire
shaded area (DWL1), spanning from QTI to Qp along the X axis. In
contrast, the deadweight loss triangle corresponding with T2 is only
the dark-gray shaded area (DWL2), spanning from QT to Qp along
the X axis. Note that the deadweight loss triangle associated with T, is
approximately four times the size of the deadweight loss triangle cor-
responding with T2.
Figure 2 thus illustrates the basic intuition underlying the tax-
smoothing principle. When taxpayers face linearly increasing margi-
nal costs to engaging in tax-reduction behaviors, distortionary costs
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rise with the square of the relevant effective tax rates.79 In other
words, doubling the relevant effective tax rate quadruples the magni-
tude of distortionary costs. More generally, so long as taxpayers' mar-
ginal costs to engaging in tax-reduction behaviors rise continuously, it
mathematically follows that distortionary costs rise exponentially with
the relevant effective tax rates, with the exponent depending on the
curvature of the taxpayers' marginal cost functions. 80
Again, in the real world contexts, taxpayers' marginal cost functions
will not always rise continuously. The question then is whether gov-
ernments can obtain any usable information about the exceptions to
the general rule that taxpayers face increasing marginal costs to en-
gaging in tax-reduction behaviors.81 To the extent that governments
can obtain usable information about such exceptions, governments
should potentially make use of that information, and the policy pre-
scriptions generated by this Article's theoretical framework should be
adjusted accordingly. 82
Having reemphasized that caveat, I now consider a key question
underlying the theoretical framework: What is the source of the mar-
ginal tax benefit (T), in Figures 1 and 2 above? In other words, which
effective tax rates are relevant for determining distortionary costs?
In some policy contexts, using two different tax instruments to raise
revenues should generate two smaller deadweight loss triangles, as
compared to raising all of the revenues through only one tax instru-
ment. For instance, consider a government levying a sales tax and de-
ciding whether to exempt a category of goods from the sales tax.8 3 All
else being equal, the tax-smoothing principle weighs against exempt-
79 This is because, whenever the marginal costs of tax-reduction behaviors rise linearly,
the total distortionary costs resulting from the tax-reduction behaviors can be represented
as the area of a triangle. Because the effective tax rate affects both the base of this triangle
(by altering the quantity of tax-reduction behaviors) and the height of this triangle (by
inducing more costly tax-reduction behaviors at the margin), and because the formula for
the area of a triangle is 1/2(base)(height), the distortionary costs of taxation should rise
precisely with the square of the relevant effective tax rates whenever taxpayers face lin-
early increasing marginal costs to tax-reduction behaviors.
80 See Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 340 (8th ed. 2008); John Creedy,
The Excess Burden of Taxation, 37 Austl. Econ. Rev. 454, 454-58 (2004); Alan J. Auerbach
& James R. Hines Jr., Taxation and Economic Efficiency, in 3 Handbook of Pubic Eco-
nomics 1347, 1415-16 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002)
81 See Gamage, note 5, at 56-63.
82 As the prior Article explains in greater detail, the policy prescriptions generated by
the theoretical framework are offered only as baselines, and these baseline prescriptions
should be adjusted to account for any usable information that governments can obtain
about the implications of relaxing the assumptions of the theoretical framework. See id. at
50-72.
83 For a simple example, imagine the government deciding whether to: (1) tax both ap-
ples and oranges, or (2) exclude apples from the sales tax so as to tax only oranges.
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ing goods from the sales tax.84 The reason is that it is better to have
two smaller tax-induced deadweight loss triangles (as in two of DWL2
in Figure 2) than one larger tax-induced deadweight loss triangle (as
in one of DWL in Figure 2). Holding the revenue goal constant, ex-
empting some goods from the sales tax requires taxing other goods at
higher rates, which-all else being equal-the tax-smoothing principle
suggests would increase overall distortionary costs. 85
Despite these implications of the tax-smoothing principle, the gov-
ernment might still wish to tax some goods at higher rates than others
if taxpayers' responses to taxing some goods are more elastic than to
others.86 Put another way, the tax-smoothing principle is only deter-
minative if all else is equal; when all else is not equal, the implications
of the tax-smoothing principle must be balanced against other consid-
erations, such as the implications of the elasticity principle. But,
again, the tax-smoothing principle implies that, all else being equal, "it
is better to tax many commodities at a lower rate than to tax a few
commodities at a higher rate .... "87 Or, as the economist Alan
Auerbach explains: "A key lesson of optimal tax theory is that the
economic loss from a tax distortion grows with the square of the size
of the distortion itself, so a lot of small tax wedges are better than a
few large ones."'88 Thus, in those policy contexts in which utilizing two
forms of taxation would induce two smaller tax-distortion wedges (or,
deadweight loss triangles), the tax-smoothing principle suggests that-
all else being equal-it should be more efficient to utilize both forms
of taxation.
However, in some other policy contexts, two different forms of tax-
ation may combine to generate only a single tax-distortion wedge, at
least with respect to specific forms of distortionary tax-reduction be-
haviors. For instance, consider a government levying both a labor in-
come tax and a sales tax. How do these two tax instruments affect the
tax-reduction technique of substituting leisure for labor (that is, of
working less)? If we assume that taxpayers work for the purpose of
earning money so as to fund purchases, then the tax benefit of substi-
tuting leisure for labor may be a direct function of both the effective
rates of the labor income tax and the sales tax. 9 This is because
working to fund purchases is taxed both when the money is earned
(by the labor income tax) and when the money is spent (by the sales
84 See Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 602-03 (3d ed. 2011).
85 Based on this logic, the tax-smoothing principle has been called "the broad base rule."
Id. For further discussion, see Gamage, note 5, at 20.
86 Id. at 21-22.
87 Rosen & Gayer, note 80, at 340.
88 Alan J. Auerbach, Comment, in Taxing Capital Income, note 21, at 83.
89 See Gamage, note 5, at 24.
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tax), and working less so as to have more time to enjoy leisure thus
reduces taxable activity for both of these tax instruments. With re-
spect to labor-to-leisure distortions, then, these two forms of taxation
may combine to generate a single larger tax-distortion wedge (as in
one of DWL1 in Figure 2) rather than two smaller tax-distortion
wedges (as in two of DWL 2 in Figure 2).90
Consequently, an important question is to what extent making use
of two different tax instruments would generate two separate
(smaller) tax-distortion wedges or one combined (larger) tax-distor-
tion wedge. All else being equal, to the extent that using multiple
forms of taxation would generate multiple smaller tax-distortion
wedges, the tax-smoothing principle suggests that overall distortionary
costs should be reduced by using multiple forms of taxation. But to
the extent that using multiple forms of taxation would generate a sin-
gle combined tax-distortion wedge, the tax-smoothing principle does
not suggest any advantages to using multiple forms of taxation.
2. The Distinction between Multi-Instrument and Single-Instrument
Distortions
Now I turn to distinguishing between "multi-instrument" distortions
and "single-instrument" distortions. When a government levies two
separate tax instruments, how does this affect distortionary costs?
Above, I discussed two possibilities.
As the first possibility, the two tax instruments might jointly gener-
ate a single combined tax-distortion wedge (as in one of DWL1 in Fig-
ure 2). I define this category of distortionary costs as "multi-
instrument" distortions.91 This definition is meant to convey that the
tax-distortion wedge associated with these distortionary costs is a joint
function of the effective tax rates of multiple tax instruments.
As the second possibility, the two tax instruments might separately
generate two distinct tax-distortion wedges (as in two of DWL2 in Fig-
ure 2). I define this category of distortionary costs as "single-instru-
ment" distortions.92 This definition is meant to convey that the two
distinct tax-distortion wedges associated with these distortionary costs
are each a direct function of only the rates of a single tax instrument. 93
90 See id. at 24.
91 See id. I might alternatively label these as "common" distortions for all of the tax
instruments being evaluated.
92 See id. at 25. We might alternatively label these as "unique" distortions for only one
of the tax instruments being evaluated.
93 When more than two tax instruments are being evaluated, there might also be "two-
instrument" distortions (when the tax-distortion wedge is jointly generated by two of the
tax instruments being evaluated, but is not a direct function of the tax rates of a third tax
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For an example of multi-instrument distortions, as explained earlier,
labor-to-leisure distortions may be a direct function of the effective
tax rates of both labor income taxes and sales taxes. Under certain
assumptions, the magnitude of labor-to-leisure distortions might be
the same regardless of the extent to which each Of these tax instru-
ments is used to raise revenue or to promote distribution, such that
labor-to-leisure responses might generate only multi-instrument dis-
tortions with respect to comparing these two tax instruments.
94
In contrast, many tax-gaming responses likely operate at least par-
tially as single-instrument distortions with respect to comparing a la-
bor income tax to a sales tax.95 For instance, consider the tax-
reduction techniques of (1) claiming inflated deductions to reduce la-
bor income tax liabilities, and (2) making purchases outside of the tax-
ing jurisdiction so as to reduce sales tax liabilities. The former tax-
reduction technique should directly reduce the taxpayer's labor in-
come tax liability, and only indirectly affect the taxpayer's sales tax
liability.96 Conversely, the latter tax-reduction technique should di-
rectly reduce the taxpayer's sales tax liability, and only indirectly af-
fect the taxpayer's labor income tax liability.97 Consequently, with
respect to comparing a labor income tax and a sales tax, the former
technique should primarily generate only single-instrument distortions
from the labor income tax, and the latter technique should primarily
generate only single-instrument distortions from the sales tax. In
other words, these two tax-reduction techniques should generate two
smaller tax-distortion wedges, such that the tax-smoothing principle
implies that levying both the labor income tax and the sales tax should
generate smaller overall distortionary costs than would raising all rev-
enues through only one of these tax instruments.
98
3. Three Categories of Distortionary Costs, Plus Overhead Costs
In addition to the categories of multi-instrument distortions and sin-
gle-instrument distortions, there is also a third possibility for how lev-
ying two separate tax instruments might affect distortionary costs. 99
instrument being evaluated). Similarly, when more than three tax instruments are being
evaluated, there might also be "three-instrument" distortions, and so on.
94 See Gamage note 5, at 24.
95 See id. at 35-41.
96 See id. at 8-9.
97 See id. at 37.
98 See id. at 27-29. A formal model in support of this analysis can be found in Gordon &
Nielsen, note 30, at 173-74.
99 In addition to single-instrument, multi-instrument, and instrument-shifting distor-
tions, both Alvin Warren and Thomas Brennan have suggested to me that there might also
be a fourth category of distortionary responses--which might be labeled as "joint-instru-
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Some distortionary tax-reduction techniques involve shifting tax liabil-
ities from one tax instrument to another tax instrument with lower
effective rates. For instance, under the current U.S. income tax, tax-
payers often seek to recharacterize ordinary labor income as capital
gain in order to take advantage of the lower tax rates on capital
gains. 100 Assuming that the taxpayers do not then exploit the realiza-
tion rules so as to defer or circumvent the capital gains tax, and so
immediately pay tax at the capital gains rate, these recharacterization
techniques generate tax savings based on the difference between the
relevant ordinary income and capital gains rates. More generally,
techniques of this sort produce a tax benefit (7) based on the differ-
ence between the effective tax rates of the tax instrument from which
the tax liability is shifted and the tax instrument to which the tax lia-
bility is shifted. The tax-distortion wedge associated with these tech-
niques is thus a function of the difference between the effective tax
rates of the two tax instruments. I define this category of distortion-
ary costs as "instrument-shifting" distortions. 10 ' The tax-smoothing
principle implies that, all else being equal, the distortionary costs asso-
ciated with instrument-shifting distortions should rise exponentially
with the difference between the effective tax rates of the two tax
instruments.1 02
Importantly, the tax-smoothing principle only supports the use of
multiple tax instruments to the extent of single-instrument and instru-
ment-shifting distortions. By definition, when evaluating which forms
of taxation a government should employ, multi-instrument distortions
will create the same social welfare costs regardless of which forms of
taxation are used. 10 3 Multi-instrument distortions thus can be fac-
ment" distortions. If the ways in which different forms of taxation might be integrated
could open up holes in these forms of taxation that would not exist were the government to
make use of only one of these forms of taxation, then there might be some tax-gaming
responses that would only be possible if the government uses multiple forms of taxation. If
so, the potential distortionary costs from these tax-gaming responses would represent a
disadvantage of utilizing multiple forms of taxation. It is not clear to me whether this
possible additional category of distortionary responses is actually of any real practical im-
portance. I am not aware of any significant real world examples of distortionary responses
that would seem to fall into this category. Nevertheless, I note here the possibility that this
category of distortionary responses could be important and might potentially weaken the
case for utilizing multiple forms of taxation.
100 See Saez et al., note 2, at 10-13.
101 See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income Taxation, in 5 Hand-
book of Public Economics 391, 419-23 (Alan J. Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein &
Emmanuel Saez eds., 2013).
102 See Gamage, note 5, at 32.
103 Id. at 24-26.
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tored out for purposes of evaluating which forms of taxation a govern-
ment should employ. 10 4
Therefore, two key sets of empirical parameters for applying the
theoretical framework are: (1) the marginal single-instrument distor-
tions that would be generated by adjusting the tax rates of each tax
instrument to be evaluated, and (2) the marginal instrument-shifting
distortions that would be generated by adjusting the gaps between the
effective tax rates of each set of tax instruments to be evaluated. The
larger these two sets of marginal costs, the more weight the tax-
smoothing principle places toward using multiple forms of taxation.
A third key empirical parameter is (3) the distributional implica-
tions of adjusting the tax rates of each tax instrument to be evaluated.
If the government did not care about distributional implications, the
government should potentially raise all of its revenue through lump
sum taxes. 10 5 It is thus important to consider distributional implica-
tions when evaluating which forms of taxation should be used. Ad-
justing for distributional implications allows for comparing the
different categories of efficiency costs through the common metric of
social welfare.
Finally, in addition to distortionary costs, a complete framework for
evaluating which forms of taxation to employ must also incorporate
administrative and compliance costs. 10 6 I use the term "overhead
costs" to refer to the aggregate category consisting of the administra-
tive costs the government incurs to enforce the tax system, the compli-
ance costs taxpayers incur as a result of the tax system, and all of the
other costs associated with raising tax revenues other than distortion-
ary costs. 10 7 Thus, the fourth key set of empirical parameters for ap-
plying the theoretical framework is (4) the marginal overhead costs
that would be generated by levying each tax instrument and by adjust-
ing the rates of each tax instrument to be evaluated.
Unfortunately, the existing literature provides only limited general
guidance for how overhead costs might function with respect to ques-
104 See id. at 30-31. However, note that many distortionary responses may function as
hybrids between multi-instrument and single-instrument distortions, if the responses re-
duce tax liabilities more for one tax instrument than for another. These responses can be
analyzed by factoring out the extent to which the responses operate as multi-instrument
distortions and then evaluating the remaining portions of these responses as single-instru-
ment distortions. See id. at 30-31. Also note that, because multi-instrument distortions
cannot be reduced by adjusting the mixture of tax instruments levied, these distortions are
especially important for the questions of how much revenue a government should raise or
how much distribution a government should promote. See text accompanying notes 54-57.
105 See notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
106 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 1, at 1426.
107 My terminology follows Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization
and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 Tax. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1992).
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tions about which forms of taxation to employ. 10 8 Nevertheless, the
literature does suggest two aspects of overhead costs that may be gen-
erally relevant for these questions.
First, there is reason to infer that overhead costs may often rise with
the number of tax instruments levied, even holding revenues raised
constant. 109 In other words, there may often be a fixed component to
overhead costs with respect to each tax instrument used. This fixed
cost component of overhead costs thus might be minimized by utiliz-
ing fewer forms of taxation. However, this prescription potentially
conflicts with the prescription for minimizing the costs from single-
instrument and instrument-shifting distortions. 110
The second aspect of overhead costs that may be generally relevant
when determining which forms of taxation to employ is that overhead
costs may often rise with the number of persons (or other agents)
charged with tax remittance obligations."' Thus, overhead costs may
be lower for tax instruments that collect revenues from a small num-
ber of taxpayers with greater ability to pay, as opposed to collecting
revenues from a larger number of taxpayers with lesser ability to pay.
Overall, then, the greater the marginal costs from single-instrument
and instrument-shifting distortions, the greater the potential advan-
tages of utilizing multiple forms of taxation. But these advantages
must be balanced against the potential for additional forms of taxation
to increase overhead costs. Consequentially, questions about which
forms of taxation to employ cannot be answered without estimates for
these key empirical parameters (or at least inductive inferences about
the plausible bounds of these parameters).
Before proceeding to review the literature relevant for estimating
the key empirical parameters for applying this theoretical framework,
it is worth noting that the above discussion did not fully explain the
power of the tax-smoothing principle. Instead, the above discussion
illustrated only what I have previously referred to as the "rule-of-
thumb version" of the tax-smoothing principle.112 Importantly, there
are reasons for inferring that the advantages of levying additional tax
instruments to supplement a labor income or a progressive consump-
tion tax may be stronger than what is suggested by the rule-of-thumb
version of the tax-smoothing principle. 113 However, because these ad-
ditional considerations are rather complicated to explain, and because
these considerations only strengthen the case for levying multiple tax
108 See Subsection II.B.2.
109 See Gamage, note 5, at 32-34.
110 See id. at 33.
Ml1 See id. at 33-34.
112 See id. at 44.
113 See id. at 41-44.
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instruments, I just allude to these considerations here rather than of-
fering a full explanation.114 Analysts attempting to quantitatively
evaluate which forms of taxation to employ--and especially those
analysts also wishing to assess how to set the tax rates for these forms
of taxation--should probably incorporate these additional considera-
tions into their estimates. Yet, for the purposes of this Article, it
should suffice to note that the rule-of-thumb version of the tax-
smoothing principle can be thought of as a rough lower bound on the
extent to which levying additional tax instruments might reduce the
distortionary costs generated by the overall mixture of the tax
instruments.11 5
B. Assessing the Key Empirical Parameters
As the previous Section explained, there are four key sets of empiri-
cal parameters for applying this Article's theoretical framework in
evaluating which tax instruments to use: (1) the marginal single-in-
strument distortions that would be generated by adjusting the tax
rates of each tax instrument; (2) the marginal instrument-shifting dis-
tortions that would be generated by adjusting the gaps between the
effective tax rates of each set of tax instruments; (3) the distributional
implications of adjusting the tax rates of each tax instrument; and (4)
the marginal overhead costs that would be generated by levying each
tax instrument and by adjusting the rates of each tax instrument.
With complete information on each parameter with respect to the
forms of taxation to be evaluated, it should be possible to estimate
baselines for which forms of taxation should optimally be employed
and also for the optimal setting of the tax rates for each form. In
combination, complete information on the four empirical parameters
should allow for assessing first, the extent to which imperfections in
the different forms of taxation overlap or are distinct and second, the
efficiency and distributional implications of the potential advantages
from utilizing multiple forms of taxation based on the extent to which
the imperfections in these forms of taxation are non-overlapping; and,
finally, how these potential efficiency and distributional advantages
compare to the possible disadvantages if utilizing multiple forms of
taxation would increase overhead costs.
For this Article's purposes, however, these four empirical parame-
ters are probably best thought of as being mostly just a checklist of
factors that should be considered when analyzing which forms of taxa-
tion to employ. I have not attempted to develop this theoretical
114 For further discussion, see id.
115 See id. at 44.
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framework into a formal model, and there seems limited point in at-
tempting to do so in light of the current lack of empirical estimates for
some of the key parameters. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework
can still helpfully inform questions about which forms of taxation a
government should employ. It can be useful to refer to a checklist of
factors that should be considered, after all, especially seeing that so
much of the prior literature that has attempted to make policy recom-
mendations based on double-distortion reasoning has disregarded the
potential relevance of some of these factors. Moreover, beyond being
a checklist of important factors, this theoretical framework can also
offer some guidance for evaluating the potential implications of these
factors, as elaborated in Part III.
Before proceeding to apply this theoretical framework to specific
tax policy debates, this Section discusses what can be learned from the
empirical economics literature about the four key empirical parame-
ters for applying the theoretical framework.
There is a relatively well-developed literature on the distributional
implications of utilizing different forms of taxation, based on measure-
ments of tax incidence.' 16 There are also a number of good studies on
the implications of instrument-shifting responses with respect to the
analysis of some of the tax policy questions for which these responses
are likely to be particularly significant, such as the comparison of la-
bor income taxes to capital income taxes or to corporate income
taxes.117 In contrast, the existing literature is lacking in estimates for
single-instrument distortions and marginal overhead costs. This Sec-
tion thus focuses on assessing these two empirical parameters. In do-
ing so, it mostly focuses on comparing the existing U.S. income tax to
other possible supplementary forms of taxation.
1. The Taxpayer Responsiveness Literature
There is a sizeable economics literature attempting to empirically
measure how taxpayers respond to taxation. There are a number of
good surveys of this literature.118 I do not attempt to repeat the work
of those surveys here, but rather highlight some of their conclusions.
116 For a review of this literature, see Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Inci-
dence, in 4 Handbook of Public Economics 1787, 1787-872 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin
Feldstein eds., 2002).
117 For discussion, see Saez et al., note 2, at 10-12.
118 See, e.g., Kaplow, note 3, at 80-90; Robert Carroll & Warren Hrung, What Does the
Taxable Income Elasticity Say About Dynamic Responses to Tax Changes?, Am. Econ.
Rev., May 2005, at 426, 426-27; Jonathan Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of
Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications, 84 J. Pub. Econ. 1, 1-6 (2002); Meghir &
Phillips, note 3, at 206; Saez et al., note 3. at 3-41.
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Most of the early studies in the taxpayer responsiveness literature
attempted to measure labor supply elasticities, in particular by exam-
ining the elasticity of the number of hours worked by taxpayers. Dur-
ing the 1970's and 1980's, several empirical studies suggested that
labor supply elasticities might be large. 119 A large body of subsequent
research, however, has employed more refined empirical methodolo-
gies to find measured labor supply elasticities that are rather mod-
est. 120 Most economists now agree that measured labor supply
elasticities are overall fairly small, being close to zero for middle-in-
come primary workers and for high-income taxpayers generally, and
somewhat higher for low-income and secondary workers. 121
As discussed further below, these empirical findings do not rule out
the possibility that actual overall labor supply elasticities might be
large. It could be that existing empirical methodologies are simply not
capable of measuring the most important aspects of actual labor sup-
ply elasticities, such as if the most important components of actual
labor supply elasticities derive from taxpayers reducing their work ef-
fort without reducing either hours worked or labor-force participation
or if long-term labor supply elasticities are much larger than shorter-
term elasticities.122 Although we cannot rule out the possibility that
actual overall labor supply responses may be large, the empirical liter-
ature does not provide support for the inference that these responses
are large. This is in notable contrast to the empirical literature offer-
ing a plethora of evidence supporting large responsiveness for a vari-
ety of tax-gaming responses.123 As a survey of the literature by three
prominent economists explains, "[a]lthough evidence of a substantial
compensated labor supply elasticity has been hard to find, evidence
that taxpayers respond to tax system changes more generally has de-
cidedly not been hard to find. '124
In light of this evidence, beginning in the 1990's, the empirical liter-
ature on taxpayer responsiveness moved away from its prior focus on
labor supply elasticities and toward also studying how reported taxa-
119 See Gruber & Saez, note 118, at 2-3.
120 See id at 2.
121 See Saez et al., note 2, at 4-5 ("With some notable exceptions, the profession has
settled on a value for this [labor supply] elasticity of close to zero for prime-age males,
although for married women the responsiveness of labor force participation appears to be
significant. Overall, though, the compensated elasticity of labor appears to be fairly small.
In models with only a labor-leisure choice, this implies that the efficiency cost per dollar
raised of taxing labor income . . . is bound to be low, as well.").
122 For further discussion on this point, see notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
123 See Saez et al., note 2, at 42 (concluding that "while there is compelling U.S. evi-
dence of strong behavioral responses to taxation at the upper end of the distribution,"
these responses consist entirely of "timing and avoidance" transactions, and that "[i]n con-
trast, there is no compelling evidence to date of real economic responses to tax rates . .
124 Id. at 4.
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ble income responds to changes in tax rates. 125 In a groundbreaking
paper, Martin Feldstein argued that the elasticity of taxable income
can be used as a sufficient statistic for determining the efficiency costs
of labor income taxation. 126 Feldstein argued that, on the margin, tax-
payers should be willing incur up to a dollar of costs to avoid a dollar
of tax liabilities, and that we can thus assume that the deadweight loss
from the labor income tax can be calculated based on the elasticity of
taxable income and the square of the relevant marginal labor income
tax rates. 127 In essence, Feldstein claimed that the elasticity of taxable
income can be used as a comprehensive parameter for measuring the
welfare costs from the combination of all of the techniques that tax-
payers can use to reduce their labor income tax liabilities, including
labor-to-leisure responses and all possible tax-gaming responses, such
that the elasticity of taxable income "provides all of the information
that is needed to evaluate the deadweight loss of the income tax.' 128
Inspired by Feldstein, numerous studies have attempted to measure
taxable income elasticities. These studies have reported a range of
possible results, 29 but there is general agreement on a couple of
points. First, measured taxable income elasticities are much greater
than measured labor supply elasticities. 130 Second, measured taxable
125 Within the U.S. tax system, the ordinary income tax rates (in contrast to the capital
gains rates) can be thought of as the rates most affecting labor income.
126 Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel
Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 551, 552-55 (1995); see also Martin
Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 Rev. Econ. &
Stat. 674, 674-75 (1999) [hereinafter Tax Avoidance]. These two papers by Feldstein
spawned a literature that Chetty described as developing a sufficient-statistics methodol-
ogy for studying income taxation; see Chetty, note 51, at 467-70. This Article's theoretical
framework is based on this literature and especially on Chetty's synthesis of this literature.
127 Feldstein, Tax Avoidance, note 126, at 675 ("The deadweight loss therefore ... [i]s
equivalent in the current case to the product of the square of the tax rate and the elasticity
of taxable income with respect to one minus the tax rate.").
128 Id. at 674.
129 Gruber & Saez, note 118, at 2-3 ("[T]his subsequent work has generated a range of
estimated elasticities, ranging from Feldstein's estimate at the high end to close to zero at
the low end .... We find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is 0.4, well below the
original estimates of Feldstein but roughly at the mid-point of the subsequent literature...
We also find that this response is driven largely by the behavior of high income
taxpayers ... ").
130 E.g., Kaplow, note 2, at 86-87 ("In sum, the elasticity of taxable income is not yet
known with confidence. Nevertheless, it appears that this elasticity is significantly larger
than the elasticity of labor supply with regard to hours and participation alone."); Alan J.
Auerbach & James R. Hines Jr., Taxation and Economic Efficiency, in 3 Handbook of
Public Economics, note 80, at 1348, 1361 ("The evidence indicates that taxable income is
generally very responsive to tax changes, with estimated response elasticities that signifi-
cantly exceed the typically very modest estimated effects of taxation on numbers of hours
worked."); Meghir & Phillips, note 3, at 252 ("For highly educated individuals the sensitiv-
ity of both hours of work and participation to work incentives are almost zero. However,
for higher income and higher skill individuals the total income elasticity is substantial
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income elasticities are much greater for high-income taxpayers than
for low- and middle-income taxpayers. 13'
The more recent literature has noted some limitations to Feldstein's
argument that taxable income elasticities can be used as a sufficient
statistic for measuring all of the distortionary costs generated by the
labor income tax. 132 Most importantly, 133 some of the tax-reduction
techniques measured by taxable income elasticities may involve tax-
payers recharacterizing their income so that it is subject to the corpo-
rate income tax or the tax rates for capital gains rather than the tax
rates for ordinary labor income-in this Article's terminology, some
portions of taxable income elasticities represent instrument-shifting
distortions. 34 To the extent that some of the behaviors measured by
taxable income elasticities do represent instrument-shifting distor-
tions, Feldstein's approach may overestimate the efficiency costs of
labor income taxation, because the deadweight loss from instrument-
shifting distortions must be measured with respect to the gap between
the effective tax rates of the tax instruments in question, not with re-
spect to the labor income tax rates alone.135
...."); Saez et al., note 2, at 4, 17-43 (concluding that "[o]verall . . .the compensated
elasticity of labor appears to be fairly small" and then reviewing the empirical literature on
taxable-income elasticities to find a range of possible results nearly all of which are much
larger than measured labor supply elasticities).
131 E.g. Gruber & Saez, note 118, at 1 ("We estimate that this overall elasticity is prima-
rily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above
$100,000 per year, who have an elasticity of 0.57, while for those with incomes below
$100,000 per year the elasticity is less than one-third as large."); Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable
Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion
and Avoidance, 1 Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y, Aug. 2009 at 31, 31 ("The empirical literature
on taxable income elasticity has generally found that elasticities are large (0.5 to 1.5) for
individuals in the top percentile of the income distribution, and relatively small (0 to 0.3)
for the rest of the income distribution ...."); Saez et al., note 2, at 6 ("[A] number of
empirical studies have found that the behavioral response to changes in marginal tax rates
is concentrated in the top of the income distribution .... ).
132 E.g., Chetty, note 131, at 32-33; Saez et al., note 2, at 5-17.
133 Other possible limitations to Feldstein's argument that have received significant at-
tention in the prior literature involve the possibility of externalities or salience effects. I
discussed the potential implications of these complicating factors in Gamage, note 5, at 63-
69.
134 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 1, at 1443-45. Relatedly, some of the behavior mea-
sured by taxable-income elasticities involves taxpayers shifting the timing of their tax liabil-
ities. As with instrument-shifting distortions among different tax instruments, the welfare
costs from these behaviors should be measured with respect to the gap between the present
value of the effective tax rates at the different time periods. Id. at 1463; Saez, et al., note 2,
at 10-13.
135 In other words, measuring just how taxpayers can alter their behavior to reduce their
income tax liabilities overstates the welfare costs of this behavior to the extent that the
behavior is simultaneously increasing the taxpayers' liabilities with respect to the corporate
income tax or the capital gains tax rates.
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For the purposes of this Article, the key question that arises from
the taxpayer-responsiveness literature is the extent to which the be-
haviors measured by taxable income elasticities represent single-in-
strument distortions, multi-instrument distortions, or instrument-
shifting distortions, when comparing the labor income tax to other
possible tax instruments. Again, there are several good studies ana-
lyzing the possibility that portions of measured taxable income elastic-
ities result from instrument-shifting distortions from the labor income
tax to other existing tax instruments. 136 But, perhaps because my
prior Article was the first scholarly work to introduce the distinction
between single-instrument and multi-instrument distortions in a gen-
eralized setting, there is essentially no literature analyzing the extent
to which taxable income elasticities measure single-instrument distor-
tions as opposed to multi-instrument distortions.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that nearly all of the studies in
the taxpayer-responsiveness literature examine only short- and me-
dium-term elasticities.1 37 A number of scholars have suggested that
labor supply elasticities might be much larger over the long run.1 38
There may be adjustment costs involved in taxpayers switching
jobs, 139 optimization errors involved in taxpayers learning about
136 See note 134.
137 Saez et al., note 2, at 13-14.
138 For discussion, see Kaplow, note 2, at 87-90.
139 See Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Tore Olsen & Luigi Pistaferri, Adjustment Costs,
Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish
Tax Records, 129 Q.J. Econ. 749, 749 (2011). This groundbreaking paper finds that "two
observations suggest that the structural elasticity A is likely to be an order of magnitude
larger than the observed elasticities in our data." Id. at 753. However, the paper's dataset
does not allow the authors to directly measure labor supply elasticities. Instead, the au-
thors attempt to construct a measure for labor supply elasticities by factoring out observa-
ble (1) tax evasion, (2) shifting to pension contributions, and (3) shifting of wage income to
capital income. Id. at 781-83. The authors acknowledge that they are unable to distinguish
between labor supply responses and other tax minimization techniques other than those
few listed above. Id. Yet, as discussed in Gamage, note 5, at 37-38 and 60-61, much (if not
most) tax evasion cannot be detected through auditing studies (which the authors rely on),
and (particularly for high-income taxpayers) much of the wage income shifted into capital
income goes untaxed by the capital income tax rules (and thus undetected by the authors'
methods) because of planning based on realization rules. Consequently, there is reason to
infer that much of the long-term responsiveness measured by this paper may result from
tax minimization techniques other than labor-to-leisure distortions, and this is particularly
likely to be true for higher-income taxpayers. The authors note these limitations, and ar-
gue that these limitations are not directly relevant for their purpose of measuring the effi-
ciency costs of raising revenues through an income tax. Chetty et al., supra, at 782-83. In
contrast, these limitations are crucial for this Article's purposes.
Similarly, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, Stefanie Stantcheva, Optimal Taxation of
Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities, 6. Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 230, 231-33
(2014), finds suggestive evidence from cross-country comparisons that both long-run labor
supply elasticities and long-run tax avoidance elasticities are relatively small, with elastici-
ties related to rent-seeking behaviors being much larger. However, the authors' measure
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changes to the tax system and calibrating their responses,1 40 or other
transition costs that impede taxpayers from adjusting their behavior in
response to tax-rate changes, except over long time frames. There is
thus a literature comparing the relationship between tax rates and la-
bor supply across different countries, with the goal of measuring what
sometimes are called "macro-elasticities. 1' 41 Some of these studies
have concluded that long-term labor supply elasticities may be much
larger than those measured over the short term.142 But other scholars
have questioned these results, arguing that differences across coun-
tries are more likely the result of unionization, workplace regulations,
or cultural attitudes toward work variables that can explain variation
in both tax rates and measured labor supply.1 43
In any case, the arguments made for why labor supply elasticities
may be larger in the long run also apply to taxpayer responses other
than labor-to-leisurc distortions. There are large transition costs in-
volved in setting up many tax-gaming techniques. 144 And there is no
particular reason to expect that transition costs are larger for labor
supply responses than for other tax-reduction strategies. Indeed,
many of the most powerful tax-gaming responses involve significantly
altering the way income is earned so as to take advantage of gaps in
the tax system. 1 45 These techniques thus may involve larger transition
costs than do changing hours worked or changing jobs within an in-
dustry, especially when the tax-gaming responses require renegoti-
ating long-term contracts or if it takes lawyers and accountants some
time to devise new tax-gaming responses following changes to tax
rates. Similarly, taxpayers are likely to face optimization errors with
for tax avoidance elasticities is constructed "based on a broader definition of income (that
includes realized capital gains and hence a significant part of avoidance channels) ...." Id.
at 232. The authors' measure for tax avoidance thus excludes any techniques that reduce
this broad definition of income, which for the reasons noted above, probably implies that
the authors are not measuring many important forms of tax-gaming responses.
140 For a discussion, see e.g., Raj Chetty, Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Fric-
tions: A Synthesis of Micro and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply, 80 Econometrica 969,
970 (2012).
141 Id. at 972.
142 E.g. Edward C. Prescott, Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europe-
ans?, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis Q. Rev. 2, July 2004, at https://www.minneapolisfed
.org/research/qr/qr2811.pdf.
143 Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, Work and Leisure in the US and
Europe: Why So Different?, 20 NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1, 5 (2005).
144 For instance, important forms of tax planning involve substituting debt financing for
equity financing, shifting from using corporate forms to using partnership forms, shifting
assets or income-producing activities to lower-tax jurisdictions, establishing trusts, and oth-
erwise significantly altering contractual agreements or the structure of income-producing
activities. All of these techniques (and many others) are likely to involve large transition
costs.
145 Id.; see also Scholes et al., note 39, at 16-28; Schizer, note 32, at 1316-33.
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respect to tax-gaming decisions just as with respect to labor supply
decisions.1 46 Consequently, long-term elasticities may be larger than
measured short- and medium-term elasticities for tax-gaming re-
sponses as well as for labor supply responses.
2. The Need for Marginal Cost Information
For the purposes of designing an optimal tax system, the only rele-
vant social welfare costs are those that can be affected by adjusting
components of the tax system. So, for an example discussed earlier,
multi-instrument distortionary costs can be factored out when analyz-
ing which forms of taxation to employ, because-by definition-these
costs cannot be altered by adjusting the mixture of forms of taxation
are used.147
For similar reasons, determining optimal tax policy requires infor-
mation on the marginal costs of taxation, as only marginal cost infor-
mation indicates how adjusting components of the tax system affects
social welfare. 48 Information on average costs or on total costs is
only relevant to the extent that such data sheds light on marginal
costs. This is why the taxpayer-responsiveness literature attempts to
measure marginal costs, focusing on elasticity measurements-which
are functions for expressing marginal cost information.
Unfortunately, the existing empirical literature only provides infor-
mation on total and average overhead costs, not the needed informa-
tion on marginal overhead costs. 149 For instance, the economists Joel
Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki report estimates that the overall over-
head costs created by the U.S. income tax are around 11% of reve-
nues raised.150 For comparison, Feldstein estimated that the overall
distortionary costs generated by the U.S. income tax total 32% of rev-
enues raised.' 5' However, Feldstein's calculations do not account for
complications raised by the subsequent literature such as the possibil-
ity of instrument-shifting distortions. Moreover, Feldstein's calcula-
tions were based on a much higher measurement for taxable income
146 For discussion of salience effects and optimization errors, see Gamage, note 5, at 57-
69.
147 See notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
148 Jonathan Shaw, Joel Slemrod & John Whiting, Administration & Compliance, in
Mirrlees Review, note 3, at 110, 1109.
149 Id.
150 The vast majority of these costs arise from taxpayers' compliance costs (estimated at
10% of tax revenues), with the government's enforcement costs being much smaller (esti-
mated at 0.6% of revenues). Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 1, at 1448-49.
151 Feldstein, Tax Avoidance, note 126, at 678.
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elasticities than those reported in the more recent literature (using
more developed empirical methodologies). 152
In any case, these estimates for total overhead and distortionary
costs potentially suggest that both categories of costs may be signifi-
cant. But, again, determining which forms of taxation to employ re-
quires information on marginal costs. A recent review of the
literature by three prominent economists concludes (based on the best
available estimates for taxable income elasticities) that the marginal
distortionary costs created by the U.S. income tax equal about 20% of
the marginal dollar of revenue raised.153 This estimate may be too
low, because it is based on measured short-run taxable income elastic-
ities, rather than long-run elasticities. Also, when comparing the in-
come tax to other forms of taxation, it is unclear to what extent this
measure represents multi-instrument distortions, single-instrument
distortions, or instrument-shifting distortions. And it should be kept
in mind that reported elasticities are much larger for higher-income
taxpayers than for low- and moderate-income taxpayers. Neverthe-
less, this measure offers at least some indication of the possible magni-
tude of marginal distortionary costs. In contrast, we lack even
ballpark estimates for the possible magnitude of marginal overhead
costs.
1 54
Lacking estimates for marginal overhead costs, we cannot quantita-
tively assess how a government should balance the goal of minimizing
overhead costs against the goal of minimizing distortionary costs when
deciding which forms of taxation to employ. Until the literature pro-
duces better estimates of the relevant parameters, then, the best we
can do is to speculate about plausible bounds to questions about
which forms of taxation to employ, based on the empirical data we do
have and on inductive inferences about the other relevant empirical
parameters-as this Article does in Part III.
3. On the Prevalence of Single-Instrument Distortions
I now return to considering the extent to which the taxpayer re-
sponsiveness to the U.S. labor income tax might consist of single-in-
152 Feldstein applied a measurement for the taxable income elasticity of 1.04. Id. In
contrast, Saez et al., note 2, at 42, conclude that the best available estimates for taxable
income elasticities in the more recent literature range from 0.12 to 0.40. Feldstein notes
that his calculation for the distortionary costs of the U.S. income tax as a percent of reve-
nues raised would be twelve times smaller based on a taxable income elasticity of 0.125.
Feldstein, Tax Avoidance, note 126, at 678.
153 Saez et al., note 2, at 42 (estimating that "the marginal excess burden per dollar of
federal income tax revenue raised is $0.195 for an across-the-board proportional increase,
and $ 0.339 for a tax increase focused on the top 1 percent of income earners.").
154 See Shaw et al., note 148, at 1101.
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strument distortions, multi-instrument distortions, or instrument-
shifting distortions. Crucially, the answer to this question depends on
what we are comparing the labor income tax to. We simply cannot say
whether a tax-reduction technique constitutes a single-instrument or
multi-instrument distortion in the abstract. For instance, at the ex-
treme, when comparing the labor income tax to a lump sum tax, al-
most all of the responsiveness to the labor income tax should consist
of single-instrument distortions, as there is little that taxpayers can do
reduce their liabilities under lump sum taxes (beyond perhaps moving
entirely out of the taxing jurisdiction). 155 In contrast, at the other ex-
treme, when comparing the federal-level income tax to a state-level
income tax, if the state-level income tax fully conforms with the base-
calculation rules and procedures of the federal-level income tax,'156
then almost all of the responsiveness to the federal-level income tax
should consist of multi-instrument distortions. With full conformity,
there is little that taxpayers might do to reduce their federal-level in-
come tax liabilities that would not also simultaneously reduce their
state-level income tax liabilities. 157
For this reason, assessing the extent to which taxpayer responsive-
ness might consist of single-instrument, multi-instrument, or instru-
ment-shifting distortions is best done in the context of analyzing more
specific tax policy debates. I thus mostly delay working through ex-
amples to illuminate this question until Part III, so as to better ground
those examples by comparing more specific forms of taxation.
Before proceeding to that more detailed discussion, however, it is
worth first discussing what can be said about the prevalence of single-
instrument distortions at a more general conceptual level. There is at
least some reason to expect that almost any form of taxation should
generate significant single-instrument responses as compared to other
forms of taxation that are based on substantially different base-calcu-
lation rules, at least if the form of taxation is levied with high enough
tax rates so as to motivate taxpayers to engage in tax avoidance and
tax evasion responses. Many important real world tax avoidance tech-
niques involve exploiting gaps in the details of tax-base-calculation
rules, as taxpayers strive to reduce their tax liabilities while altering
155 See notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
156 For a discussion of conformity, see Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity
with the Federal Tax Base, 62 Duke L.J. 1267, 1274-312 (2013).
157 Even with full conformity, there are a number of important ways in which taxpayers
might reduce their state-level income tax liabilities that would not directly affect their fed-
eral-level income tax liabilities (such as moving taxable income from higher-tax states to
lower-tax states). These responses would represent single-instrument distortions for the
state-level income tax.
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their economic affairs as little as possible. 158 The more contingent a
tax-avoidance technique is on the detailed rules of a form of taxation,
the more likely that the technique should operate at least partially as a
single-instrument response when comparing that form of taxation to
other forms of taxation that are based on significantly different base-
calculation rules. Similarly, many forms of tax evasion involve taxpay-
ers concealing their taxable resources while otherwise maintaining
their regular economic affairs. 159 These sorts of tax-evasion tech-
niques should often at least partially represent single-instrument re-
sponses when comparing the form of taxation in question to other
forms of taxation based on significantly different tax-base-calculation
measurements. Because all real world forms of taxation are subject to
tax-avoidance and tax-evasion techniques of these sorts, one can ex-
pect that most any real world form of taxation should generate signifi-
cant single-instrument responses as compared to many other real
world forms of taxation. As Ronald Pearlman writes, "[e]very tax sys-
tem has Achilles' heels .... [m]oreover, in the real world, every tax
system is vulnerable to tax avoidance and tax evasion, much of it un-
anticipated during the legislative process. ' 160
That said, when comparing most possible forms of taxation, there is
reason to expect that a much larger portion of the tax-reduction tech-
niques employed by higher-income taxpayers should constitute single-
instrument responses as opposed to the tax-reduction techniques em-
ployed by low- and medium-income taxpayers. As noted earlier, the
gap between measured taxable income elasticities and measured labor
supply elasticities for the U.S. income tax is much larger for higher-
income taxpayers.1 6' Moreover, it stands to reason that higher-in-
come taxpayers generally should be better positioned to hire lawyers
and accountants to structure transactions so as to take advantage of
the gaps and loopholes that exist in any real world form of taxation.162
Similarly, higher-income taxpayers are generally better positioned to
negotiate the details of their employment contracts and their other
economic affairs so as to maximize tax advantages, whereas lower-
income taxpayers often have to accept standardized contractual terms,
making it more difficult for lower-income taxpayers to engage in tax-
158 See Shackelford, note 35, at 114-15; Avi-Yonah, note 3, at 1398 ("most of the evi-
dence for behavioral responses ... relates to tax avoidance strategies (e.g., charitable giv-
ing techniques, shifting income from corporations to individuals, and the timing of
receipts), rather than to real activities (labor and saving decisions)"); see also Gamage,
note 5, at 38-41.
159 Gamage, note 5, at 39-40 & 60-61.
160 Ronald A. Pearlman, Fresh from the River Styx: The Achilles' Heels of Tax Reform
Proposals, 51 Nat'l Tax J. 569, 569 (1998).
161 See notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
162 Gruber, note 84, at 747-48.
2015]
TAX LAW REVIEW
gaming responses based on manipulating the detailed rules of how
forms of taxation are implemented. 163
Finally, it is worth re-emphasizing that the more different the rules
two distinct forms of taxation use for calculating tax liabilities, the
more likely the distortionary responses to each form of taxation will
constitute single-instrument responses as compared to the other form
of taxation. At the extreme, if two forms of taxation use the exact
same base-calculation rules, then essentially all of the distortionary
responses to these forms of taxation should constitute multi-instru-
ment responses. For instance, at the U.S. federal level, both the regu-
lar income tax and the alternative minimum tax systems use very
similar rules for calculating tax liabilities. 164 The primary differences
between these two forms of taxation lie in their different rate sched-
ules, rather than in their rules for calculating taxable income. Conse-
quently, most of the distortionary responses to these two forms of
taxation probably constitute multi-instrument responses.165 Con-
versely, U.S. state-level income and sales tax systems use very differ-
ent rules for calculating their tax bases. A much larger portion of the
distortionary responses to these two forms of taxation thus probably
constitutes single-instrument responses with respect to the other form
of taxation.
Ultimately, there is only so much that can be inferred about the
prevalence of single-instrument distortions based on this sort of more
general conceptual discussion. What is needed ideally are empirical
studies comparing the taxpayer responsiveness to multiple forms of
taxation, as discussed further in the next Subsection. Because we cur-
rently lack these sorts of studies, Part III further assesses the taxpayer
responsiveness to more specific forms of taxation primarily through
analyzing examples of tax-gaming responses. Part III argues that
these examples suggest that the tax-gaming responses to these forms
of taxation at least significantly consist of single-instrument and in-
strument-shifting responses as compared to the other forms of taxa-
tion considered-in other words, the tax-gaming responses are at least
significantly non-overlapping between these forms of taxation-and
especially so with respect to the top portion of the best-off taxpayers.
163 David Gamage & Shruti Rana, Taxation and Incentives in the Business Enterprise, in
Enterprise Law: Contracts, Markets, and Laws in the US and Japan 277, 286 (Zenichi
Shishido ed., 2014).
164 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 110th Cong., Present Law and Background
Relating to the Individual Alternative Minimum Tax 2-5 (Comm. Print 2007) (describing
the rules of the AMT).
165 For further discussion, see notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
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4. Directions for Future Empirical Work
As noted earlier, of the four key empirical parameters, there is a
sizable literature relevant for estimating the marginal distributional
impact of adjusting the rates of various forms of taxation, and there
are a number of good studies related to estimating marginal instru-
ment-shifting distortions with respect to comparing certain forms of
taxation. 166 Where the existing literature is lacking is in providing es-
timates for marginal single-instrument distortions and for marginal
overhead costs.
Beginning with the first of these questions, to estimate single-instru-
ment distortions, we need techniques for distinguishing the extent to
which measurements of taxable income elasticities result from multi-
instrument or from single-instrument responses. One approach for
empirically studying the distinction between single-instrument distor-
tions and multi-instrument distortions would be to examine the cross-
elasticity of taxpayer responses to one tax instrument with respect to
changes in the tax rates for another instrument. For instance, a study
might measure the extent to which taxpayers reduce their taxable
purchases under state sales taxes in response to changes in the rates of
the federal and state income taxes. To the extent that measured tax-
payer responsiveness to the income taxes represents multi-instrument
distortions as compared to the sales taxes, we should expect taxpayers
to reduce both their reported taxable incomes and their purchases
subject to state sales taxes. Conversely, to the extent that taxpayer
responsiveness to the income taxes represents single-instrument dis-
tortions, we should expect taxpayers to reduce their reported taxable
income without also reducing their purchases subject to state sale
taxes.
Future empirical work might also shed more light on marginal over-
head costs with respect to the choice of which forms of taxation to
employ. As a starting point, the best approach for examining this
question might be to measure the total overhead costs within a variety
of different taxing jurisdictions in order to examine the correlations
between different tax structures (and in particular the use of different
mixtures of forms of taxation used) and the total level of overhead
costs within the jurisdiction. A study of this sort probably could only
produce suggestive data on marginal overhead costs, but having even
suggestive data would be extremely valuable for informing questions
about which forms of taxation to employ.
If this Article succeeds in convincing scholars of the importance of
these questions, future empirical work quite probably will conceive of
166 See notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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other creative approaches for measuring single-instrument distortions
and marginal overhead costs. That we currently lack good estimates
for these parameters may be at least partially a result of the prior
theoretical literature's focus on labor-to-leisure distortions and on
other tax-reduction behaviors that are less contingent on the details of
how forms of taxation are implemented. Focusing more on the signifi-
cance of tax-gaming distortions and on marginal overhead costs
should thus (I hope) prod the future empirical literature to produce
better estimates for the relative magnitudes of these important forms
of efficiency costs.
III. APPLYING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE
SELECTED TAX POLICY DEBATES
Much of the prior theoretical literature on tax reform has tried to
separate the question of what should be taxed from the related ques-
tion of how tax systems should be implemented. 167 Yet, to a large
extent, these two questions are inextricably intertwined. 168 The theo-
retical literature's insights thus should be integrated with the lessons
that the more applied literature teaches about the major imperfections
that are likely to manifest in the real world implementations of tax
reform proposals.
Certainly, there is value to modeling tax reforms at an abstract
level. It is simply not possible to simultaneously analyze all of the
considerations relevant to implementing real world forms of taxa-
tion.169 It is thus both useful and appropriate for scholars to evaluate
abstract or even "ideal" conceptions of tax systems. But great care
should be taken in extrapolating from analyses of these "ideal" con-
ceptions to their real world analogs. 170 Because the empirical litera-
ture suggests that tax-gaming distortions and marginal overhead costs
167 Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 1, at 1425, 1450-56.
168 Id.; Ronald Pearlman, note 40, at 12 ("[I]t is important for policymakers to remem-
ber that in order to achieve broad tax policy objectives, it is best not to leave design and
implementation issues until the end.").
169 See, e.g., David Gamage, On the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative
Mechanisms and Limiting Factors, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 173, 173 (2013) ("The U.S. tax
system is incomprehensibly complex. Any attempt to assess the U.S. tax system must
therefore rely on applying some theoretical frame."); Weisbach, note 57, at 1670-71 ("One
is forced between the Scylla of simple generalizations that are sometimes wrong and the
Charybdis of an approach that is too complex to apply.").
170 See Sarah Lawsky, How Tax Models Work, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1657, 1693 (2012) ("[T]he
models of law and economics do not authorize irrefutable deductive reasoning about the
real world. Reasoning from models to the real world, amplifies, relies on similarity, and is
creative and imaginative."); Weisbach, note 57, at 1644 ("The platonic or essentialist no-
tions contained in doctrinal rules are not tied to values that a tax system should pro-
mote .... [P]latonic approaches also cannot be defended on pragmatic grounds . . ..
[PIlatonic reasoning only creates complexity and avoidance opportunities.").
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may well be of primary importance for many tax policy questions, pol-
icy recommendations that do not account for the possibility of these
effects should be regarded with suspicion.
When it comes to analyzing proposals for fundamental tax reform,
however, there is a difficulty in evaluating tax-gaming distortions. By
their very nature these distortions are contingent and context-depen-
dent. So then, how can we know what forms of tax-gaming distortions
taxpayers might use in response to hypothetical proposals for future
tax reform?
Fortunately, a number of studies in the tax legal literature have al-
ready grappled with this difficulty. Although little can be said with
certainty about the sorts of tax-gaming responses that might be used
to circumvent hypothetical proposals for future tax reform, there is
still much that can be said with reasonable confidence. There is a sub-
stantial body of tax legal scholarship analyzing the sorts of tax-gaming
distortions that likely would be used in response to a variety of pro-
posals for fundamental tax reform. 171 By integrating this scholarship
with the insights that can be gleaned from the relevant economics lit-
eratures, 172 this Part evaluates the potential implications of tax-gam-
ing distortions with respect to some common proposals for taxing
labor income, consumption, capital income, and wealth.
To keep the scope of the discussion manageable, this Part compares
only selected versions of these forms of taxation. First, the next Sec-
tion compares labor income taxes to value-added consumption taxes.
Second, the following Section compares progressive consumption tax
proposals to supplementary capital income taxes. Third, the final Sec-
tion compares realization-based capital income taxes to annual-valua-
tion-based wealth taxes.
Through these comparisons, I argue that it is probably optimal for
developed country governments that seek to raise substantial reve-
nues while promoting substantial distributional equity (like the
United States) to utilize some approach for taxing (all of) labor in-
come, consumption, capital income, and wealth, rather than forgoing
the use of one or more of these forms of taxation. However, I do not
attempt to determine the best approach for levying any of these forms
of taxation. For instance, it might well be superior to integrate these
forms of taxation in some ways, rather than levying all of these forms
of taxation as separate tax systems. Fully evaluating how these forms
171 See, e.g., Daniel Goldberg, The Death of the Income Tax: A Progressive Consump-
tion Tax and the Path to Fiscal Reform 28-44 (2013); Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 245-49;
Mark P. Gergen, The Effects of Price Volatility and Strategic Trading Under Realization,
Expected Return and Retrospective Taxation, 49 Tax L. Rev. 209, 218-28 (1994); Shackel-
ford, note 35, at 114-30.
172 See Part II.
2015]
TAX LAW REVIEW
of taxation might be implemented or integrated is beyond the scope of
this Article.
Moreover, I do not argue that these four forms of taxation are nec-
essarily superior to other potential alternatives beyond those consid-
ered. This Part only argues that utilizing all of these forms of taxation
is probably superior to not making use of one or more of these forms
of taxation. Quite possibly, there might be other forms of taxation
that would be superior to use in place of one or more of the forms of
taxation I evaluate, or perhaps as an additional supplement to the
forms of taxation evaluated. For instance, I do not evaluate wealth
transfer taxes (such as estate and gift taxes or inheritance taxes), nor
do I evaluate mark-to-market approaches for capital income taxation
as an alternative or supplement to realization-based approaches for
capital income taxation.
It is my view that proposals for fundamental tax reform are (gener-
ally) best analyzed through a series of comparisons between compet-
ing reform proposals. I doubt that it is possible to meaningfully
evaluate the question of what ultimately would be the most ideal of all
possible tax systems. There are so many variables that should be con-
sidered in evaluating this question so as to make the scope of the
question unmanageable, unless the question is posed so abstractly
such that any insights gleaned from the analysis may have little rele-
vance to real world tax reforms.
Therefore, scholarship seeking to shed light on real world tax re-
form proposals generally should operate at more of a medium level of
abstraction. To this end, I propose that scholarship focus more on
comparing competing options for tax reform, with the goal of rejecting
inferior options. Through a series of such comparisons, the scholarly
literature then can work toward identifying more and less promising
approaches for tax reform. It might not be possible to determine the
ultimately ideal tax system. But if an aim of tax legal scholarship is to
inform real world policy debates, this approach should suffice for
scholarship to assist in evaluating real world options for tax reform.
A. Comparing Labor Income Taxes and
Value-Added Consumption Taxes
The two most important forms of taxation used to raise revenues in
most developed countries today are income taxes and VATs. 173 The
United States is anomalous among developed countries in not levying
173 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Risk, Rents, and Regressivity: Why the United States
Needs Both an Income Tax and a VAT, 105 Tax Notes 1651, 1651 (Dec. 20, 2004).
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both an income tax and a VAT,174 thus raising the question of whether
the United States should perhaps adopt a VAT to supplement its in-
come tax.
I put to the side, for the moment, the related questions of whether
and how capital and wealth should be taxed.175 For the purposes of
this Section, then, I focus on the portions of real world income taxes
that are designed to reach labor income-for example, the ordinary
income component of the U.S. income tax. These labor income taxes
can be conceived of as forms of taxation whose base-calculation rules
are designed to measure the inflows that taxpayers receive from sell-
ing their labor.
In contrast to labor income taxes, VATs are similar to retail sales
taxes and also excise taxes in that all of these forms of taxation are
designed to collect revenues from taxing consumption in the form of
market purchases. Yet most scholars have concluded that VATs tend
to have fewer holes than do retail sales taxes, because VATs are col-
lected at multiple steps of the production process, rather than just at
the retail level. 176 In any case, whereas the bases of labor income
taxes are calculated measuring inflows (on the resources taxpayers re-
ceive in exchange for selling their labor), the bases of VATs are calcu-
lated measuring outflows (on the resources taxpayers expend to
purchase market consumption). 177
Most prior theoretical analyses consider labor income taxes and
VATs to be essentially equivalent in terms of distortionary costs.' 78
Both of these forms of taxation burden the decision to work for the
purpose of funding market consumption, as compared to working less
and enjoying more leisure. Thus, in models that focus only on labor-
to-leisure and saving-to-spending distortions, these forms of taxation
appear to be essentially equivalent, as both forms of taxation similarly
174 Id.
175 These questions are analyzed in Sections III.B and C.
176 E.g., Carroll & Viard, note 24, at 159-61; Joel Slemrod, Comment 2, in Institutional
Foundations of Public Finance: Economic and Legal Perspectives 104-05 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Daniel N. Shaviro eds., 2009) [hereinafter Institutional Foundations].
177 Or, at least, this is how I conceive of what these forms of taxation measure for the
purposes of this analysis.
178 E.g., McCaffery, note 36, at 5-6 ("The two taxes are, from an economic point of view,
equivalent."); Ian Crawford, Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, Value-Added Tax and Ex-
cises, in Mirrlees Review, note 3, at 275, 276-77; Laurence Seidman, Book Review, 67 Nat'l
Tax J. 269, 274 (2014) ("[M]any economists ... call a labor income tax 'a consumption-
based tax' or simply 'a consumption tax.' These economists correctly point out that a labor
income tax or a consumption tax, in contrast to a capital income tax, does not distort the
trade-off between present and future consumption, and that the lifetime present values of
the tax bases under the two systems are identical under certain circumstances.").
Note that VATs and labor income taxes may differ in dynamic models because of the
different timing of when the taxes are assessed. But the general point remains that most
prior theoretical analyses treat the bases of these taxes as being essentially the same.
2015]
TAX LAW REVIEW
burden the labor-to-leisure decision without directly burdening the
saving-to-spending decision. 179
Moreover, the traditional Haig-Simons formulation holds that con-
sumption equals income minus changes in wealth.'8 0 Because neither
the bases of labor income taxes nor VATs are designed to reach
changes in wealth, analysts thus frequently conclude that these two
forms of taxation are essentially equivalent, except for administrative
considerations, as the Haig-Simons formulation suggests that the labor
component of income equals consumption.181 In other words, based
on the notion that inflows must eventually equal outflows, analysts
often conclude that the bases of labor income taxes and VATs are
essentially just opposite sides of the same coin.
Expanding the analysis to incorporate tax gaming, however, reveals
that real world labor income taxes and VATs in fact have rather dif-
ferent bases. Even to the extent that actual inflows do equal actual
outflows, this does not imply that measured inflows equal measured
outflows. As elaborated below, the inflows measured by real world
labor income taxes are likely to differ substantially from the outflows
measured by real world VATs.
I start by explaining some common tax-gaming distortions that
serve to reduce labor income tax liabilities, without directly affecting
VAT liabilities-in other words, single-instrument distortions for a la-
bor income tax as compared to a VAT. These sorts of tax-gaming dis-
tortions allow taxpayers to fund purchases with the returns to their
labor while at least partially circumventing a labor income tax.
Perhaps the most serious problem in designing labor income taxes is
that it can be very difficult for a tax system to distinguish between
labor income and capital income. 18 2 Inevitably, this problem seems to
open the door for many high-income taxpayers to convert what theo-
retically would seem to be labor income into forms that the tax system
treats as capital income, which then allows for further games, with the
eventual result being that the taxpayers can fund consumption
179 See Bankman & Weisbach, Ideal Consumption Tax, note 13, at 1417 ("A consump-
tion tax, as a matter of legal implementation, is imposed on consumption and not on labor,
but it is economically equivalent to a tax on labor earnings. The reason is that on a going-
forward basis, there are two sources of consumption: earnings from labor (wages) and
earnings from capital. If, under a consumption tax, capital income is not taxed, all that is
left to tax is wages.").
180 David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 Tax L. Rev. 1, 23-24 (2004).
181 John R. Brooks II, Taxation, Risk, and Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns
to Risk Under a Normative Income Tax, 66 Tax. L. Rev. 255, 259 (2013).
182 See, e.g., McCaffery, note 36, at 12-17; Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case
for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ.
Persp., Fall 2011, at 165, 181 ("[I]t is often difficult to distinguish between capital and labor
incomes.").
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purchases while circumventing substantial portions of the labor in-
come tax.183 The Ellison example discussed previously illustrates one
of the ways that taxpayers can engage in these sorts of games so as to
reduce their tax liabilities under the U.S. income tax.184 Similar to the
earlier discussion of Ellison's tax gaming, many of the best-off Ameri-
cans appear to have substantially exempted their wealth from the U.S
income tax because the initial receipt of their wealth was treated as
being related to capital rather than labor income.' 8 5 Yet, were the
United States to adopt a VAT, many of the consumption purchases
made by these wealthy Americans would potentially be subject to that
VAT.
Of course, the U.S. income tax perhaps might be reformed so as to
combat these forms of tax-gaming responses. But it seems rather na-
ive to think that these forms of tax-gaming responses could be com-
pletely shut down. As Daniel Goldberg concludes in assessing some
of the gaming responses currently used to reduce U.S. income tax
liabilities,
[t]axing income is a flawed concept because income itself is
an ambiguous concept. It is difficult to define, and its mea-
surement is complicated and subject to substantial disagree-
ment. As a result, an income tax would be deficient even if it
were pristine, free of tax incentive provisions and personal
itemized deductions. The income tax thus cannot be fixed
with just some tinkering. 186
Another sort of tax-gaming response through which taxpayers can
reduce their labor income tax liabilities is by inflating deductions
through the use of aggressive or even fraudulent valuations. For in-
stance, charitable tax planning is a big business, and U.S. taxpayers
have devised numerous creative strategies for giving up something of
little value in exchange for a large charitable contribution deduc-
tion.187 Similarly, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that numer-
183 Gamage, note 2, at 37-38.
184 See notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., Christopher H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax Reform, 59 SMU L. Rev. 435,
437-38 (2006) ("[M]uch of the wealth of entrepreneurs and capitalists, such as Bill Gates
and Warren Buffet, the two wealthiest Americans, has never been taxed because, in each
case, the bulk of their wealth is held in stock of corporations that they created or ac-
quired .... In other words, Gates and Buffet have primarily pretax wealth, while most
individuals have primarily after-tax wealth."); Victor Fleischer, The Top 10 Private Equity
Loopholes, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2013, 1:18 PM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com
2013/04/15/the-top-10-private-equity-loopholes/?_r=0.
186 Goldberg, note 171, at 15.
187 See, e.g., Michael A. Livingston & David S. Gamage, Taxation: Law, Planning, and
Policy 443-47 (2d ed. 2010); Josh Eagle, Notional Generosity: Explaining Charitable Do-
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ous taxpayers inflate deductions related to claiming business
expenses.188 Claiming inflated deductions reduces taxpayers' labor in-
come tax liabilities by the tax value of the deduction claimed, but tax-
payers' consumption is only reduced by the value of what is given up.
When taxpayers use inflated valuations to claim deductions many
times larger than their actual expenses, then, these tax-gaming re-
sponses should generally reduce the taxpayers' labor income tax liabil-
ities significantly in excess of any corresponding reduction to the
taxpayers' VAT liabilities.
Beyond these specific examples, there is a large literature explain-
ing the various ways that taxpayers act to reduce their income tax lia-
bilities. As Slemrod and Yitzhaki assess this literature:
The research has clarified that when the tax structure
changes, people may alter their consumption basket, but
they also may call and give new instructions to their account-
ant, change their reports to the IRS, change the timing of
transactions, and effect a set of other actions that do not di-
rectly involve a change in their consumption basket. In
many cases, particularly for high-income taxpayers, this lat-
ter set of responses has larger revenue and welfare implica-
tions than the real substitution responses, such as labor
supply, that tax analysis has traditionally focused on.189
To the extent that taxpayers act to reduce their income tax liabilities
without altering their consumption baskets, these behaviors generally
should constitute single-instrument responses for the income tax as
compared to VATs. Consequently, Slemrod and Yitzhaki's assess-
ment of the literature suggests that at least a substantial portion of the
taxpayer responsiveness to the U.S. income tax probably consists of
single-instrument distortions as compared to a VAT, and especially so
with respect to the highest-income taxpayers. 190
More generally, both "income" and "labor income" are nebulous
concepts.1 91 When looking beyond straightforward transactions such
nors' High Willingness to Part with Conservation Easements, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 47
(2011); Calvin H. Johnson, Ain't Charity: Disallowing Deductions for Kept Resources, 128
Tax Notes 545 (Aug. 2, 2010).
188 See Goldberg note 171, at 19-26; Gergen, note 29, at 472-77.
189 Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 1, at 1464.
190 See id. at 1454-56.
191 A substantial portion of most introductory tax law courses typically involves border-
line questions related to "what is income?" and another substantial portion typically in-
volves borderline questions related to what expenses should be deductible against taxable
income. E.g., Livingston & Gamage, note 187, at 25-128, 251-454; see also Goldberg, note
171, at 15-44.
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as the payment of cash wages, there are thus numerous important real
world contexts in which it is rather unclear whether and to what ex-
tent the transactions should be considered as involving taxpayers re-
ceiving income. 192 Because income is a nebulous concept, taxpayers
have developed numerous tax-gaming techniques for exploiting gaps
in the rules for calculating taxable income-and many of these tech-
niques allow the taxpayers to reduce their reported taxable incomes
without needing to simultaneously reduce or conceal their market
expenditures.1 93
Less familiar to many U.S.-based tax scholars, 194 "consumption"
and "value-added" are also nebulous concepts, and there are many
tax-gaming techniques that reduce VAT liabilities without directly
preventing individuals from expending their monetary resources so as
to derive utility from market consumption. 95 At the individual level,
perhaps the simplest technique that taxpayers can use to reduce their
VAT liabilities is to purchase goods or services from vendors in for-
eign jurisdictions that do not levy VATs or from domestic vendors
who are able to circumvent the VAT. Probably more importantly,
there are numerous tax-gaming techniques that business taxpayers can
use to reduce their VAT liabilities.196
As Bankman and Schler note, "European VAT systems, like the
current U.S. income tax, are plagued by fraud."'197 Moreover, beyond
clearly illegal fraud, VAT systems have difficulty coping with financial
transactions, with the shifting of business income to tax-exempt and
loss entities, with the shifting of business income or property to for-
eign affiliates or to financial intermediaries, with related-party pricing
192 Goldberg, note 171, at 15-44.
193 Gamage, note 5, at 36-41.
194 As Michael Keen and Ben Lockwood note, the "literature on the VAT is surprisingly
sparse" and, in particular, "[e]mpirical work on the VAT is also scant." Michael Keen &
Ben Lockwood, The Value-Added Tax: Its Causes and Consequences, 92 J. Development
Econ. 138, 139 (2010).
195 See Rita de la Feria & Richard Krever, Ending VAT Exemptions: Learning from
Experience, Towards a Post-Modern VAT, in VAT Exemptions: Consequences and Design
Alternatives 3, 35 (Rita de la Feria ed., 2013) ("One recurrent issue... is the definition of
consumption... It has therefore become clear that one of the main challenges of the post-
modern VAT will be a rather unexpected one: not about feasible legal designs or economic
consequences, but one with an intrinsically philosophical nature, one about philosophy of
tax. That is, how to conceptually define what constitutes consumption for the purposes of
a consumption tax."); Walter Hellerstein & Jon Sedon, Challenging Legal Issues Con-
fronting VAT Regimes, 131 Tax Notes 409, 416 (Apr. 25, 2011).
196 Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 246.
197 Id. at 246 (describing several major forms of fraud and concluding that these "frauds
have become so pervasive that they are distorting official trade statistics"); see also Rich-
ard T. Ainsworth, VAT Fraud and Technological Solutions, in The VAT Reader 204,204-06
(2011); Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know, and
What Can Be Done? 59 Nat'l Tax J. 861, 866-68 (2006).
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issues, with valuation issues, and with deferral. 198 All of these issues
open gaps in VAT-base calculation rules, thus creating opportunities
for tax-gaming transactions. Because these forms of tax gaming oper-
ate by reducing reported VAT liabilities, rather than by taxpayers sub-
stituting away from earning income for the purpose of funding
purchased consumption, these forms of tax gaming should largely con-
stitute single-instrument responses for VATs as compared to labor in-
come taxes. 199
Overall then, there is strong reason to infer both: (1) that at least a
significant portion of the taxpayer responsiveness to labor income
taxes constitutes single-instrument distortions as compared to VATs,
and (2) that at least a significant portion of the taxpayer responsive-
ness to VATs constitutes single-instrument distortions as compared to
labor incomes taxes. In other words, the holes in these two forms of
taxation are at least significantly nonoverlapping. In light of the tax-
smoothing principle, then, I infer that using both of these forms of
taxation probably has the potential to reduce overall distortionary
costs as opposed to not using one of these forms of taxation.
Based on the existing literature, it is difficult to assess with any con-
fidence whether VATs or labor income taxes are worse in terms of
overall distortionary costs (with respect to any fixed amount of reve-
nues to be raised).200 In their excellent analysis of the tax-gaming re-
sponses that taxpayers might employ if the United States replaced its
income tax with an X-tax (a form of a VAT integrated with a progres-
sive consumption tax at the individual level201), Bankman and Schler
agree that the VAT component of the X-tax "will present considerable
opportunities for tax planning. '202 Bankman concludes that these op-
portunities for tax gaming are likely to be less than under the existing
U.S. income tax, whereas Schler concludes the opposite. 20 3 But both
of these esteemed tax scholars expect that the VAT component of the
X-tax would be "subject to various tax avoidance transactions" and
would present considerable "opportunities for socially unproductive
tax planning. 20 4
198 Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 246.
199 Many of these tax-gaming transactions are essentially equivalent to the discussion in
the prior article of taxpayers claiming artificial or inflated labor income tax deductions or
exclusions, except that in this case the deductions and exclusions are used to reduce busi-
ness taxpayers' VAT liabilities. See Gamage, note 5, at 8-9.
200 Put differently, it is difficult to assess how elastic the overall distortionary responses
are to these two forms of taxation or which form of taxation is more elastic in terms of
overall distortionary coasts.
201 For further discussion of the X-tax, see notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
202 Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 273.
203 Id. at 275.
204 Id. at 273-74.
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An important complicating factor is that the VATs levied by most
real world governments are currently more regressive than are most
real world labor income taxes.20 5 If real world VATs induce less dis-
tortionary costs than do real world labor income taxes, then, this may
just be a result of the fact that higher-income taxpayers tend to engage
in more tax-gaming responses than do lower-income taxpayers. A
meaningful comparison of VATs and labor income taxes in terms of
distortionary costs thus should control for distributional incidence.
It is theoretically possible to adjust labor income tax rates to
achieve any desired level of distributional equity. It is also theoreti-
cally possible to adjust a VAT so as to achieve any desired level of
distributional equity, although doing so requires (for instance) trans-
forming the VAT into an X-tax by integrating the VAT with an indi-
vidual-level progressive consumption tax.20 6 However, as no real
world governments have implemented an X-tax, it is difficult to pre-
dict the magnitude of distortionary costs such a tax might induce. Al-
ternatively, a VAT can be made more progressive by levying
additional excise taxes on luxury goods purchases, but no real world
governments have adopted this approach to anywhere near the extent
necessary to make a VAT as progressive as most real world labor in-
come taxes.
I see no reason to think that there would be significant instrument-
shifting responses between labor income taxes and VATs.20 7 Also,
were the United States to levy a VAT to supplement its income tax,
the rates of the labor income tax could be adjusted to achieve the
desired level of revenue and the desired distributional incidence of the
tax system. Hence, the question of whether it would be optimal for
the United States to levy a VAT to supplement its labor income tax
should largely boil down to comparing the potential for reducing dis-
tortionary costs from single-instrument responses (after adjusting for
revenues and distributional incidence) against any increase in over-
head costs that might be generated by using both forms of taxation.20 8
How much potential is there for reducing distortionary costs by lev-
ying both a labor income tax and a VAT instead of only one of these
forms of taxation? This question probably cannot be answered with
205 Avi-Yonah, note 173, at 1651-52.
206 See notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
207 If there are, then this would strengthen the case for levying both a VAT and a labor
income tax. See notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
208 This follows from the four questions for applying the theoretical framework. See
Subsection II.A.3. Note, however, that there may be important political economy consid-
erations entailed in this question. For a discussion of the implications of political economy
considerations, see Gamage, note 5, at 69-72. For a discussion of possible political econ-
omy considerations involved in levying a VAT, see Gamage & Shanske, note 62, at 35-38.
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any precision based on the empirical information currently available.
As discussed earlier, in their review of the taxpayer responsiveness
literature, the economists Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz report that their
best estimates for the marginal distortionary costs generated by the
U.S. federal income tax are approximately 20% of the marginal dollar
of revenue raised with respect to all taxpayers, or 34% of the marginal
dollar of revenue raised with respect to the top 1% of income earn-
ers.20 9 What portion of these distortionary costs results from single-
instrument responses as compared to a VAT? Based on the evidence
that overall measured labor supply elasticities are small,210 and on the
analyses of the many tax-gaming responses for both income taxes and
VATs that likely represent single-instrument responses as compared
to the other form of taxation, 211 it seems reasonably safe to infer that
at least a substantial portion of the distortionary costs induced by the
U.S. income tax might result from single-instrument responses as com-
pared to a VAT, and especially so with respect to the highest-income
taxpayers. 21 2 In an earlier Article, I suggested as a very rough best-
guess estimate that perhaps 50% of the taxpayer responsiveness to the
U.S. income tax might constitute single-instrument responses as com-
pared to a VAT or to excise taxes. 21 3
Would levying both a labor income tax and a VAT increase over-
head costs as compared to levying only one of these forms of taxa-
tion? And, if so, by how much? I can only speculate about the
answers to these questions based on the empirical information cur-
rently available. European Commission officials report that the ad-
ministrative costs of VATs range from about 0.5 % to 1% of revenues
collected. 21 4 In addition to these administrative costs, studies suggest
that the overall compliance costs of a VAT are in the neighborhood of
3% to 5% of revenues collected, for countries that raise a substantial
share of their tax revenues through a VAT.215 We might thus estimate
that the overall overhead costs associated with levying a substantial
VAT might range from 3.5% to 6% of revenues collected.
209 Saez et al., note 2, at 42.
210 See notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
211 Gamage, note 5, at 36-41; see notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
212 See notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
213 Gamage, note 5, at 40-41.
214 See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-08-566, Value-Added Taxes: Lessons
Learned from Other Countries on Compliance Risks, Administrative Costs, Compliance
Burden, and Transition 15-16 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-
566.
215 Randall Holcombe, The Value Added Tax: Too Costly for the United States 25
(Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 10-32, 2010), available at http://
mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication.VAT.Holcombe.pdf.
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What do these estimates suggest about the marginal overhead costs
of supplementing a labor income tax with a VAT? Again, it is hard to
say, as what is needed is information about marginal costs rather than
total costs. 216 Yet it is worth noting that a number of distinguished
scholars have suggested that the United States might be able to de-
crease overall overhead costs by reducing reliance on its income tax in
favor of levying some form of a VAT. 217 Moreover, Michael Graetz
has proposed integrating a VAT and an income tax in a fashion that
would largely exempt most low- and moderate-income taxpayers
from the income tax.218 There is some question about whether this
proposal is actually workable,219 but if so, some variation of this ap-
proach could perhaps achieve most of the advantages of levying both
forms of taxation in terms of minimizing distortionary costs without
significantly increasing overhead costs.
The evidence implies that distortionary costs are a much larger con-
cern with respect to higher-income taxpayers. 220 Conversely, over-
head costs are largely a function of the number of taxpayers charged
with compliance and remittance obligations. 221 Empirical studies sug-
gest that the majority of overhead costs probably results from the
paperwork obligations imposed on taxpayers generally, rather than
from the elements of overhead that might be associated more specifi-
cally with higher-income taxpayers.222 The ratio of overhead costs to
tax revenues raised is thus likely to be much higher for low- and mod-
erate-income taxpayers, for the simple fact that fewer tax dollars are
collected from these taxpayers. If it is administratively feasible to levy
an integrated VAT and income tax in such a way as to levy both forms
of taxation with respect to high-income taxpayers while mostly avoid-
ing subjecting low- and moderate-income taxpayers to income tax
216 See Subsection II.B.2.
217 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 Tax L. Rev. 1, 8
(2006) (stating that the "main reason" for levying both a VAT and a labor income tax "is
administrability"); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for
the U.S. Tax System, 112 Yale. L.J. 261, 299 (2002) (concluding that the "principal advan-
tage" of his proposed tax reform plan "would be its major simplification of the lives of the
American people"); see also Joel Slemrod, My Beautiful Tax Reform, in Toward Funda-
mental Tax Reform, note 40, at 135, 137 ("[A VAT] is not without its problems and com-
plexities; the cost of compliance is not trivial, but is still probably half or less of that of our
income tax.").
218 Graetz, note 217, at 290-93.
219 For questions about whether Graetz's approach could be successfully implemented,
see Robert Greenstein & Iris Lav, The Graetz Tax Reform Plan and the Treatment of Low-
Income Households, 108 Tax Notes 99, 99 (July 4, 2005).
220 See notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
221 See note 111 and accompanying text.
222 See Slemrod & Gillitzer, note 28, at 75-76 (concluding that "compliance costs dwarf
administrative costs" and that compliance costs primarily result from the value of the hours
taxpayers spend keeping records and fulfilling other tax filing requirements).
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compliance obligations, then this may well be the optimal approach
for minimizing both distortionary costs and overhead costs.
Overall then, it seems plausible to me that levying some combina-
tion of a labor income tax and a VAT probably would be superior to
levying only one of these forms of taxation-at least for developed
country governments with high revenue and distributional goals. It
seems fairly clear that using some combination of both of these forms
of taxation could at least significantly reduce overall distortionary
costs, as opposed to not using any version of one or the other of these
forms of taxation. In contrast, it is not at all clear how using both of
these forms of taxation might affect overall overhead costs. But we at
least lack strong reason for inferring that using both forms of taxation
would substantially increase overall overhead costs, and it seems pos-
sible that doing so might even reduce overall overhead costs.
Certainly, the answers to these questions largely depend on the de-
tails of how these forms of taxation might be implemented. Also,
whether it makes sense to levy both a VAT and an income tax is par-
tially a function of the government's revenue and distributional goals.
The higher the government's revenue and distributional goals, the
faster the exponential growth of distortionary costs per marginal dol-
lar of revenues raised, and the greater the advantages of raising reve-
nues and promoting distribution through multiple forms of
taxation. 223 Remember that distortionary costs rise exponentially as
any form of taxation is used more to raise revenues or to promote
distribution. Therefore, the greater the need to raise revenues from
high-income taxpayers, the more powerful are the potential advan-
tages of raising this revenue through a larger number of forms of taxa-
tion.224 At some magnitude of revenue needs or distributional goals,
then, the advantages of levying both an income tax and a VAT in
terms of reducing distortionary costs are very likely to overpower any
possible disadvantages in terms of increasing overhead costs.
Many tax legal scholars have previously argued that the United
States should levy a VAT to supplement its income tax.225 Up to now,
these arguments have mostly not been based on the potential for re-
ducing distortionary costs, as prior legal scholarship has not been able
to convincingly explain how levying both a VAT and a labor income
tax could reduce distortionary costs in light of the conflicting implica-
223 Gamage, note 5, at 44; notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
224 I thus suspect that it is not mere coincidence that, as compared to the United States,
most of the world's other major developed countries both raise considerably more revenue
as a percent of GDP and raise a much larger portion of this revenue from instruments
other than an income tax.
225 E.g., Avi-Yonah, note 217.
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tions of double-distortion arguments. 226 Applying this Article's theo-
retical framework clarifies why using both forms of taxation probably
has the potential to reduce overall distortionary costs. This analysis
thus strengthens the case for why the United States might want to
implement a VAT to supplement its income tax.
B. Comparing Progressive Consumption Tax Proposals
to Capital Income Taxes
One of the most influential policy applications of double-distortion
arguments has been in regard to the question of whether capital in-
come should be taxed. Indeed, prominent scholars have contended
that this may be "the single most important tax policy decision. ' 227
Largely based on double-distortion reasoning, Shaviro has claimed
that there is now a "consensus" among many leading law professors
and economists in favor of progressive consumption taxes.228
This Section begins with a discussion of why the prior theoretical
arguments that have been made against taxing capital income have
only limited applicability to the real world forms of taxation com-
monly referred to as "capital income taxes" and "consumption taxes."
This Section then proceeds to evaluate the major proposals advocated
for how the United States might replace its income tax with a progres-
sive consumption tax. Contrary to the "dominant view" in the prior
literature,229 this Section concludes that it is probably optimal for de-
veloped country governments (like the United States) to positively tax
capital income at least to some degree.
Moreover, beyond arguing that capital income should be positively
taxed, this Section suggests that there may be considerable merit to
some of the reform proposals forwarded as mechanisms for imple-
menting a progressive consumption tax-so long as these reform pro-
226 See, e.g., id. at 1, 4 (seemingly implying that historical experience suggests that levy-
ing both a labor income tax and a VAT would generate less distortionary costs than levying
only a labor income tax with higher rates, but not directly responding to the double-distor-
tion argument with respect to the choice between a VAT and labor income tax, despite
addressing the implications of that argument with respect to whether capital income should
be taxed); Daniel Shaviro, Update on Graetz Tax Reform Plan, Start Making Sense (June
1, 2005, 12:45 PM), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2005/06/update-on-graetz-tax-reform-
plan.html (critiquing Graetz's plan for levying an integrated VAT and income tax on the
basis that this plan would not reduce distortionary costs); notes 214-15 and accompanying
text.
227 Bankman & Weisbach, Ideal Consumption Tax, note 13, at 1414.
228 Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 745,
747 (2007).
229 Sanchirico, Tax Eclecticism, note 12, at 224 (claiming that it "is clear that the domi-
nant position in tax law and policy" is that capital income should not be taxed "at least as a
rule of thumb," and further describing this as the "dominant view").
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posals are divorced from the goal of exempting capital income from
taxation. Certain proposals for implementing a progressive consump-
tion tax might perhaps do a better job than existing income taxes at
combatting major tax-gaming distortions, especially those that exploit
the rules for distinguishing labor income from capital income. This
Section argues that these reform proposals will almost certainly fail to
fully plug these holes, and that combining these reform proposals with
supplementary capital income taxes should thus probably be superior
to levying these reform proposals in a manner designed to exempt
capital income from taxation. Yet approaches for integrating these
reform proposals with supplementary capital income taxes present in-
triguing possibilities for fundamental tax reform.
1. The Limited Applicability of the Arguments Against Taxing
Capital Income
Academic debate over whether capital income should be taxed has
largely focused on the implications of labor-to-leisure and saving-to-
spending distortions. 230 Scholars have argued that taxing capital in-
come induces both saving-to-spending distortions and labor-to-leisure
distortions.231 Consequently, many scholars have concluded that it is
optimal to tax only labor income or consumption, as double-distortion
arguments suggest that doing so would induce only labor-to-leisure
distortions and not also saving-to-spending distortions.232
Providing further support for these conclusions, some economists
have argued that saving-to-spending distortions are especially odious.
A frequently cited argument notes that even a small tax on capital
income as it accrues can impose a large burden on the decision to
invest in order to fund consumption in the distant future. 233 In a
model with infinite time frames-wherein taxpayers invest to fund
consumption in the infinitely far future-this argument has been in-
terpreted as implying that governments should perhaps not burden
savings decisions even if doing so would alleviate labor-to-leisure dis-
tortions. 234 However, recent work by the economists Ludwig Straub
and Ivdin Werning concludes that the models that are used to derive
230 Carroll & Viard, note 24, at 10-11; Shaviro, note 228, at 759-60.
231 Carroll & Viard, note 24, at 10-11.
232 Id.; Mankiw et al., note 23, at 147.
233 Christophe Chamley, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium
with Infinite Lives, 54 Econometrica 607, 619 (1986); Kenneth L. Judd, Optimal Taxation
and Spending in General Competitive Growth Models, 71 J. Pub. Econ. 1, 1 (1999); Ken-
neth L. Judd, Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model, 28 J. Pub. Econ.
59, 59 (1985).
234 For discussion and critique of this argument, see, e.g., Alan Auerbach, The Choice
between Income and Consumption Taxes: A Primer, in Institutional Foundations, note
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this result do not actually provide a rationale for not taxing capital
income. 235
Even the proponents of taxing capital income have largely focused
on labor-to-leisure and saving-to-spending distortions. The most in-
fluential economics-oriented arguments for taxing capital income have
been based on the implications of taxpayer heterogeneity and non-
separable preferences. 236 These arguments have suggested ways in
which taxing capital income might reduce labor-to-leisure distortions,
such that labor-to-leisure distortions might at least partially operate as
single-instrument responses for a labor income tax as compared to a
capital income tax.237 Despite these arguments, and perhaps unsur-
prising in light of the prior literature's focus on labor-to-leisure and
savings-to-spending distortions, many scholars continue to contend
that the economics-oriented literature implies that capital income
should not be taxed.238
However, when evaluating the real world policy instruments that we
typically label as "capital income taxes" and "consumption taxes," as
opposed to when analyzing highly idealized conceptions of these tax
instruments, the empirical literature does not provide support for the
176, at 13, 27-38; James Banks & Peter Diamond, The Base for Direct Taxation, in Mir-
rlees Review, note 3, at 548, 574-80; Diamond & Saez, note 182, at 165, 178-79.
235 Ludwig Straub & Ivdn Werning, Positive Long Run Capital Taxation: Chamley-Judd
Revisited (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20441, 2014), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20441.pdf.
236 For instance, Emmanuel Saez has argued that savings behavior can operate as a tag
for ability, because taxpayers with greater ability to earn labor income are more prone to
saving. Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear In-
come Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. Pub. Econ. 217, 228 (2002); Diamond &
Saez, note 182, at 181-83. For further discussion, see, e.g., Gamage, note 5, at 52-56;
Mikhail Gosolov, Maxim Troshkin, Aleh Tsyvinski & Matthew Weinzierl, Preference Het-
erogeneity and Optimal Capital Income Taxation, 97 J. Pub. Econ. 160 (2013).
237 See Gamage, note 5, at 52-56 for a general discussion of the logic behind these argu-
ments and for analysis of the related debates between Chris Sanchirico and a number of
prominent advocates of double-distortion arguments.
Another line of argument that potentially supports taxing capital income based on analy-
sis of labor-to-leisure and saving-to-spending distortions can be found in the literature on
"New Dynamic Public Finance." For discussion, see Mikhail Gosolov, Aleh Tsyvinski &
Ivdin Werning, New Dynamic Public Finance: A User's Guide, in 21 NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 317 (Daron Acemoglu, Kenneth Rogoff & Michael Woodford
eds., 2006).
238 E.g., Mankiw et al., note 23, at 167, 169 ("Perhaps the most prominent result from
dynamic models of optimal taxation is that the taxation of capital income ought to be
avoided. This result, controversial from its beginning in the mid-1980s, has been modified
in some ways and challenged directly in others, but its strong underlying logic has made it
the benchmark .... Both statutory tax rates on capital and measures of effective tax rates
remain far from zero, the level recommended by standard optimal tax models."). But see
Sanchirico, Tax Eclecticism, note 13, at 224 ("It is clear that the dominant position in tax
law and policy is that labor-earnings-only taxation is optimal-at least as a role of thumb.
This Article presents an argument for the proposition that labor-earnings-only taxation is
effectively never optimal.".
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notion that either labor-to-leisure or saving-to-spending distortions
are likely to be the primary concerns. As discussed previously, there
is essentially no persuasive empirical evidence that high-income tax-
payers substantially respond to taxation through labor-to-leisure re-
sponses. 239  The same conclusion holds for saving-to-spending
responses, although there is even more uncertainty in the empirical
estimates of saving-to-spending responses. 240 At the very least, then,
it is noteworthy that the empirical literature has failed to offer persua-
sive evidence that taxpayers significantly reduce their savings behav-
iors in response to real world attempts at capital income taxation.2 41
My inferences about real world taxpayer behavior correspond with
these empirical findings. There is reason to infer that most taxpayers
view consuming in the distant future as very different from consuming
in the present,242 and that consumption in distant time periods is thus
unlikely to be readily substitutable as a response to taxation. Cer-
tainly, if tax rates were high enough, and if taxpayers had no other
techniques available for circumventing capital income taxes, I would
expect those taxes to induce some reduction in savings behavior. But
for the highest-income taxpayers who produce the lion's share of capi-
239 See note 3 and accompanying text; Subsection II.B.1.
240 See, e.g., Orazio P. Attanasio & Matthew Wakefield, The Effects on Consumption
and Saving of Taxing Asset Returns, in Mirrlees Review, note 3, at 675, 728 ("[I]t is un-
likely that changes in interest rates due to preferential taxation, or other movements in
interest rates, will cause big changes in the level of saving."); B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxa-
tion and Saving, in 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1173, 1210 (Alan J. Auerbach &
Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) ("For the United States, there has been relatively little histori-
cal correlation between the growth rate of aggregate consumption and measures of the
after-tax rate of return. Consequently estimates . . . imply intertemporal elasticities of
substitution near zero."); Gravelle & Marples, note 3, at 6-7 ("Empirical evidence suggests
a negligible and possibly negative savings response."); Saez et al., note 2, at 42 ("[Tjhere is
no compelling evidence to date of real economic responses to tax rates.., at the top of the
income distribution."); Eric Toder & Kim Rueben, Should We Eliminate Taxation of Capi-
tal Income?, in Taxing Capital Income, note 21, at 89, 127, 129 ("[S]tudies have found ...
mixed effects of interest rates on saving [and] evidence of the responsiveness of saving to
after-tax returns is low...").
241 See note 240. There is a large theoretical literature that infers that saving-to-spend-
ing elasticities may be significant based on stylized models of how taxpayers save in order
to smooth consumption over their lifecycles. But in addition to relying on other strong
assumptions, these studies do not consider the possibility of taxpayers circumventing taxes
on capital through tax-gaming transactions as an alternative to substituting spending for
saving. Thus, these studies are compatible with the possibility (or, in my view, the strong
likelihood) that saving-to-spending distortions may be of second-order importance as com-
pared to tax-gaming techniques for circumventing taxes on capital income, at least for the
highest-income taxpayers. For reviews of this literature, see, e.g., Attanasio & Wakefield,
note 240; Bernheim, note 240.
242 1 partially derive this inference from the substantial literature on time inconsistency
in decisionmaking. For discussion of this literature, see Daniel Shaviro, Multiple Myopias,
Multiple Selves, and the Under-Saving Problem 23-28 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series No. 14-19, Aug. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=2469269; Gamage, note 169, at 185-88.
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tal income, both real world labor income and (especially) capital in-
come taxes appear to be relatively easy to game.243 I thus think it
likely that most of the responsiveness to real world capital income
taxes consists of distortions that are more contingent on the details of
how these taxes are implemented. I am skeptical that even a substan-
tial portion of the responsiveness to real world capital income taxes
consists of either saving-to-spending or labor-to-leisure responses, es-
pecially for the highest-income taxpayers. Perhaps I am wrong about
these inferences; I fully admit that the existing evidence is inconclu-
sive. Nevertheless, this inconclusiveness does not support defaulting
to the assumption that labor-to-leisure or saving-to-spending distor-
tions should be treated as primary considerations. Importantly,
whereas we lack convincing evidence of substantial labor-to-leisure or
saving-to-spending distortions, there is considerable evidence that tax-
payers respond to capital income taxation through a diverse variety of
tax-gaming responses.
Moreover, some recent scholarship suggests that there might not
even be much difference between an idealized income tax and an ide-
alized consumption tax, as these forms of taxation have typically been
conceived of in the prior theoretical literature.244 As Weisbach has
argued:
The risk-free return historically has been close to zero. All
that [a hypothetical, idealized] income tax taxes that a [hypo-
thetical, idealized] consumption tax does not is this amount.
Therefore, an income tax taxes vanishingly little not taxed
under a consumption tax. Notwithstanding the long debate
over the two tax bases, they are essentially the same.245
He further concludes that the prior theoretical debate over capital in-
come taxation "therefore, is almost meaningless, and the decision is
best made purely on administrative grounds rather than on theoretical
considerations about the appropriateness of taxing capital. ' ' 246 Other
scholars have disagreed with these conclusions, and have argued that
there is more of a difference between idealized income and consump-
tion taxes (as conceived of in the prior theoretical literature). 247 Yet
even these scholars do not provide reasons for inferring that labor-to-
leisure or saving-to-spending distortions are especially important fac-
243 See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Pref-
erence, 48 Tax L. Rev. 319, 351 (1993); Gamage, note 5, at 37-41.
244 Weisbach, note 180, at 26-27.
245 Id. at 24.
246 Id. at 25.
247 See e.g., Brooks, note 181, at 301.
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tors for evaluating the real world policy instruments commonly la-
beled as capital income taxes and consumption taxes.248
Ultimately, regardless of whether it is theoretically desirable (or
even possible) to burden the returns to savings, taxpayers' assets do in
fact appreciate, and the policy instruments commonly labeled as capi-
tal income taxes do in fact raise significant revenues from measuring
this appreciation. 249 Furthermore, there is little doubt that measured
appreciation tends to be associated far more with better-off (that is,
"high ability") taxpayers than with worse-off (that is, "low ability")
taxpayers.250
When evaluating existing and proposed real world capital income
and consumption taxes, then, there is little reason to infer that consid-
erations related to labor-to-leisure or saving-to-spending distortions
should be the primary concerns. 251 Instead, what Weisbach refers to
as "administrative" considerations probably should be the central fo-
cus. 252 Not coincidentally, this Article's theoretical framework is de-
signed to analyze what Weisbach presumably would label as
"administrative considerations"-in particular, distortionary costs re-
lated to tax-gaming responses that exploit the idiosyncratic design of
forms of taxation, and overhead costs. Put another way, it might be
an interesting theoretical question to ask whether governments should
seek to tax the returns to savings, narrowly defined. But this question
is rather removed from the question of whether governments should
248 See id. at 302 ("There is no question that this is a theoretical result. We do not have
a pure, normative Haig-Simons income tax, nor, arguably, should we. We also do not have
the complete capital markets that the Domar-Musgrave result requires, and so on. This
Article is not arguing that capital income is effectively taxed only because of the effects I
describe here. In fact, capital income does face a real and material tax under our current
income tax system.").
249 Alan J. Auerbach, The Future of Capital Income Taxation, 27 Fiscal Stud. 399, 401,
411 (2006) ("In light of the substantial revenues we collect from taxing capital income...
[o]nly a small portion of the measured return to capital represents the normal return to
new saving that our theories tell us not to tax. Eliminating all taxes on capital income gives
up much more revenue than simply eliminating the tax on the normal return to new saving,
and does little for the cause of equity, in fact and in appearance.").
250 Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Capital Gains, Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means & the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 5 (2012) (statement of Leonard E.
Burman, Professor, Syracuse Univ.) ("The benefits of a capital gains tax preference are
extremely concentrated among those with very high incomes."); Joel Slemrod, The Fortu-
nate 400, 100 Tax Notes 935, 936 (Aug. 18, 2003) ("In 2000 capital gains of the Fortunate
400 [best-off taxpayers] accounted for 71.83 percent of their AGI."); Eric Toder, Who Pays
Capital Gains Tax?, 120 Tax Notes 483, 483 (Aug. 4, 2008) (showing the distribution of
capital gains by income brackets).
251 It is important to distinguish here between saving-to-spending distortions and distor-
tions as to choices among different forms of savings (or different forms of capital invest-
ment). The latter forms of distortions may well be of primary importance. For further
discussion, see note 300.
252 See note 246 and accompanying text.
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utilize the real world policy instruments typically thought of as being
capital income taxes.
For a general overview of this Section's argument, I start with the
optimal-tax-theory notion that governments seek to raise revenues
based on measuring taxpayers' "ability" or "ability to pay."253 As dis-
cussed in the previous Section, we might then conceive of labor in-
come taxes as attempts at measuring ability by examining inflows.254
Correspondingly, we might conceive of VATs and excise taxes as at-
tempts at measuring ability by examining outflows. Real world at-
tempts at measuring both inflows and outflows are likely to be at least
somewhat imperfect, because all of these forms of taxation induce tax-
gaming responses.
Real world capital income taxes then can be conceived of as at-
tempts at measuring ability by examining the appreciation of taxpay-
ers' assets. In theory, the resources used to purchase assets must first
come to taxpayers as inflows, and the returns taxpayers enjoy from
the appreciation of their assets must at some point be used as out-
flows. In practice, however, taxpayers may be able to purchase assets
with resources that they obtained while circumventing forms of taxa-
tion designed to measure inflows, and they may be able to enjoy the
fruits of the appreciation of their assets while circumventing forms of
taxation designed to measure outflows. Thus, although in theory large
portions of appreciation can be taxed through forms of taxation de-
signed to measure inflows and outflows (such as, labor income taxes,
VATs, and other consumption taxes), these theoretical forms of equiv-
alence are likely to at least partially break down in practice-and es-
pecially so with respect to the best-off taxpayers.
In other words, the holes in the real world forms of taxation de-
signed to measure inflows, outflows, and appreciation are all likely to
be at least significantly nonoverlapping with the holes in these other
forms of taxation, as the base-calculation rules for these different
forms of taxation tend to be rather different.25 5 Therefore, in light of
the tax-smoothing principle, we can infer that using some version of
all three of these forms of taxation should have the potential to reduce
overall distortionary costs, as compared to not making use of one or
more of these forms of taxation.
Proceeding with the analysis, on one hand, real world capital in-
come taxes may tend to have far worse holes than real world labor
253 See note 60 and accompanying text.
254 See Subsection III.A.
255 As discussed in Subsection II.B.3, the more different the base calculation rules of
different forms of taxation are, the more likely a greater portion of the tax-gaming re-
sponses to each form of taxation will consist of single-instrument responses with respect to
the other forms of taxation.
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income taxes or VATs. 256 Yet, on the other hand, measured capital
income tends to be far more concentrated amongst the best-off (or,
high ability) taxpayers than either labor income or consumption, such
that levying even a low tax rate on capital income has the potential to
promote substantial distributional equity. Moreover, even if the capi-
tal income taxes that governments plausibly might employ have far
worse holes than do plausible labor income or consumption taxes
(with respect to any fixed sum of revenues to be raised, and even after
adjusting for distributional impact), it still may be optimal to levy a
substantial capital income tax as a supplement to these other forms of
taxation, in light of the tax-smoothing principle. Therefore, even if
the majority of revenues should be raised through some combination
of a labor income tax and a VAT, I argue that it is probably optimal
for developed country governments to also tax capital income so as to
raise significant revenues and promote significant distributional equity
at the margin.257
For these reasons, and as the remainder of this Section elaborates, it
is probably optimal to tax capital income to at least some degree.
Moreover, incorporating the implications of tax gaming suggests that
it is likely optimal to tax capital income even under the controversial
assumptions of double-distortion arguments that labor and consump-
tion are weakly separable and that taxpayers are homogeneous except
in their ability to earn labor income. 258 Thus, for readers who may
already have been convinced that it is optimal to tax capital income
based on the arguments of Saez or the other related scholarship dis-
cussed previously,259 this Section's analysis implies that capital income
should be taxed at higher effective rates than what would be optimal
based solely on those prior arguments.
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize that sophisticated
consumption tax proponents do not necessarily advocate (for in-
stance) reducing the tax rates on capital gains within the context of
the existing U.S. income tax. Among other concerns, these scholars
generally recognize that taxpayers can employ instrument-shifting
techniques to transform their ordinary labor income tax liabilities into
capital gains liabilities within the current U.S. income tax rules. These
scholars thus advocate instead for replacing the existing U.S. income
tax with some form of a progressive consumption tax. In support of
this position, many of these scholars argue that a well-designed pro-
256 Bankman & Weisbach, Ideal Consumption Tax, note 13, at 1415. But note that there
are proposals for how capital income taxes might be designed so as to fix many of the
problems plaguing existing real world capital income taxes; note 266.
257 But note that I do not argue for taxing capital and labor income at the same rates.
258 For discussion of these assumptions, see Gamage, note 5, at 52-56.
259 See notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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gressive consumption tax could prevent taxpayers from employing in-
strument-shifting techniques to convert their consumption tax
liabilities into a form treated as tax-exempt capital income.260
There are a variety of proposals for how a progressive consumption
tax might be implemented. 261 I focus on what I believe are the two
most influential of these proposals. First, as noted earlier, what is typ-
ically called an "X-tax" would implement a modified VAT wherein
businesses would deduct wages from their VAT liabilities and workers
would be taxed on wages at progressive rates.262 Second, what is
sometimes called either a "Personal Expenditures Tax" (or "PET") or
a "cash-flow consumption tax" would implement a modified labor in-
come tax such that taxpayers would deduct all savings (including "de-
posits into savings accounts, asset purchases, amounts lent to others,
and payments made on outstanding debts") but would then be taxed
on all dissavings (including "withdrawals from savings accounts, gross
proceeds of asset sales, amounts borrowed from others, and payments
received on outstanding loans"). 263 In theory, neither of these ap-
proaches for implementing a progressive consumption tax would bur-
den the returns to saving, and both approaches could be implemented
so as to promote any desired level of distributional equity.264
These proposals typically are advocated as mechanisms for exempt-
ing capital income from taxation while still maintaining progressivity.
I argue that supplementing these proposals with some form of a capi-
tal income tax probably would be superior to implementing these pro-
posals in a manner that exempts capital income from taxation. I focus
my analysis on the U.S. context, but my arguments should also apply
more generally to other developed country governments that seek to
raise substantial revenues while promoting significant distributional
equity.
260 See, e.g., Kaplow, note 2, at 233; David Weisbach, Implementing Income and Con-
sumption Taxes, in Institutional Foundations, note 176, at 59, 76 ("This means that relabel-
ing wages as capital income cannot reduce taxes."); Daniel Shaviro, Tax Policy Colloquium,
Week 5: Should We Raise the High-End Tax Rates to 70 Percent?, Start Making Sense
(Feb. 27, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2013/02/tax-policy-colloquium-
week-5-should-we.html (claiming that "no good consumption tax model" requires distin-
guishing between labor income and capital income).
261 Auerbach, note 33, at 40 ("[Tlhere are several attributes that define a consumption
tax and distinguish it from an income tax, although not all of these attributes are found in
every variant of the consumption tax."); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income
Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 Tax Notes 91, 100 (Apr. 5, 2004).
262 Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 246.
263 Carroll & Viard, note 24, at 33.
264 For more detailed explanations, see id. at 33-39.
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2. The Case for Supplementing Progressive Consumption Tax
Proposals with a Capital Income Tax
Under a pure X-tax, individual taxpayers would not be taxed on
dividends, interest payments, or other similar returns to investing.265
Supplementing the X-tax with a capital income tax thus would result
in these payments to individuals being taxed under the rates and rules
for the supplemental capital income tax. This tax could thus be struc-
tured similar to how capital income is taxed under the current U.S.
income tax. There are quite possibly better approaches for designing
a capital income tax to supplement an X-tax,266 but I discuss this ap-
proach for ease of exposition. For example, in November 2005, the
President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform recommended two alterna-
tive approaches for fundamental tax reform.267 One of these ap-
proaches-the so called "Growth and Investment Tax" or "GIT"-
combined an X-tax with a supplementary capital income tax that
would have levied a 15% tax rate on dividends, capital gains, and in-
terest income.268 The GIT was conceived of as a compromise between
consumption tax advocates and the defenders of capital income taxa-
tion, and the proposal does not appear to have been anyone's first
choice.269 Nevertheless, the GIT proposal provides an example for
how an X-tax might be supplemented with a capital income tax.
Under a pure PET, individual taxpayers would deduct savings and
would then be taxed on dissavings. 270 One approach for combining a
PET with a supplemental capital income tax would be to levy an addi-
tional tax on capital gains, interest, dividends, and similar returns to
investments-similar to how these items are taxed under the current
U.S. income tax. Thus, taxpayers who realized capital gains but then
reinvested those gains would be subject to only the supplemental capi-
tal income tax. In contrast, taxpayers who realized capital gains and
then used those gains to fund consumption would be subject to both
the PET tax rate and the supplemental capital income tax rate, as this
265 Earnings would be taxed at the business level under the VAT-component of the X-
tax, but would not be taxed again on distribution to stockowners. See Bankman & Schler,
note 32, at 245.
266 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 Am. Econ.
Rev. 167, 169 (1991) (proposing an alternative approach for taxing capital income);
Gergen, note 171, at 209-12 (evaluating alternative approaches for taxing capital income).
267 The President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-
Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System 59 (2005), www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/Simple-Fair-and-Pro-Growth-Proposals-to-Fix-Americas-
Tax-System 11 2005.pdf.
268 Id. For discussion, see Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform: Time for a Plan C?, Econo-
mist's Voice, Dec. 2005, at 1-2.
269 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of the Consumption Tax: A Historical
Perspective, 146 Tax Notes 247, 249-50 (Jan. 12, 2015).
270 See Carroll & Viard, note 24, at 33.
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would constitute both a realization of the gains and a form of dis-
saving. There are probably better alternative approaches that might
be used to supplement a PET with a capital income tax.271 But, for
now, I focus on this approach for ease of exposition.
Returning to the double-distortion argument for why capital in-
come should not be taxed, it is important to understand that: (1) be-
cause the tax base of only consumption (that is, of measured outflows)
is smaller than a tax base consisting of both consumption and capital
income (that is, of both measured outflows and measured apprecia-
tion), and (2) because capital income (that is, measured appreciation)
tends to be concentrated among higher-income taxpayers, a progres-
sive consumption tax must levy steeper statutory rates on higher-in-
come taxpayers as compared to an income tax with the same
distributional incidence. 272 Nevertheless, despite the progressive con-
sumption tax needing to levy higher statutory tax rates, the double-
distortion position concludes that the progressive consumption tax
would impose the same effective tax rates on labor supply decisions as
the income tax.273 Because one of the reasons that taxpayers work to
earn income is for the purpose of investing that income in order to
fund future consumption, taxing capital income reduces the returns to
work. Hence, under the assumptions of double-distortion arguments,
taxing capital income would induce the same labor-to-leisure distor-
tions as would taxing only labor income, in addition to also inducing
saving-to-spending distortions, such that it is strictly optimal to forgo
taxing capital income. 274
Based on this logic, consumption-tax advocates often criticize what
they call the "trade-off fallacy. '275 The trade-off fallacy refers to the
arguments sometimes made that, because a progressive consumption
tax would levy higher statutory tax rates on labor income, the progres-
sive consumption tax would distort labor supply decisions more than
would taxing both labor income (or consumption) and capital income.
The "trade-off" in this fallacy refers to the idea that an optimal tax
system should balance the concern of not distorting saving-to-spend-
ing decisions through capital income taxation against the concern of
not distorting labor-to-leisure decisions through labor income taxa-
271 My favored approach probably would be to allow a full deduction for invested funds
only for low- and moderate-income taxpayers, with the highest-income taxpayers being
allowed only a partial deduction. The nondeductible portion of invested funds could then
be tracked via a basis measurement. In future scholarship, I hope to elaborate on how this
approach could work and on its advantages over alternative approaches.
272 Carroll & Viard, note 24, at 41.
273 Id. at 18-19.
274 Id.
275 Id.; Bankman & Weisbach, Ideal Consumption Tax, note 13, at 1420, 1422-28.
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tion. Under the assumptions of the double-distortion models, there is
no trade-off, because taxing capital income would distort both saving-
to-spending decisions and labor-to-leisure decisions.
Yet even if consumption-tax advocates are correct about the trade-
off fallacy with respect to labor-to-leisure and saving-to-spending dis-
tortions, incorporating tax-gaming demonstrates that there is in fact a
trade-off between the single-instrument distortions generated by con-
sumption taxation and the single-instrument distortions generated by
capital income taxation.
Consider first the X-tax. At the individual level, taxpayers might
reduce their X-tax liabilities by (for instance) purchasing goods or ser-
vices from a vendor in a foreign country that does not levy a VAT.276
As noted earlier, there are also numerous tax-gaming techniques that
businesses might use to reduce their VAT liabilities under an X-tax.277
For the purposes of this Article, the key question is the extent to
which these tax-reduction techniques would constitute single-instru-
ment, multi-instrument, or instrument-shifting distortions, as com-
pared to a supplementary capital income tax. Remember that raising
revenues by supplementing an X-tax with a capital income tax would
allow a government to lower the statutory rates of both the VAT com-
ponent of the X-tax and the progressive rates levied on individuals'
salary incomes. These lower statutory rates should then decrease the
incentives for both business and individual taxpayers to engage in
many tax-gaming responses for reducing X-tax liabilities. 278 For in-
stance, consider a business taxpayer contemplating reducing its VAT
liability through inflating valuations in order to claim excess deduc-
tions.279 These techniques should directly reduce the business-taxpay-
ers' X-tax liabilities, implying that business-taxpayers' incentives to
engage in these techniques should be directly related to the rates of
the VAT component of the X-tax. In contrast, it is not clear what
effect adjusting the rates of the add-on capital income tax would have
on business taxpayers' incentives to engage in these transactions, as
these techniques would not directly affect any taxpayers' capital in-
276 See notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
277 See note 196 and accompanying text.
278 This is because, as explained in Section II.A., the marginal tax benefit derived from
engaging in many of these tax-gaming responses would be equal to the effective marginal
tax rate.
279 For further discussion of how such techniques might work, see, e.g., John W. Dia-
mond, Book Review, 61 Nat'l Tax. J. 337, 342 (2008) ("The most basic opportunity arises
because businesses may deduct the cost of any nonfinancial asset up to the point of elimi-
nating their entire tax liability .... This type of incentive would encourage some busi-
nesses to find or create a tax-evading seller and, thus, would be associated with large
revenue losses."); Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 248-49.
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come tax liabilities.280 Indeed, to the extent that business taxpayers'
motivations to engage in these techniques might be for the purpose of
maximizing profits so as to pay dividends to stockowners, levying a
supplementary capital income tax potentially could reduce incentives
to engage in these tax-gaming techniques, because any extra profits
generated by reducing X-tax liabilities would be subject to the supple-
mentary capital income tax on distribution to stockowners. Hence,
many (if not most) of the tax-gaming techniques through which tax-
payers might reduce their X-tax liabilities should at least partially con-
stitute either single-instrument or instrument-shifting distortions as
compared to a supplementary capital income tax.
Crucially, to the extent that the X-tax would generate any single-
instrument or instrument-shifting distortions as compared to a supple-
mentary capital income tax, a variation of the "trade-off fallacy"
would not in fact be a fallacy. Raising some portion of revenue
through a supplementary capital income tax would allow a govern-
ment to reduce the tax rates for the X-tax, which would thereby de-
crease taxpayers' incentives to engage in tax-reduction techniques that
constitute single-instrument distortions for the X-tax as compared to
the supplementary capital income tax. 281 Thus, even if the capital in-
come tax would generate much larger costs from single-instrument
distortions than would the X-tax (for any fixed amount of revenue to
be raised), overall distortionary costs could still be minimized by levy-
ing both an X-tax and a supplementary capital income tax, following
the tax-smoothing principle. 282 Certainly, it might be optimal to set
the tax rates for the supplementary capital income tax well below the
rates of the X-tax, depending on the relative elasticities of the single-
instrument distortions generated by the two forms of taxation. Never-
theless, minimizing distortionary costs would require positively taxing
capital income to at least some degree.
Moreover, in addition to single-instrument distortions, the X-tax
would also almost certainly generate instrument-shifting distortions
with respect to a supplementary capital income tax. Scholars such as
Diamond, Banks, and Saez have previously discussed the possibility of
instrument-shifting distortions as a general argument for why capital
income should be taxed.283 But a number of sophisticated consump-
tion tax advocates have claimed that a well-designed progressive con-
280 See Gamage, note 5, at 8 (discussing the analogous case of labor income taxes and
excise taxes).
281 See Diamond, note 279, at 342 (noting "the incentive to create new tax-planning
schemes to avoid the flat tax/X tax would be greater at the margin under a full repeal of
the income tax system").
282 See note 67 and accompanying text.
283 See Banks & Diamond, note 234, at 570-71; Diamond & Saez, note 182, at 181.
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sumption tax (like an X-tax) would not generate any instrument-
shifting distortions. 28 4 Yet this claim is almost certainly mistaken.
This Section argues that any plausible real world implementation of
an X-tax would almost certainly generate significant instrument-shift-
ing distortions as compared to a supplementary capital income tax.
For example, consider a taxpayer establishing a closely-held busi-
ness entity for which the taxpayer would then work as an employee.
X-tax proponents acknowledge that it is difficult for any tax system to
police the line between salary payments, on the one hand, and divi-
dends and other financial payments made to business owners, on the
other hand.28 5 Nevertheless, many X-tax proponents have argued
that, because any business-level earnings would be subject to the VAT
component of the X-tax, business owners would have no incentive to
recharacterize their salaries as dividends so long as the tax rate of the
VAT component of the X-tax were the same as that applied to sala-
ries.28 6 Yet this argument ignores the possibility of business taxpayers
using tax-gaming techniques to reduce their VAT liabilities287 and
then making payments to owners in the form of dividends instead of
salaries. In this fashion, individual taxpayers could transform their X-
tax liabilities into capital income tax liabilities. In the absence of a
supplementary capital income tax, then, to the extent that individual
taxpayers who own businesses could both circumvent the business-
level VAT liability and then characterize payments received from the
business as dividends, earnings attributed at the business level would
go untaxed. In contrast, incorporating a supplementary capital in-
come tax would make these earnings taxed at the rates of that tax.
Arguably, an X-tax perhaps might generate far less instrument-
shifting distortions than does the current U.S. income tax. But there
can be no doubt that business taxpayers would have ample opportu-
nity to use tax-gaming responses to reduce the effective rates of an X-
tax below the statutory rates.288 It is then virtually certain that some
taxpayers would seek to characterize what theoretically might be
thought of as labor income as dividends or as some other form of fi-
nancial payments from investing in businesses. Consequently, an X-
tax would almost certainly generate some amount of instrument-shift-
284 See Bankman & Weisbach, Ideal Consumption Tax, note 13, at 1422-28; Carroll &
Viard, note 24, at 74.
285 Carroll & Viard, note 24, at 74.
286 Id. Hence, X-tax advocates argue that the same tax rate should be set for the VAT
component of the X-tax as for the salary income of the highest-income individual
taxpayers.
287 See Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 246-71 (discussing tax avoidance techniques and
tax planning opportunities under the flat tax/X-tax).
288 See id.
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ing distortions as compared to a supplementary capital income tax,
and this places weight in favor of combining an X-tax with some form
of supplementary capital income tax so as to positively tax capital in-
come to at least some extent.28 9
In sum, an X-tax would almost certainly generate both single-instru-
ment and instrument-shifting distortions as compared to a supplemen-
tary capital income tax, and combining an X-tax with a capital income
tax should thus reduce overall distortionary costs as compared to levy-
ing only an X-tax. Moreover, beyond the specific tax-gaming tech-
niques discussed above, as Bankman and Schler explain: "Generally
it is the specific statutory language that creates loopholes. The real
test comes only after the drafting is complete. ... The biggest dangers
of a flat tax/Xtax are the flaws not yet identified, or even existing until
the specific statutory language is in place. ' '290 Thus, any plausible im-
plementation of an X-tax (or any other progressive consumption tax)
would almost certainly leave numerous openings for taxpayers to ex-
ploit through tax-gaming responses. It is difficult to predict precisely
how taxpayers might respond to a large-scale tax reform before that
reform has been implemented, but there is strong reason to infer that
at least some of the tax-reduction techniques whereby taxpayers
would reduce their X-tax liabilities would constitute single-instrument
or instrument-shifting distortions as compared to a supplementary
capital income tax.
The remaining consideration is overhead costs. For low- and mod-
erate-income taxpayers, the advantages of taxing capital income from
reducing overall distortionary costs might well be overpowered by the
disadvantages from increasing overhead costs. But I doubt that this
would be true with respect to the top portion of the best-off taxpayers.
As discussed earlier, marginal overhead costs are largely a function of
the number of taxpayers charged with compliance and remittance ob-
ligations, and prior studies suggest that most of these costs result from
the paperwork and reporting obligations imposed on taxpayers gener-
ally, rather than the sorts of costs that would be primarily associated
with the best-off taxpayers.291 For developed country governments
seeking to raise substantial revenues from the best-off taxpayers, then,
I tentatively infer that the reduction in overall distortionary costs that
could be achieved from combining an X-tax with a supplementary
capital income tax would greatly overpower any possible increase in
overhead costs, at least with respect to the top portion of the best-off
taxpayers.
289 See notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
290 Bankman & Schler, note 32, at 247.
291 See notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
2015]
TAX LAW REVIEW
It thus might be optimal to build a substantial exemption into the
supplementary capital income tax so that it would apply only for the
highest-income taxpayers. But, at a minimum, it seems probable that
an X-tax should be combined with some form of a supplementary cap-
ital income tax-that it is not optimal to forgo taxing capital income
all together.
The analysis of the PET is very similar. Many of the techniques that
taxpayers currently use to reduce their income tax liabilities presuma-
bly would remain available under the PET, as the PET would tax la-
bor income in essentially the same fashion as the current U.S. income
tax. Consequently, techniques such as inflating deductions or generat-
ing artificial losses generally should operate as single-instrument dis-
tortions for a PET as compared to a supplementary capital income
tax.292 Remember that, as compared to a PET plus a supplementary
capital income tax, a pure PET would need to levy higher statutory
tax rates on labor income.293 The tax benefit from techniques such as
inflating deductions thus would be larger under a pure PET as com-
pared to a PET plus a supplementary capital income tax. 294 Conse-
quently, many of the tax-gaming techniques through which taxpayers
would seek to reduce their PET liabilities should function as single-
instrument distortions as compared to a supplementary capital income
tax. For this reason, in light of the tax-smoothing principle, minimiz-
ing the costs from single-instrument distortions would require levying
both a PET and a supplementary capital income tax. 295
Additionally, it seems almost certain to me that a PET would gener-
ate significant instrument-shifting distortions as compared to a supple-
mentary capital income tax. I expect that taxpayers would devise
creative techniques for disguising consumption-related expenditures
as investment expenditures for which deductions could be taken
against PET liabilities.296 It is difficult to predict what specific tech-
niques of this sort might be successful in the absence of a detailed set
292 See Gamage, note 5, at 36-37 (discussing analogous techniques).
293 See note 272 and accompanying text.
294 Techniques such as inflating deductions should always reduce PET liabilities more
than liabilities under the add-on capital income tax, because the inflated deductions would
directly lower PET liabilities and would only indirectly affect capital income tax liabilities.
See Gamage, note 5, at 43-44 (discussing analogous techniques).
295 See note 282 and accompanying text.
296 For instance, taxpayers might "invest" in assets that offer investment incentives such
as fancy stockholder retreats. In theory, investment incentives of this sort should be taxa-
ble, but I doubt that they would be in practice. Relatedly, taxpayers might devise ways to
"invest" in real estate that they live in or vacation in or in other physical assets that they
make use of. For example, would a Picasso painting purchased partially in the hopes of its
increasing in value constitute consumption or investment? For these reasons, implement-
ing a PET would require drawing lines between true investments and consumption-related
"investments," and it seems rather unlikely that these lines could be drawn perfectly.
[Vol. 68:
THE CASE FOR TAXING
of rules for how the PET would be implemented.297 But I find it im-
plausible to think that a government could implement a PET without
leaving openings through which taxpayers could disguise at least some
consumption-related expenditures as deductible "investments. ' 298 To
the extent so, the PET would generate at least some amount of instru-
ment-shifting distortions as compared to a supplementary capital in-
come tax.
For the same reasons discussed previously with regard to the X-tax,
I tentatively infer that any increased overhead costs that might be gen-
erated by combining a PET with a supplementary capital income tax
would be more than overpowered by the reduction in distortionary
costs, at least with respect to the highest-income taxpayers. Of course,
the existing literature does not provide conclusive empirical evidence
on these questions. Nevertheless, considering that capital income is
highly concentrated amongst the best-off taxpayers, and that these
best-off taxpayers have historically been rather successful at develop-
ing tax-gaming responses to reduce their tax liabilities, I think it rea-
sonable to infer that it would be optimal to supplement progressive
consumption tax proposals with some form of capital income taxation.
In any case, considering the implications of tax-gaming responses,
the double-distortion arguments for not taxing capital income simply
do not hold. Without better information about the key empirical pa-
rameters, it is difficult to predict whether the optimal level of capital
income taxation should be small or substantial. But it seems highly
probable that capital income should be positively taxed at least to
some degree.
3. The Overall Case for Taxing Capital Income and Implications
for Fundamental Tax Reform
Beyond the discussion above, there is a vast literature analyzing a
variety of considerations that potentially might be relevant for deter-
mining the optimal level of capital income taxation.299 I hope to fur-
ther discuss how some of these considerations might interact with this
Article's analysis in future work. Nevertheless, so long as a labor in-
come tax or a progressive consumption tax would generate either sin-
gle-instrument or instrument-shifting distortions as compared to a
297 See note 290 and accompanying text.
298 Additionally, taxpayers might also devise techniques for using their accumulated sav-
ings to fund consumption without withdrawing those savings in a fashion that would lead to
being taxed under the PET. Although PET advocates argue that borrowing should be
taxed, I expect that taxpayers would devise techniques for effectively borrowing against
their accumulated savings while avoiding the PET's rules for taxing explicit borrowing.
299 See, e.g., Banks & Diamond, note 234, at 549; Auerbach, note 234, at 28-29.
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capital income tax, and so long as any additional overhead costs that
would be generated by levying a capital income tax would be over-
powered by the reduction in these distortionary costs, none of the ad-
ditional considerations discussed in the existing literature are likely to
defeat this Article's arguments for why it is probably optimal to tax
capital income at least to some degree. 300 Again, many additional
considerations may be relevant for answering the questions of deter-
mining how to optimally structure a capital income tax and the opti-
mal rates at which capital income should be taxed. But, based on the
current empirical literature, there is no convincing reason for inferring
that an optimal tax system should only tax labor income or consump-
tion-that capital income should not be taxed. Moreover, for anyone
who was already persuaded that capital income should be positively
taxed based on the arguments in the prior literature, this Article's
analysis implies that the optimal rates at which capital income should
be taxed are higher than what might be implied based only on these
prior arguments.30
Nevertheless, the conclusion that capital income should be posi-
tively taxed does not necessarily support maintaining the rules for tax-
ing capital income under the existing U.S. income tax. Quite
plausibly, the combination of a progressive consumption tax and a
supplementary capital income tax might do a better job of taxing even
300 The primary exception would be if taxing capital income induced sizeable saving-to-
spending responses and if savings behavior generated strong positive externalities. As
noted earlier, I am skeptical that real world capital income taxes generate large saving-to-
spending responses. See notes 239-241 and accompanying text. Moreover, considering the
recent environment in which interest rates have been low and macroeconomists have wor-
ried about a global savings glut, it seems unlikely that savings behavior generates suffi-
ciently large positive externalities to make it optimal to forgo taxing capital income all
together. See Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., The Global Savings Glut
and the U.S. Current Account Deficit, Remarks at the Sandbridge Lecture, Va. Assn of
Econ. (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocs/speeches/
2005/200503102/.
Another possible exception might be if taxing capital income unavoidably leads to differ-
entially taxing different forms of capital income and if levying only a progressive consump-
tion tax could make it possible to not differentially tax different forms of capital income.
However, in light of instrument-shifting distortions and possible techniques through which
taxpayers might be able to gain economic benefit from some forms of capital appreciation
while circumventing any plausible progressive consumption tax, it seems unlikely to me
that a consumption tax could actually eliminate the differential taxation of different forms
of capital income. Moreover, to the extent that differential taxation of capital income is an
inevitable result of taxing capital income positively, then it should follow that this probably
should be minimized by taxing capital income at a low rate, such that balancing this source
of distortion against other sources of distortion probably should require positive taxation
of capital income to at least some degree, in light of the tax-smoothing principle.
301 See notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
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capital income.30 2 More generally, there is a substantial literature an-
alyzing how the U.S. system for taxing capital income might be re-
formed.303 Numerous of these reform possibilities would perhaps be
superior to the current U.S. system for taxing capital income. Regard-
less, considering that capital income is highly concentrated among the
best-off taxpayers, and that these best-off taxpayers appear to be able
to circumvent both existing labor income and consumption taxes with
some ease, taxing capital income is likely to be one of the best options
available for supplementing labor income or consumption taxes in or-
der to raise revenue from the best-off taxpayers. 30 4
Integrating this Section's analysis with that of the previous Section,
there is reason to infer that the United States should probably levy
some version of (all of) a VAT, a labor income tax, and a capital in-
come tax. As this Section argued, both a VAT (such as the VAT com-
ponent of the X-tax) and a labor income tax (or a modified labor
income tax, such as a PET) are likely to induce both significant single-
instrument and instrument-shifting distortions as compared to a capi-
tal income tax. And as the previous Section argued, both a VAT and a
labor income tax are likely to induce significant single-instrument re-
sponses as compared to each other. It thus seems probable that over-
all distortionary costs could be significantly reduced by utilizing some
version of all three of these forms of taxation. In order to not exces-
sively increase overhead costs, it may be desirable to integrate these
three forms of taxation in some fashion,30 5 and perhaps to exempt all
but the best-off taxpayers from one or two of these forms of taxation.
Yet the case for levying some version of all three of these forms of
taxation seems fairly strong.
C. Comparing Realization-Based Capital income Taxes and
Annual-Valuation-Based Wealth Taxes
Even more so than with measured capital income, measured wealth
is highly concentrated among a small group of extremely well-off tax-
302 On this point, it is worth noting McCaffery's argument that the existing U.S. income
tax is devolving into a mere wage tax. Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of
Tax, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 807, 885-86 (2005).
303 See note 256.
304 Put another way, even if capital income taxes score only mediocre on the criteria of
distortionary costs and overhead costs, these tax instruments probably score sufficiently
well on the criterion of promoting distribution so as to raise capital income taxes to being
among the most promising of candidates for measurements that governments might use as
proxies for ability. See notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
305 See, e.g., notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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payers.306 Moreover, many of these wealthy taxpayers seem to have
been able to circumvent substantial portions of existing labor income
and capital income taxes, such that the effective tax rates faced by
these taxpayers sometimes appear to be lower than for many middle-
income taxpayers, at least as calculated with respect to a broad mea-
sure of economic income or well-being.30 7
To cite a well-known example, the billionaire Warren Buffet reports
being taxed at a lower effective rate than his secretary.30 8 And the
effective tax rates reported by Buffet are in a sense massively over-
stated, because these rates are based on realized income and do not
account for unrealized capital appreciation. 30 9 Accounting for unreal-
ized capital appreciation, some wealthy taxpayers are taxed at very
low effective rates under existing forms of taxation. 310
306 See Marco Cagetti & Mariacristina De Nardi, Wealth Inequality: Data and Models,
12 Macroeconomic Dynamics (Supp. 2) 285, 285 (2008).
307 See, e.g., Nat'l Econ. Council, The Buffet Rule: A Basic Principle of Tax Fairness 1
(2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/BuffettRule-ReportFi
nal.pdfl ("Some of the richest Americans pay extraordinarily low tax rates-as they hire
lawyers and accountants to take particular advantage of loopholes and tax expendi-
tures. ... Many high-income Americans are paying less in taxes than middle class Ameri-
cans in taxes."); Hanna, note 185, at 437-38; Shackelford, note 35, at 127 (explaining how
through the use of tax-gaming techniques "the capitalist can transform the income tax into
a somewhat voluntary assessment").
308 Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Buffet Slams Tax System Disparities: Speech Raises at
Least $1 Million for Clinton Campaign, Wash. Post, June 27, 2007, at D3 ("Last year, Buf-
fet said, he was taxed at 17.7 percent on his taxable income of more than $46 million. His
receptionist was taxed at about 30 percent."). Of course, the primary reason for this may
be the lower tax rate applied to capital gains.
309 See Hanna, note 185, at 437-38; David S. Miller, Reducing the Corporate Tax Rate
and Income Inequality 8 (Dec. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2544048 ("So while Warren Buffett may be the
greatest investor the world has ever seen, his vast wealth owes more to the absence of tax
than it does to his investing acumen. If Warren Buffett had been subject to tax each year
on his economic income, just as wage earners are, he would probably be worth about $9
billion today, or about one-eighth of his current net value of $72.9 billion."); Gene
Steuerle, The President's Capital Gains Proposals: An Opening for Business Tax Reform?,
Tax Vox (Feb. 6, 2015), http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2015/02/06/presidents-capital-
gains-proposals-opening-business-tax-reform/ ("But Buffett doesn't just pay a modest capi-
tal gains tax rate .... On his total economic income, including unrealized gains, it's doubt-
ful that his personal taxes add up to more than 5 percent.").
310 Unrealized capital appreciation should at least arguably be considered to be a form
of economic income, and so the effective tax rates faced by Buffet and many other wealthy
taxpayers are extremely low with respect to a broadly defined measure of economic in-
come. For further discussion, see id.; Miller, note 42, at A27 (advocating for the adoption
of a mark-to-market system of taxation on the top 0.1% of earners to address the problem
of untaxed unrealized capital appreciation); Steuerle, note 309 ("The very wealthy, moreo-
ver, tend to realize a fairly small share of their accrued gains and an even smaller share
than those who are merely wealthy. It makes sense: the nouveaux riche seldom become
wealthy unless they continually reinvest their earnings. And when they want to consume
more, they can do so through means other than selling assets, such as borrowing.").
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In light of this reality, for anyone desiring to raise additional reve-
nue from the best-off taxpayers, an annual wealth tax might seem like
an obvious solution.311 Even a wealth tax assessed at a low rate could
potentially raise significant revenues from wealthy taxpayers. For in-
stance, Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott recently estimated that a
2% annual wealth tax levied on U.S. households owning more than
$7.2 million in net assets (the top 0.5% of Americans in 2009) would
yield at least $70 billion a year in revenues. 312
Nevertheless, there has been little support for annual wealth taxes
in the existing academic literature.313 Based on double-distortion
models, there has been widespread agreement that annual wealth
taxes are essentially equivalent to capital income taxes. 314 The reason
is that both wealth taxes and capital income taxes induce both labor-
to-leisure and saving-to-spending distortions. Indeed, under standard
assumptions, wealth taxes and capital income taxes generate exactly
the same magnitude of labor-to-leisure and saving-to-spending distor-
tions, and so these two forms of taxation are typically viewed as creat-
ing equivalent distortionary costs. 315
Following the dominant view that capital income should not be
taxed, the economics-oriented literature thus has generally concluded
that wealth should also go untaxed.316 A few scholars have ques-
311 By "wealth tax" I mean a periodic levy assessed on the value of taxpayers' assets.
For discussion, see, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Commentary, What Can We Say About a
Wealth Tax?, 53 Tax L. Rev. 477, 477-78 (2000). At the U.S. federal level, there might be
constitutional impediments to some approaches for how an annual wealth tax might be
implemented. But these impediments would not apply to (for instance) state-level wealth
taxes. See Roy Ulrich, A Wealth Tax for the States, 75 St. Tax Notes 349, 349 (Feb. 9,
2015).
312 Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, Tax the Wealth: Target the Top of the Pyramid to
Protect America's Democracy, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 2011, at All; see also Deborah H.
Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L. Rev. 423,473 (2000) ("Even a
.4% [wealth] tax would yield about $97 billion.").
313 There has been dramatically increased discussion of wealth taxes since the recent
publication of Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014). So far, however, most of this discussion has been con-
fined to journalistic media and blogs, rather than academic publications. E.g., Clive Cook,
Piketty's Wealth Tax Isn't a Joke, Bloomberg View (May 11, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://
www.bloombergview.comlarticles/2014-05-11/picketty-s-wealth-tax-isn-t-a-joke. But see
Symposium on Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 68 Tax L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2015). Notably, Piketty's advocacy of wealth taxes has not yet been synthe-
sized with the relevant optimal-tax-theory literature.
314 See Bankman, note 311, at 486 ("noting the near identity between income and
wealth taxes").
315 See Kaplow, note 3, at 235-36 ("Although sometimes viewed as a different sort of
taxation, wealth taxes are, upon examination, simply a form of capital income taxation"
with "[t]he primary difference ... administrative."); Bankman, note 311, at 486.
316 Tyler Cowen, Wealth Taxes: The Future Battleground, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2013, at
BU6 ("Historically, economists ... have generally favored taxes on consumption [over
wealth taxes].").
TAX LAW REVIEW
tioned this dominant view to argue in favor of wealth taxes, but even
some of these scholars have proposed adopting wealth taxes as a re-
placement for capital income taxes.317 In contrast, applying this Arti-
cle's theoretical framework suggests that governments should perhaps
levy some form of both wealth taxes and capital income taxes, at least
with respect to the top portion of best-off taxpayers.
Although wealth taxes and capital income taxes may be similar with
respect to labor-to-leisure and savings-to-spending responses, these
forms of taxation are likely to be significantly different with respect to
many tax-gaming responses. If we conceive of capital income taxes as
being based on attempts at measuring appreciation, 318 then we might
conceive of wealth taxes as being based on attempts at measuring the
value of asset holdings. As with comparing forms of taxation based on
measurements of inflows, outflows, and appreciation, the base-calcu-
lation rules for forms of taxation designed to measure holdings are
likely to be rather different from those for forms of taxation designed
to measure appreciation.319 Thus, these two forms of taxation are
likely to induce rather different tax-gaming responses.
In other words, it is certainly true that both capital income taxes
and wealth taxes are related in that both of these forms of taxation
measure taxpayers' savings and investments. Nevertheless, whereas
capital income taxes measure the flows of investments (appreciation),
wealth taxes measure the stocks of investments (holdings). These
measurements tend to be substantially different in practice.
More specific analysis requires being more precise about possible
implementations of capital income taxes and wealth taxes. 320 Most
real world capital income taxes are based on a realization require-
ment, whereby tax is only due on sale of appreciated assets or on
317 See e.g., Schenk, note 312, at 424-25. More generally, the prior scholars who have
argued in favor of a wealth tax have not done so on the grounds proposed in this Article-
that levying both a wealth tax and a capital income tax would raise revenues from the best-
off taxpayers while inducing smaller overall distortionary costs. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman
& Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 94-112 (1999) (arguing for a wealth tax primarily
on philosophical grounds related to equality of opportunity).
318 See Subsection III.B.1.
319 From an ex ante perspective, wealth taxes and capital income taxes may seem simi-
lar, as the value of asset holdings is largely a function of expected appreciation over time.
Yet the real world tax instruments typically referred to as capital income taxes are designed
to measure appreciation that has already occurred, not expected future appreciation.
Thus, the base-calculation rules for capital income taxes and for wealth taxes are designed
with different measurement objectives and are thus likely to be substantially different in
practice.
320 For a general discussion of the implementation issues involved in wealth taxation, see
David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 Tax. L. Rev. 499, 526-
31 (2000).
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some other realization event.321 There are perhaps other ways to de-
sign a capital income tax.322 But to keep the exposition tractable, I
focus on comparing annual wealth taxes to realization-based capital
income taxes. In any case, according to Deborah Schenk, "it is highly
unlikely that any adoptable form of a [capital] income tax would elim-
inate the realization rule for all capital. '323
Accordingly, the most important tax-gaming responses used to cir-
cumvent most real world capital income taxes typically involve taking
advantage of the realization requirement. 324 Indeed, the realization
requirement has been called the Achilles' heel of taxing capital in-
come.325 The reason is that the realization requirement creates strong
incentives for taxpayers to forgo transactions that would result in the
taxation of unrealized capital appreciation. To the extent that taxpay-
ers with unrealized capital appreciation need money to fund consump-
tion or to diversify their investment portfolios, the taxpayers can often
borrow against their appreciated assets or otherwise engage in forms
of financial arbitrage so as to achieve their economic goals without
triggering tax realization.326
In contrast, there is no realization requirement for most wealth
taxes. Wealth taxes typically are measured based on the value of as-
sets owned, rather than on the appreciation of assets for which there
has been a sale or other market exchange. Thus, the most important
tax-gaming responses for wealth taxes typically involve exploiting val-
uation problems, as it is often difficult to value the components of
taxpayers' wealth. 327
Valuation problems tend to be less severe for publically traded
stock and for similar assets for which there is a robust market that
produces regular valuations. Conversely, valuation problems tend to
be more severe for assets like land, closely held businesses, and
321 Under the realization requirement, capital income taxes are not assessed when capi-
tal assets increase in value over time. Instead, these taxes are only assessed when a tax-
payer sells capital assets for a profit or otherwise disposes of appreciated capital assets.
See, e.g., IRC § 1001.
322 See note 266. But see Schenk, note 312, at 424 ("The realization requirement essen-
tially makes the tax on capital income avoidable and so far no one has offered an effective
stratagem to limit this.").
323 Schenk, note 312, at 428.
324 See id. at 424 ("The realization requirement, which is easily manipulated, makes it
possible for the well-advised and wealthy taxpayer at least to defer, and frequently to elim-
inate, tax on most capital income.").
325 William D. Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in New
Directions in Federal Tax Policy for the 1980s, at 278, 280 (Charls E. Walker & Mark A.
Bloomfield eds., 1983).
326 Gamage, note 5, at 38-39.
327 See Bankman, note 311, at 478 ("The downsides to an annual wealth-based tax are
the related problems of liquidity and valuation.").
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unique items like artwork. Some wealth tax proposals thus would
limit the base of the wealth tax to only financial assets that are rela-
tively easy to value. 328 But doing so would create incentives for
wealthy taxpayers to substitute away from investing in these easier-to-
value taxable assets in favor of investing in harder-to-value assets that
would be exempt from wealth taxation. Moreover, even applying a
wealth tax to all assets would not fully alleviate these distortionary
incentives, as taxpayers could use a variety of techniques for reporting
low valuation estimates for their harder-to-value assets to the tax au-
thority, thus making it likely that harder-to-value assets would often
be taxed at lower effective rates, 329 and thereby creating incentives for
taxpayers to substitute into holding harder-to-value assets.
Consequently, much of the tax-gaming responsiveness to realiza-
tion-based capital income taxes should largely operate as single-in-
strument distortions when comparing a realization-based capital
income tax to an annual-valuation-based wealth tax, and vice versa.
Ultimately, it is difficult to effectively tax the best-off taxpayers under
either a wealth tax or a capital income tax. But it is also difficult to
effectively tax the best-off taxpayers under labor income taxes, con-
sumption taxes, or any other real world forms of taxation. 330 Because
the major tax-gaming techniques for reducing wealth-tax liabilities
(valuation games) are substantially different from the major tech-
niques for reducing capital income tax liabilities (realization games),
utilizing some version of both of these forms of taxation should have
the potential to significantly reduce the overall distortionary costs
from tax-gaming responses.331
Levying both a capital income tax and a wealth tax might signifi-
cantly increase overhead costs as compared to utilizing only one of
these forms of taxation. Thus, the potential advantages of utilizing
both forms of taxation from reducing the distortionary costs from sin-
gle-instrument responses (and also from reducing instrument-shifting
328 See Schenk, note 312, at 455 ("One also might consider sacrificing some elements of
the wealth tax base to promote ease of valuation. For example, exemptions for extremely
hard-to-value items might eliminate controversy, although they would decrease revenue
and would distort investment decisions.").
329 See Shackelford, note 35, at 127-29 (describing several techniques to exploit valua-
tion in the context of transfer taxes).
330 See notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
331 Of course, some tax-gaming responses may operate as multi-instrument distortions
capable of reducing both wealth and capital income tax liabilities, such as tax-evasion tech-
niques involving hiding capital assets in foreign bank accounts. Nevertheless, in light of the
above analysis, there is strong reason for inferring that a considerable portion of the re-
sponsiveness to both wealth taxes and capital income taxes represents single-instrument
distortions as compared to the other form of taxation.
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responses, if there are any332), as adjusted for distributional incidence,
must be weighed against the potential for increasing overhead costs.
Yet, as discussed previously, overhead costs are largely a function of
the number of taxpayers charged with remittance obligations. Ac-
cordingly, at least if revenue or distributional needs are high enough,
it seems probable that levying both a capital income tax and a wealth
tax with respect to the best-off taxpayers should have the potential to
reduce distortionary costs in excess of any possible increase to over-
head costs.
For these reasons, although we lack the empirical estimates needed
to evaluate this conclusion with any certainty, the potential to raise
significant revenues and to promote substantial distributional equity
through levying a wealth tax even as applied to only the best-off frac-
tion of a percent of taxpayers would seem to support the inference
that the potential for reducing distortionary costs through levying a
wealth tax probably outweighs the possibility of increasing overhead
costs. Moreover, in light of the massive concentration of wealth in
many countries,333 and the evidence suggesting that wealth concentra-
tions may be increasing over time,334 the case for levying a wealth tax
may well grow stronger over the coming years. 335
IV. CONCLUSION
I argued above that forms of taxation measuring inflows, outflows,
appreciation, and holdings all tend to use rather different base-calcu-
lation rules, and that plausible implementations of these forms of tax-
ation tend to induce significantly different tax-gaming distortions.
Each of these measurements is correlated with "ability" in that better-
off taxpayers tend to have much larger inflows, outflows, appreciation,
and holdings as compared to worse-off taxpayers. Therefore, because
each of these forms of taxation tends to induce significantly different
distortionary responses as compared to the other forms of taxation,
each of these measurements should be independently correlated with
ability.336 Accordingly, in light of the tax-smoothing principle, I infer
332 It is unclear to me whether capital income taxes and wealth taxes are likely to induce
significant instrument-shifting distortions as compared to each other.
333 See notes 250, 306, AND ACCOMPANYING TEXT.
334 See Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman, Capital Is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in
Rich Countries 1700-2010, 129 Q.J. Econ. 1255, 1308 (2014) (observing "aggregate wealth
has risen from about 200-300% of national income in 1970 to a range of 400-600% today");
see also Tyler Cowen, Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great
Stagnation 4, 229-30 (2013).
335 Cowen, note 316.
336 In other words, because taxpayers respond to each of these tax instruments in differ-
ent ways, and because each of these tax instruments measures a different proxy for ability,
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that governments probably should adopt some approach for taxing all
of labor income, consumption, capital income, and wealth.
These conclusions are somewhat tentative in that we lack quantita-
tive estimates for the marginal overhead costs of implementing these
forms of taxation. Also, I have not (in this Article) discussed political
economy considerations or other potential complicating factors.337
Nevertheless, I have argued that it tentatively seems probable that the
potential for reducing distortionary costs from levying some version of
all of these forms of taxation would overpower the possible increase
to overhead costs, at least if the government's revenue and distribu-
tional goals are high enough, and at least with respect to the top por-
tion of best-off taxpayers. If others disagree with these inferences,
then it is my hope that scholarly debate over the plausible range of the
key empirical parameters might help both to refine our assessments of
these parameters and to motivate empirical researchers to further
study these parameters. At the very least, I believe I have demon-
strated that the double-distortion arguments for why governments
should primarily rely on only either a labor income tax or a progres-
sive consumption tax are unpersuasive as applied to real world tax
policy environments. In contrast to the conclusions of Bankman and
Weisbach and numerous other tax scholars, double-distortion reason-
ing does not support governments forgoing the taxation of capital in-
come and wealth.
Ultimately, much of the art of analyzing fundamental tax reform
proposals lies in determining what packages of reforms are worth
comparing.338 I argued that levying some version of a labor income
tax, a value-added consumption tax, a capital income tax, and a wealth
tax is probably superior to not levying any version of one or more of
these forms of taxation. But this analysis only begins the task of com-
levying each of these tax instruments should provide at least some information about tax-
payers' ability that is not provided by the other tax instruments. The question then be-
comes whether each of these measurements generates sufficient incremental information
about taxpayers' ability to justify the overhead costs required to elicit each of these
measurements.
337 See Gamage, note 5, at 50-72.
338 For instance, rather than supplementing the U.S. income tax with a VAT, might it be
optimal to instead design a new Alternative Minimum Tax based on measuring expendi-
tures? I expect not. But some approach for integrating an income tax and a VAT might
well be superior to levying both as separate tax systems. In this light, Michael Graetz's
proposal'for combining a VAT with an income tax applied to only the best-off taxpayers
seems especially promising as a candidate for further consideration. See note 218 and ac-
companying text. Tentatively, it strikes me that incorporating an Alternative Minimum
Capital Income Tax designed around measuring wealth might be a promising approach for
levying a hybrid between a wealth tax and a capital income tax. This approach might help
to address the concern of liquidity in designing the wealth tax and also might help to allevi-
ate some of the political opposition to levying a wealth tax.
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paring alternative possibilities for implementing or integrating these
forms of taxation, or the task of comparing the use of these forms of
taxation to other potential alternatives.
In a sense, then, I am proposing that this Article's framework can
be applied to analyze fundamental tax reform possibilities through a
tournament of competing reform proposals. This Article in no way
purports to have discovered the most optimal of all possible tax re-
forms (that is, the ultimate winner of the tax reform tournament). In-
stead, I only argued that levying all of a labor income tax, a VAT, a
capital income tax, and a wealth tax should advance to round two of
this tournament over the first round competitor of not levying any
version of one or more of these forms of taxation. I would not be
surprised if-in some future round of this metaphorical tournament-
the proposal of levying each of these forms of taxation as independent
tax systems might lose out to the competitor of some approach for
integrating these forms of taxation. Put another way, future scholar-
ship might evaluate how approaches for implementing each of these
forms of taxation could be designed and integrated so as to more ac-
curately target the holes in the other forms of taxation.
Were a government to adopt some approach for taxing all of labor
income, consumption, capital income, and wealth, should the govern-
ment then also employ other additional supplementary forms of taxa-
tion? The answer is very likely to be yes. There might well be a
number of other possible supplementary tax instruments for which the
potential for reducing distortionary costs might justify possibly in-
creasing overhead costs, at least if a government's revenue or distribu-
tional needs were high enough. Thus, the case for designing at least
some legal rules to promote marginal amounts of distributional equity
should remain strong even if the United States were to supplement its
income tax with both a VAT and an annual wealth tax.339 Other ma-
jor tax policy debates that might be fruitfully analyzed using this Arti-
cle's theoretical framework include the use of corporate income taxes,
estate and gift taxes, international tax rules, tariffs, gross receipts
taxes, Pigouvian taxes, and many others.
339 As discussed in the prior Article, for many legal rules, there is no particular reason to
expect that adjusting the design of the legal rules to promote marginal amounts of distribu-
tion would increase overhead costs. Thus, as long as the tax system continues to generate
significant single-instrument distortions as compared to promoting distribution through the
design of the legal rules in question, the case for designing the legal rules to promote
marginal amounts of distribution should remain strong. To the extent that levying supple-
mentary tax instruments (or otherwise improving the design of the tax system) would re-
duce the single-instrument distortions generated by the tax system, this would reduce the
extent to which it would be optimal to promote distributional equity through the design of
the legal rules, but the optimal amount of distribution that should be promoted through
the design of the legal rules should remain positive. Gamage, note 5, at 72-84.
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This Article's theoretical framework can also assist in identifying
existing forms of taxation that perhaps should be abolished. For in-
stance, I noted earlier that the U.S. AMT relies on very similar base-
calculation rules to the regular income tax.340 Thus, most of the re-
sponsiveness to these two forms of taxation likely constitutes multi-
instrument distortions as compared to the other form of taxation. Yet
the evidence suggests that the AMT generates substantial marginal
overhead costs by imposing calculation and reporting obligations on
numerous taxpayers. 341 This Article's theoretical framework thus
does not support maintaining the AMT, at least in its current form.342
Beyond applying the theoretical framework as it was developed in
this and the prior Article, future scholarship might also evaluate refin-
ing or expanding the framework along numerous possible dimensions.
For instance, there may be insight to be gleaned from further analyz-
ing the distributional implications of tax-gaming responses, so as to
consider how supplementary forms of taxation might be better tai-
lored to focus on raising greater revenues from those taxpayers who
are best able to circumvent existing forms of taxation through gaming
responses. 343 Another question worthy of further investigation is the
extent to which reforming existing tax systems might be a complement
or a supplement to levying additional forms of taxation so as to make
up for the flaws in the existing tax systems.
Many additional questions might also merit further research. Tax
reform is frustratingly complex, reflecting the multitude of ways in
which tax systems interact with the modern global economy. 344 Policy
relevant scholarship must thus navigate between "the rock" of being
340 See note 164 and accompanying text.
341 Allen H. Lerman & Peter S. Lee, Evaluating the Ability of the Individual Taxpayer
Burden Model to Measure Components of Taxpayer Burden: The Alternative Minimum
Tax as a Case Study, in Proceedings of the 2004 IRS Research Conference 139, 150-67
(2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04lerman.pdf.
342 Instead of abolishing the AMT, might it be optimal to redesign the AMT based on
substantially different base-calculation rules? Perhaps, and thus an interesting question for
future research might be to compare levying an AMT based on substantially different
base-calculation rules to instead levying multiple separate forms of taxation.
343 In a sense, I am suggesting that the theoretical framework perhaps could be im-
proved by refining the framework in light of the scholarship on "tagging for ability." See
Gamage, note 5, at 52-53. A key question for such a project would be how to identify
observable characteristics of taxpayers that are correlated with the taxpayers' proclivities
to engage in tax-gaming responses. For prior scholarship related to these questions, see
David Gamage, A Way Forward for Tax Law and Economics? A Response to Osofsky's
"Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design," 62 Buff. L. Rev. 189, 190 (2014); Leigh Osof-
sky, Who's Naughty and Who's Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 Buff.
L. Rev. 1057, 1058-59, 1074-1081 (2013).
344 See e.g., James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 Tax L. Rev. 7,
11-13 (1989); Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and
Proposals, 45 Tax L. Rev. 121, 123-24 (1989).
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so abstract as to be irrelevant and "the hard place" of analyzing so
much detail as to yield no useful insight.345 To better traverse these
turbulent waters of tax reform, tax legal scholarship should focus
more on the sorts of efficiency costs that the empirical literature sug-
gests may be the most important-specifically, tax-gaming distortions
and administrative and compliance costs. Analysis of these factors is
the most promising route for how tax legal scholars can inform real
world tax policy.
345 See notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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